Files
papers/lux-decentralized-cloud/lux-decentralized-cloud.tex
zeekay dd93cb41f7 papers: cover-consistency + build pass on Lux Tier-2/3 catalogue
Sweep across the non-Tier-1 paper catalogue (Tier-1 owned by parallel
agent and excluded). All 113 processed papers already had luxcover
wired up; this commit fixes 14 build breakers and produces fresh
PDFs across the catalogue.

Fixes:
- lux-blockchain-scaling-laws: em-dash inside lstlisting -> --
- lux-corona-pq: stale \input pointing at 03-the-corona-scheme renamed
  to 03-the-corona-scheme (file already renamed on disk)
- lux-lattice-cryptography-primer: same Corona->Corona rename
- lux-formal-verification-lean4: Lean source uses unicode (×, ∀, ∃, ∈,
  ∧, ∨, ∩, ≠, ⟨, ⟩, ·, ¬) inside lstlistings. Added a literate map
  so listings render the math glyphs without UTF-8 fault.
- lux-id-did-specification: ✓/✗ in tabular replaced with \ding{51}
  / \ding{55} (pifont). Added pifont package.
- lux-ntt-simd-implementation: middle-dot in Go assembly listings;
  added literate {·}{\textperiodcentered}.
- lux-ntt-transform: μ, ×, –, — in regular text (no T1 fontenc).
  Replaced with $\mu$/$\times$/--/--- via unicode->latex sweep.
- lux-perpetuals-derivatives, lux-quantum-consensus,
  lux-quasar-consensus, lux-tee-computing-mesh: same unicode->latex
  sweep across body text. Also fixed broken math segment
  `$L_{avg} = 10$\times$$` -> `$L_{avg} = 10\times$`.
- lux-zchain: emoji glyphs in roadmap table replaced with
  parenthetical text.
- lux-triple-proof-consensus: dropped duplicate \usepackage{geometry}
  that clashed with luxcover (geometry option clash).
- pq: defined missing \Rq macro.

PDFs rebuilt for the full Tier-2/3 set.

Excluded (Tier-1, parallel agent): lp-073-pulsar, lp-stricte2epq,
dag-evm-formal, lp-010-quasar-stm-{3,4}, lp-020-quasar-consensus,
lux-institutional-custody, lux-nist-mptc-submission, pqsafe-il5,
pq-rns, plus shared/ and lps/.
2026-05-13 01:27:59 -07:00

82 lines
3.0 KiB
TeX

\documentclass[11pt,a4paper]{article}
\usepackage{../shared/luxcover}
\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
\usepackage{amsmath,amssymb,amsfonts,amsthm}
\usepackage{graphicx}
\usepackage{hyperref}
\usepackage{algorithm}
\usepackage{algpseudocode}
\usepackage{booktabs}
\usepackage{multirow}
\usepackage{array}
\usepackage{xcolor}
\usepackage{float}
\usepackage{enumitem}
\usepackage{mathtools}
\usepackage{tikz}
\usetikzlibrary{arrows.meta,positioning,shapes.geometric,calc}
\newtheorem{theorem}{Theorem}
\newtheorem{lemma}[theorem]{Lemma}
\newtheorem{proposition}[theorem]{Proposition}
\newtheorem{definition}{Definition}
\newtheorem{corollary}[theorem]{Corollary}
\newtheorem{remark}{Remark}
\hypersetup{
colorlinks=true,
linkcolor=blue,
citecolor=blue,
urlcolor=blue
}
\title{\textbf{The Decentralized Cloud: Providers as Relays, Storage, and Compute Markets}\\[6pt]
\large Service Markets with User-Owned Keys and Exit Rights\\on Lux Network}
\author{
Zach Kelling\thanks{Corresponding author: [email protected]}\\
\textit{Lux Industries}\\
\texttt{[email protected]}
}
\date{2025}
\begin{document}
\luxcoverpage
\begin{abstract}
We present the Lux provider model, a decentralized cloud architecture in which
infrastructure providers operate as service markets rather than data custodians.
In the centralized cloud, the provider is the owner: it holds user keys, controls
data at rest, and imposes switching costs that make exit prohibitively expensive.
The Lux model inverts this relationship. Users hold their own encryption keys in
capsule vaults. Providers compete on relay latency, storage durability, compute
throughput, and recovery guarantees---never on data lock-in. Every service
interaction produces a chain receipt on the Lux P-Chain, creating a tamper-evident
audit trail for SLA enforcement without requiring trust in any single provider.
We formalize five provider roles (relay, storage, gateway, recovery, compute),
define a stake-weighted reputation protocol that measures provider quality without
surveilling user traffic, introduce a bid/ask market for inference, storage, and
bandwidth with on-chain settlement, and prove that the provider portability
guarantee---users can switch providers without data loss or service interruption---holds
under Byzantine fault assumptions with up to $f < n/3$ malicious providers. We
compare the economic and sovereignty properties of the Lux provider model against
AWS, GCP, Vercel, and Fly.io, demonstrating that decentralized service markets
achieve comparable performance with strictly superior user sovereignty and exit rights.
\end{abstract}
\input{sections/01-introduction}
\input{sections/02-provider-model}
\input{sections/03-provider-reputation-without-surveillance}
\input{sections/04-sla-enforcement-via-chain-receipts}
\input{sections/05-compute-and-resource-markets}
\input{sections/06-provider-portability}
\input{sections/07-comparison-with-centralized-clouds}
\input{sections/08-economic-model}
\input{sections/09-related-work}
\input{sections/99-conclusion}
\end{document}