mirror of
https://github.com/lux-apps/papers.git
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zeekay
dd93cb41f7
Sweep across the non-Tier-1 paper catalogue (Tier-1 owned by parallel
agent and excluded). All 113 processed papers already had luxcover
wired up; this commit fixes 14 build breakers and produces fresh
PDFs across the catalogue.
Fixes:
- lux-blockchain-scaling-laws: em-dash inside lstlisting -> --
- lux-corona-pq: stale \input pointing at 03-the-corona-scheme renamed
to 03-the-corona-scheme (file already renamed on disk)
- lux-lattice-cryptography-primer: same Corona->Corona rename
- lux-formal-verification-lean4: Lean source uses unicode (×, ∀, ∃, ∈,
∧, ∨, ∩, ≠, ⟨, ⟩, ·, ¬) inside lstlistings. Added a literate map
so listings render the math glyphs without UTF-8 fault.
- lux-id-did-specification: ✓/✗ in tabular replaced with \ding{51}
/ \ding{55} (pifont). Added pifont package.
- lux-ntt-simd-implementation: middle-dot in Go assembly listings;
added literate {·}{\textperiodcentered}.
- lux-ntt-transform: μ, ×, –, — in regular text (no T1 fontenc).
Replaced with $\mu$/$\times$/--/--- via unicode->latex sweep.
- lux-perpetuals-derivatives, lux-quantum-consensus,
lux-quasar-consensus, lux-tee-computing-mesh: same unicode->latex
sweep across body text. Also fixed broken math segment
`$L_{avg} = 10$\times$$` -> `$L_{avg} = 10\times$`.
- lux-zchain: emoji glyphs in roadmap table replaced with
parenthetical text.
- lux-triple-proof-consensus: dropped duplicate \usepackage{geometry}
that clashed with luxcover (geometry option clash).
- pq: defined missing \Rq macro.
PDFs rebuilt for the full Tier-2/3 set.
Excluded (Tier-1, parallel agent): lp-073-pulsar, lp-stricte2epq,
dag-evm-formal, lp-010-quasar-stm-{3,4}, lp-020-quasar-consensus,
lux-institutional-custody, lux-nist-mptc-submission, pqsafe-il5,
pq-rns, plus shared/ and lps/.
52 lines
2.5 KiB
TeX
52 lines
2.5 KiB
TeX
\documentclass[11pt,a4paper]{article}
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\usepackage{../shared/luxcover}
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\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
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\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
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\usepackage{amsmath,amssymb,amsfonts,amsthm}
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\usepackage{hyperref}
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\usepackage{booktabs}
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\usepackage{enumitem}
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\usepackage{algorithm}
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\usepackage{algpseudocode}
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\usepackage{xcolor}
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\usepackage{tikz}
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\usetikzlibrary{arrows.meta,positioning,shapes.geometric,fit}
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\hypersetup{colorlinks=true,linkcolor=black,citecolor=blue,urlcolor=blue}
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\newtheorem{theorem}{Theorem}[section]
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\newtheorem{lemma}[theorem]{Lemma}
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\newtheorem{definition}{Definition}[section]
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\newtheorem{invariant}{Invariant}[section]
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\title{Security Architecture for\\Multi-Chain Networks}
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\author{
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Zach Kelling \\
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Lux Industries, Inc.\\
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\texttt{[email protected]}
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}
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\date{Original: 2023\quad|\quad Revised: February 2026}
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\begin{document}
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\luxcoverpage
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\begin{abstract}
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We analyze the security architecture of multi-chain blockchain networks where multiple specialized chains share a common validator set. The Lux Network operates three primary chains (P-Chain for platform governance, X-Chain for asset transfers, C-Chain for EVM computation) plus application-specific chains (D-Chain DEX, F-Chain FHE, M-Chain MPC, G-Chain GraphQL). Security in this architecture is not the security of any individual chain---it is the security of the cross-chain composition. We identify four classes of cross-chain attack: bridge exploits via message forgery, replay attacks across chain boundaries, finality mismatch exploitation, and validator set desynchronization. We formalize the security inheritance model by which application chains derive their security from the primary network's shared validator set and triple-proof consensus. We specify the Warp messaging protocol's authenticated cross-chain communication, including domain separators, typed payload hashing, and nonce tracking. We prove that triple-proof finality propagation across chains ensures that a transaction finalized on any chain is finalized on all chains within one epoch (1 second).
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\end{abstract}
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\input{sections/01-introduction}
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\input{sections/02-chain-architecture}
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\input{sections/03-trust-separation-model}
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\input{sections/04-cross-chain-attack-surfaces}
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\input{sections/05-warp-messaging-protocol}
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\input{sections/06-replay-protection}
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\input{sections/07-security-inheritance-for-application-cha}
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\input{sections/08-triple-proof-finality-propagation}
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\input{sections/09-quantitative-security-analysis}
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\input{sections/99-conclusion}
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\end{document}
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