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44 lines
2.0 KiB
TeX
44 lines
2.0 KiB
TeX
\section{Security Analysis}
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%%==========================================================================
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\subsection{Validator Incentive Alignment}
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The proposed mechanisms are incentive-compatible in the following sense:
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\begin{theorem}[Validator Truthfulness]
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Under Mechanism C with the SSF protocol, it is a dominant strategy for validators to
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truthfully report their capacity $K$ and honestly participate in appchains they have opted into.
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\end{theorem}
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\begin{proof}[Proof Sketch]
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Overstating $K$ leads to accepting more appchains than the validator can serve, triggering
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liveness faults and reputation slashing. Understating $K$ forgoes positive-value
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opportunities. Hence truthful reporting maximizes expected utility. Dishonest participation
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(agreeing to validate but not validating) triggers liveness slash penalties that exceed
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the validator's potential gain from saved resources.
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\end{proof}
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\subsection{Collusion Resistance}
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A coalition of validators might coordinate to extract MEV without sharing proceeds
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through the CSMO mechanism. The CSMO is resistant to such collusion because:
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\begin{enumerate}[leftmargin=1.5em]
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\item Lux Teleport bridges emit on-chain events visible to the CSMO oracle;
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\item Any cross-appchain arbitrage that bypasses the CSMO auction is detectable by
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comparing Lux Teleport event timestamps with block production timestamps;
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\item Detected collusion triggers a reputation slash of 50 points per incident.
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\end{enumerate}
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\subsection{Economic Attack Resistance}
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We consider an attacker who creates many low-cost appchains to manipulate the SSF
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distribution (collecting SSF revenue by artificially inflating appchain transaction counts).
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The SSF formula (Eq.~\ref{eq:surcharge}) ties surcharge amounts to observed security
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$\Pi(s)$, which requires real staked capital. An attacker cannot inflate transaction
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count without also posting economic collateral proportional to their claimed security,
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making the attack unprofitable.
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%%==========================================================================
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