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9bc3898a76
Append "Reproducibility" appendix to each of the 9 Tier-1 papers (lp-073-pulsar, lp-stricte2epq, dag-evm-formal, lp-010-quasar-stm-3, lp-010-quasar-stm-4, lp-020-quasar-consensus, lux-institutional-custody, lux-nist-mptc-submission, pqsafe-il5) and rebuild PDFs. Covers were already present via shared/luxcover; this commit only adds the reproducibility metadata (repo, build, hardware, standards, contact) and refreshes the PDFs. Defense Pack assembled at ~/Desktop/Lux-Hanzo-Defense-Pack/.
216 lines
7.6 KiB
TeX
216 lines
7.6 KiB
TeX
\documentclass[11pt,a4paper]{article}
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\usepackage{../shared/luxcover}
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\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
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\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
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\usepackage{amsmath,amssymb,amsfonts,amsthm}
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\usepackage{hyperref}
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\usepackage{booktabs}
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\usepackage{enumitem}
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\usepackage{longtable}
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\usepackage{array}
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\usepackage{algorithm}
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\usepackage{algpseudocode}
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\usepackage{xcolor}
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\usepackage{tikz}
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\usetikzlibrary{arrows.meta,positioning,shapes.geometric,fit,calc}
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\hypersetup{colorlinks=true,linkcolor=black,citecolor=blue,urlcolor=blue}
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\newtheorem{theorem}{Theorem}[section]
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\newtheorem{lemma}[theorem]{Lemma}
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\newtheorem{corollary}[theorem]{Corollary}
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\newtheorem{proposition}[theorem]{Proposition}
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\newtheorem{definition}{Definition}[section]
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\newtheorem{remark}{Remark}[section]
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\newtheorem{requirement}{Requirement}[section]
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\title{Institutional Digital Asset Custody\\at the Eight Billion Dollar Tier}
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\author{
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Zach Kelling\thanks{Corresponding author: [email protected]}\\
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\textit{Lux Industries, Inc.}\\
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\texttt{[email protected]}
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}
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\date{2026}
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\begin{document}
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\luxcoverpage
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\begin{abstract}
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We present a reference custody architecture for institutional digital
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asset holdings at the eight billion dollar tier (\$8B AUM, BTC and
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ETH). The architecture is structured as a three-tier signing hierarchy:
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a cold tier holding 95\% of assets behind a 3-of-5 threshold across
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five geographically and administratively independent hardware security
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modules; a warm tier holding 4\% behind a 2-of-3 threshold across
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three independent cloud HSMs; and a hot tier holding 1\% behind a
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2-of-2 threshold with a per-transaction time-lock for trading desk
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operations. All three tiers use threshold multi-party computation
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(MPC) signing -- specifically CGGMP21 for ECDSA (Bitcoin and
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Ethereum) -- such that the custody policy is invisible to the
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underlying chain and signing latency matches single-key signers.
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The design eliminates any single party (custodian, cloud provider,
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geography, ops team) capable of unilateral asset movement, satisfies
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FIPS 140-2 Level 3 on every signing component, and maps to SOC 2 Type
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II, ISO 27001, CCSS Level 3, MiCA (EU), MAS PSF (Singapore), and
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NYDFS BitLicense (US) compliance frameworks. Post-quantum hedging is
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provided through Lux Triple Consensus (BLS plus Pulsar plus ML-DSA,
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LP-020) at the chain layer. We give a complete cost model
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(approximately 1.5--2 basis points of AUM per annum, all-in), a
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ninety-day migration plan from incumbent custodians (BitGo, Fireblocks,
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Anchorage Digital, Coinbase Custody), and a detailed comparison of
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trust assumptions versus those incumbents.
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\end{abstract}
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\tableofcontents
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\newpage
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%% =====================================================================
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\input{sections/01-executive-summary}
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\input{sections/02-threat-model}
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\input{sections/03-tiered-architecture}
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\input{sections/04-hsm-selection-matrix}
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\input{sections/05-threshold-mpc-vs-multisig}
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\input{sections/06-airgapped-signing-protocol}
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\input{sections/07-key-generation-ceremony}
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\input{sections/08-operational-procedures}
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\input{sections/09-compliance-map}
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\input{sections/10-disaster-recovery}
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\input{sections/11-cost-analysis}
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\input{sections/12-implementation-timeline}
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\input{sections/13-comparison-existing-custodians}
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\input{sections/14-migration-plan}
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\input{sections/99-conclusion}
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\bibliographystyle{plain}
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\begin{thebibliography}{99}
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\bibitem{cggmp21}
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R.~Canetti, R.~Gennaro, S.~Goldfeder, N.~Makriyannis, and U.~Peled.
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UC non-interactive, proactive, threshold ECDSA with identifiable
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aborts. \emph{ACM CCS}, 2020.
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\bibitem{frost}
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C.~Komlo and I.~Goldberg. FROST: Flexible round-optimized Schnorr
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threshold signatures. \emph{Selected Areas in Cryptography (SAC)}, 2020.
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\bibitem{shamir}
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A.~Shamir. How to share a secret. \emph{Communications of the ACM},
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22(11):612--613, 1979.
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\bibitem{lp020}
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Lux Industries. LP-020: Triple-proof consensus (BLS + Pulsar +
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ML-DSA). \emph{Lux Improvement Proposals}, 2025.
