mirror of
https://github.com/lux-apps/papers.git
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zeekay
dd93cb41f7
Sweep across the non-Tier-1 paper catalogue (Tier-1 owned by parallel
agent and excluded). All 113 processed papers already had luxcover
wired up; this commit fixes 14 build breakers and produces fresh
PDFs across the catalogue.
Fixes:
- lux-blockchain-scaling-laws: em-dash inside lstlisting -> --
- lux-corona-pq: stale \input pointing at 03-the-corona-scheme renamed
to 03-the-corona-scheme (file already renamed on disk)
- lux-lattice-cryptography-primer: same Corona->Corona rename
- lux-formal-verification-lean4: Lean source uses unicode (×, ∀, ∃, ∈,
∧, ∨, ∩, ≠, ⟨, ⟩, ·, ¬) inside lstlistings. Added a literate map
so listings render the math glyphs without UTF-8 fault.
- lux-id-did-specification: ✓/✗ in tabular replaced with \ding{51}
/ \ding{55} (pifont). Added pifont package.
- lux-ntt-simd-implementation: middle-dot in Go assembly listings;
added literate {·}{\textperiodcentered}.
- lux-ntt-transform: μ, ×, –, — in regular text (no T1 fontenc).
Replaced with $\mu$/$\times$/--/--- via unicode->latex sweep.
- lux-perpetuals-derivatives, lux-quantum-consensus,
lux-quasar-consensus, lux-tee-computing-mesh: same unicode->latex
sweep across body text. Also fixed broken math segment
`$L_{avg} = 10$\times$$` -> `$L_{avg} = 10\times$`.
- lux-zchain: emoji glyphs in roadmap table replaced with
parenthetical text.
- lux-triple-proof-consensus: dropped duplicate \usepackage{geometry}
that clashed with luxcover (geometry option clash).
- pq: defined missing \Rq macro.
PDFs rebuilt for the full Tier-2/3 set.
Excluded (Tier-1, parallel agent): lp-073-pulsar, lp-stricte2epq,
dag-evm-formal, lp-010-quasar-stm-{3,4}, lp-020-quasar-consensus,
lux-institutional-custody, lux-nist-mptc-submission, pqsafe-il5,
pq-rns, plus shared/ and lps/.
52 lines
2.4 KiB
TeX
52 lines
2.4 KiB
TeX
\documentclass[11pt,a4paper]{article}
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\usepackage{../shared/luxcover}
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\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
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\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
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\usepackage{amsmath,amssymb,amsfonts,amsthm}
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\usepackage{hyperref}
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\usepackage{booktabs}
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\usepackage{enumitem}
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\usepackage{algorithm}
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\usepackage{algpseudocode}
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\usepackage{xcolor}
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\usepackage{tikz}
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\usetikzlibrary{arrows.meta,positioning,shapes.geometric,fit}
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\hypersetup{colorlinks=true,linkcolor=black,citecolor=blue,urlcolor=blue}
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\newtheorem{theorem}{Theorem}[section]
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\newtheorem{lemma}[theorem]{Lemma}
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\newtheorem{definition}{Definition}[section]
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\newtheorem{property}{Property}[section]
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\title{FHE + MPC Hybrid Systems\\for Trustless Private Computation}
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\author{
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Zach Kelling \\
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Lux Industries, Inc.\\
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\texttt{[email protected]}
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}
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\date{2024}
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\begin{document}
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\luxcoverpage
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\begin{abstract}
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We present a hybrid cryptographic architecture combining Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) and Multi-Party Computation (MPC) to achieve trustless private computation. FHE alone computes on encrypted data but concentrates trust in whoever holds the decryption key. MPC alone distributes trust but requires data sharing among participants. The hybrid approach eliminates both weaknesses: FHE handles encrypted computation while MPC distributes the decryption key via threshold secret sharing, ensuring no single party can decrypt intermediate results. We formalize the construction using TFHE for boolean circuit evaluation and FROST-based threshold decryption for key distribution. We demonstrate the architecture on a private orderbook matching engine where $N$ market participants submit encrypted orders, the matching engine evaluates the order book homomorphically, and a $t$-of-$n$ MPC committee decrypts only the matched trades. No party---including the matcher---ever observes the full order book in cleartext. The implementation runs on LiquidFHE (Lux F-Chain) with M-Chain MPC providing threshold decryption, achieving 47ms per encrypted order match at NIST Level 1 security.
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\end{abstract}
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\input{sections/01-introduction}
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\input{sections/02-threat-model}
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\input{sections/03-fhe-background-tfhe}
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\input{sections/04-threshold-decryption-via-mpc}
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\input{sections/05-frost-fhe-key-shares}
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\input{sections/06-application-private-orderbook-matching}
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\input{sections/07-implementation-on-lux}
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\input{sections/08-multi-party-encrypted-workflows}
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\input{sections/09-comparison-with-alternative-approaches}
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\input{sections/99-conclusion}
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\end{document}
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