mirror of
https://github.com/lux-apps/papers.git
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zeekay
dd93cb41f7
Sweep across the non-Tier-1 paper catalogue (Tier-1 owned by parallel
agent and excluded). All 113 processed papers already had luxcover
wired up; this commit fixes 14 build breakers and produces fresh
PDFs across the catalogue.
Fixes:
- lux-blockchain-scaling-laws: em-dash inside lstlisting -> --
- lux-corona-pq: stale \input pointing at 03-the-corona-scheme renamed
to 03-the-corona-scheme (file already renamed on disk)
- lux-lattice-cryptography-primer: same Corona->Corona rename
- lux-formal-verification-lean4: Lean source uses unicode (×, ∀, ∃, ∈,
∧, ∨, ∩, ≠, ⟨, ⟩, ·, ¬) inside lstlistings. Added a literate map
so listings render the math glyphs without UTF-8 fault.
- lux-id-did-specification: ✓/✗ in tabular replaced with \ding{51}
/ \ding{55} (pifont). Added pifont package.
- lux-ntt-simd-implementation: middle-dot in Go assembly listings;
added literate {·}{\textperiodcentered}.
- lux-ntt-transform: μ, ×, –, — in regular text (no T1 fontenc).
Replaced with $\mu$/$\times$/--/--- via unicode->latex sweep.
- lux-perpetuals-derivatives, lux-quantum-consensus,
lux-quasar-consensus, lux-tee-computing-mesh: same unicode->latex
sweep across body text. Also fixed broken math segment
`$L_{avg} = 10$\times$$` -> `$L_{avg} = 10\times$`.
- lux-zchain: emoji glyphs in roadmap table replaced with
parenthetical text.
- lux-triple-proof-consensus: dropped duplicate \usepackage{geometry}
that clashed with luxcover (geometry option clash).
- pq: defined missing \Rq macro.
PDFs rebuilt for the full Tier-2/3 set.
Excluded (Tier-1, parallel agent): lp-073-pulsar, lp-stricte2epq,
dag-evm-formal, lp-010-quasar-stm-{3,4}, lp-020-quasar-consensus,
lux-institutional-custody, lux-nist-mptc-submission, pqsafe-il5,
pq-rns, plus shared/ and lps/.
77 lines
2.7 KiB
TeX
77 lines
2.7 KiB
TeX
\documentclass[11pt,a4paper]{article}
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\usepackage{../shared/luxcover}
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\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
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\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
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\usepackage{amsmath,amssymb,amsfonts,amsthm}
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\usepackage{graphicx}
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\usepackage{hyperref}
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\usepackage{algorithm}
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\usepackage{algpseudocode}
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\usepackage{xcolor}
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\usepackage{booktabs}
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\usepackage{enumitem}
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\usepackage{tikz}
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\usepackage{tabularx}
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\hypersetup{colorlinks=true,linkcolor=black,citecolor=blue,urlcolor=blue}
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\newtheorem{theorem}{Theorem}[section]
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\newtheorem{lemma}[theorem]{Lemma}
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\newtheorem{corollary}[theorem]{Corollary}
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\newtheorem{proposition}[theorem]{Proposition}
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\newtheorem{definition}{Definition}[section]
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\newtheorem{remark}{Remark}[section]
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\title{\textbf{Hybrid Post-Quantum Cryptographic Architecture\\for Blockchain Systems}}
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\author{
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Zach Kelling \\
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\textit{Lux Industries, Inc.}\\
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\texttt{[email protected]}
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}
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\date{2024}
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\begin{document}
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\luxcoverpage
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\begin{abstract}
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We present a hybrid cryptographic architecture that combines classical elliptic curve
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primitives (BLS12-381, ECDH on Curve25519) with NIST post-quantum standards (ML-DSA
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FIPS~204, ML-KEM FIPS~203) via dual-signature and key-combiner constructions. The core
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security property is \emph{compositional resilience}: an attacker must break \emph{both}
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the classical and post-quantum components simultaneously to compromise any authenticated
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message or key agreement. We prove this property formally under standard assumptions
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(co-CDH for BLS, Module-LWE for ML-DSA/ML-KEM) and show that the hybrid construction
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is strictly stronger than either component during the transition period when the
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relative security of lattice assumptions remains uncertain. The architecture is
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implemented as native EVM precompiles on the Lux C-Chain, adding 678\,$\mu$s to
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signature generation (ML-DSA-65 keygen) and 1.2\,KB to signature size (dual BLS +
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ML-DSA), while preserving backward compatibility with existing BLS-only validators.
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We provide concrete benchmarks, a migration schedule, and an analysis of the
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harvest-now-decrypt-later threat that motivates immediate hybrid deployment rather
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than a wait-and-see approach.
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\textbf{Keywords}: hybrid cryptography, post-quantum, ML-DSA, ML-KEM, BLS,
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key combiner, blockchain
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\end{abstract}
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\tableofcontents
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\newpage
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%% ========================================================================
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%% 1. INTRODUCTION
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%% ========================================================================
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\input{sections/01-introduction}
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\input{sections/02-threat-model}
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\input{sections/03-dual-signature-construction}
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\input{sections/04-hybrid-key-exchange}
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\input{sections/05-forward-secrecy}
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\input{sections/06-implementation}
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\input{sections/07-related-work}
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\input{sections/99-conclusion}
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\end{document}
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