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\bibitem{lp137}
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Lux Industries. LP-137: GPU residency, attestation, and airgapped
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signing flow. \emph{Lux Improvement Proposals}, 2026.
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\bibitem{lp006}
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Lux Industries. LP-006: M-Chain (MPC custody chain) specification.
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\emph{Lux Improvement Proposals}, 2024.
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\bibitem{nist-fips140-2}
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NIST. \emph{FIPS PUB 140-2: Security Requirements for Cryptographic
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Modules}, 2001 (validation programme active through 2026).
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\bibitem{nist-fips140-3}
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NIST. \emph{FIPS PUB 140-3: Security Requirements for Cryptographic
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Modules}, 2019.
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\bibitem{nist-sp800-57}
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NIST. \emph{SP 800-57 Part 1 Rev.~5: Recommendation for Key
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Management}, 2020.
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\bibitem{ccss}
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CryptoCurrency Certification Consortium (C4). \emph{CryptoCurrency
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Security Standard (CCSS), v8.0}, 2024.
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\bibitem{soc2}
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AICPA. \emph{Trust Services Criteria for Security, Availability,
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Processing Integrity, Confidentiality, and Privacy (SOC~2)}, 2017.
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\bibitem{iso27001}
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ISO/IEC. \emph{ISO/IEC 27001:2022 -- Information security management
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systems}.
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\bibitem{mica}
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European Parliament. \emph{Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 on Markets in
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Crypto-Assets (MiCA)}, 2023.
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\bibitem{mas-psn02}
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Monetary Authority of Singapore. \emph{Notice PSN02: Prevention of
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Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism --- Digital
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Payment Token Service}, 2020 (revised 2024).
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\bibitem{nydfs-bitlicense}
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New York Department of Financial Services. \emph{23 NYCRR Part 200:
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Virtual Currencies (BitLicense)}, 2015.
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\bibitem{occ-trust}
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Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. \emph{Interpretive
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Letter 1170: Custody of Cryptocurrency Assets}, 2020.
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\bibitem{thales-luna7}
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Thales Group. \emph{Luna Network HSM 7 Product Brief and FIPS 140-2
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Level 3 Certificate \#3205}, 2024.
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\bibitem{utimaco-secsr}
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Utimaco. \emph{u.trust SecurityServer Se-Series Gen2 Datasheet --- FIPS
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140-2 Level 3 (Level 4 for physical)}, 2024.
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\bibitem{aws-cloudhsm}
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Amazon Web Services. \emph{AWS CloudHSM (Marvell LiquidSecurity)
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Service Documentation and FIPS 140-2 Level 3 Certificate \#4218},
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2024.
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\bibitem{gcp-cloudhsm}
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Google Cloud. \emph{Cloud HSM Documentation: FIPS 140-2 Level 3
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attested via Marvell LiquidSecurity}, 2024.
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\bibitem{azure-dedicated-hsm}
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Microsoft Azure. \emph{Azure Dedicated HSM (Thales Luna 7) Product
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Documentation}, 2024.
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\bibitem{yubihsm2}
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Yubico. \emph{YubiHSM 2 Product Specification --- FIPS 140-2 Level 3
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Certificate \#3915}, 2023.
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\bibitem{chainalysis}
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Chainalysis Inc. \emph{KYT (Know Your Transaction) API Reference},
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2024.
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\bibitem{trm}
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TRM Labs. \emph{Transaction Monitoring API Reference}, 2024.
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\bibitem{bitgo-soc}
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BitGo Trust Company. \emph{SOC 2 Type II Report (excerpts) and
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\$250M Insurance Disclosure}, 2024.
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\bibitem{fireblocks}
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Fireblocks. \emph{Architecture White Paper: MPC-CMP and Policy
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Engine}, 2023.
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\bibitem{anchorage}
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Anchorage Digital Bank. \emph{OCC National Trust Charter and
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Custody Operations Disclosure}, 2021.
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\bibitem{coinbase-custody}
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Coinbase Custody Trust Co.~LLC. \emph{NYDFS Trust Charter Filing
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and Cold Storage Architecture Disclosure}, 2018--2024.
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\end{thebibliography}
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\appendix
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\section*{Reproducibility}
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\textbf{Source code.} \texttt{github.com/luxfi/threshold} (MPC custody backbone, commit \texttt{TBD}); HSM adapters at \texttt{github.com/luxfi/hsm}; key-management policy at \texttt{github.com/luxfi/kms}.\\
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\textbf{Build.} \texttt{go build ./...}; HSM integration tests require vendor SDKs (Thales Luna, Utimaco, YubiHSM, AWS CloudHSM, GCP Cloud HSM).\\
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\textbf{Hardware tested.} TBD (Tier-1 HSM lab: Thales Luna 7, Utimaco SR-Se200, YubiHSM 2; cloud Tier-1: AWS CloudHSM, GCP Cloud HSM).\\
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\textbf{Standards referenced.} FIPS 140-2 Level 3, FIPS 140-3, SOC 2 Type II, ISO 27001:2022, CCSS Level 3, MiCA, MAS PSN02, US OCC trust charter, NYDFS BitLicense.\\
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\textbf{Contact.} [email protected].
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\end{document}
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