mirror of
https://github.com/lux-apps/papers.git
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zeekay
dd93cb41f7
Sweep across the non-Tier-1 paper catalogue (Tier-1 owned by parallel
agent and excluded). All 113 processed papers already had luxcover
wired up; this commit fixes 14 build breakers and produces fresh
PDFs across the catalogue.
Fixes:
- lux-blockchain-scaling-laws: em-dash inside lstlisting -> --
- lux-corona-pq: stale \input pointing at 03-the-corona-scheme renamed
to 03-the-corona-scheme (file already renamed on disk)
- lux-lattice-cryptography-primer: same Corona->Corona rename
- lux-formal-verification-lean4: Lean source uses unicode (×, ∀, ∃, ∈,
∧, ∨, ∩, ≠, ⟨, ⟩, ·, ¬) inside lstlistings. Added a literate map
so listings render the math glyphs without UTF-8 fault.
- lux-id-did-specification: ✓/✗ in tabular replaced with \ding{51}
/ \ding{55} (pifont). Added pifont package.
- lux-ntt-simd-implementation: middle-dot in Go assembly listings;
added literate {·}{\textperiodcentered}.
- lux-ntt-transform: μ, ×, –, — in regular text (no T1 fontenc).
Replaced with $\mu$/$\times$/--/--- via unicode->latex sweep.
- lux-perpetuals-derivatives, lux-quantum-consensus,
lux-quasar-consensus, lux-tee-computing-mesh: same unicode->latex
sweep across body text. Also fixed broken math segment
`$L_{avg} = 10$\times$$` -> `$L_{avg} = 10\times$`.
- lux-zchain: emoji glyphs in roadmap table replaced with
parenthetical text.
- lux-triple-proof-consensus: dropped duplicate \usepackage{geometry}
that clashed with luxcover (geometry option clash).
- pq: defined missing \Rq macro.
PDFs rebuilt for the full Tier-2/3 set.
Excluded (Tier-1, parallel agent): lp-073-pulsar, lp-stricte2epq,
dag-evm-formal, lp-010-quasar-stm-{3,4}, lp-020-quasar-consensus,
lux-institutional-custody, lux-nist-mptc-submission, pqsafe-il5,
pq-rns, plus shared/ and lps/.
77 lines
3.0 KiB
TeX
77 lines
3.0 KiB
TeX
\documentclass[11pt,a4paper]{article}
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\usepackage{../shared/luxcover}
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\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
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\usepackage{amsmath,amssymb,amsfonts,amsthm}
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\usepackage{graphicx}
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\usepackage{hyperref}
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\usepackage{algorithm}
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\usepackage{algpseudocode}
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\usepackage{xcolor}
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\usepackage{booktabs}
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\usepackage{enumitem}
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\usepackage{tikz}
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\hypersetup{colorlinks=true,linkcolor=black,citecolor=blue,urlcolor=blue}
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\newtheorem{theorem}{Theorem}[section]
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\newtheorem{lemma}[theorem]{Lemma}
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\newtheorem{corollary}[theorem]{Corollary}
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\newtheorem{proposition}[theorem]{Proposition}
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\newtheorem{definition}{Definition}[section]
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\newtheorem{remark}{Remark}[section]
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\title{\textbf{Flare Protocol: Certificate Skip Exclusivity\\with Honest Support in DAG Consensus}}
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\author{
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Zach Kelling\thanks{Corresponding author: [email protected]}\\
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\textit{Lux Industries, Inc.}\\
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\texttt{[email protected]}
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}
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\date{2024}
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\begin{document}
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\luxcoverpage
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\begin{abstract}
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We present the Flare protocol, a conviction-based consensus mechanism that introduces
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the \emph{certificate/skip} paradigm for finality in DAG-structured transaction sets.
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Flare extends the Slush stochastic sampling primitive with a conviction counter that
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tracks consecutive rounds of supermajority agreement. A validator \emph{certifies} a
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transaction when its conviction counter reaches threshold $\beta_2$, producing a
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cryptographic certificate. If the validator's preference switches before certification,
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the counter resets---a \emph{skip}---and the validator must rebuild conviction from zero.
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We prove the \emph{Certificate Skip Exclusivity} (CSE) theorem: in any execution
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with honest supermajority, at most one color can accumulate $\beta_2$ consecutive
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supermajority rounds across the honest validator population, ensuring that conflicting
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certificates cannot coexist. The proof leverages the \emph{honest support invariant}:
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if an honest validator certifies color $c$, then more than $2/3$ of honest validators
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must have supported $c$ during every round of the conviction streak, creating an
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information-theoretic barrier against simultaneous certification of opposing colors.
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We analyze the protocol's resistance to \emph{luring attacks} where the adversary
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attempts to split honest validators by strategic equivocation, proving that the
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probability of successfully creating two certificates for opposing colors is bounded by
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$e^{-\Omega(k\beta_2)}$. Empirical evaluation on a 500-node testnet demonstrates
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sub-second finality with median 6 rounds to certification.
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\end{abstract}
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\tableofcontents
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\newpage
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%% -----------------------------------------------------------------------
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%% 1. INTRODUCTION
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%% -----------------------------------------------------------------------
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\input{sections/01-introduction}
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\input{sections/02-system-model}
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\input{sections/03-the-flare-protocol}
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\input{sections/04-certificate-skip-exclusivity}
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\input{sections/05-luring-attack-analysis}
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\input{sections/06-comparison-with-wave}
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\input{sections/07-empirical-evaluation}
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\input{sections/08-related-work}
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\input{sections/99-conclusion}
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\end{document}
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