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zooqueen
ed0d9cabdf
Scrub residual Ring-LWE mislabels of the Corona/Pulsar threshold
signature family per canonical decision-b (source: ringtail/sign/config.go
M=8,N=7, q=0x1000000004A01).
- Corona = Module-LWE (Ringtail-derived parameter set, A in R_q^{8x7}),
not Ring-LWE / not "Module-LWE at rank 1".
- Pulsar = Module-LWE (ML-DSA-65, FIPS-204 byte-equal).
- Corona+Pulsar differ by parameter regime/codebase, NOT hardness family:
intra-lattice parameter/implementation diversity, NOT family-disjoint.
- True family-disjoint defense = Magnetar (hash, SLH-DSA) / HQC (codes).
Reframed the false Corona(R-LWE)-vs-Pulsar(M-LWE) family-independence
across lp-219/lp-220/lp-222/lp-223 (P3Q kinds), lux-quasar-composition
(profile hardness table + composition corollary/proof), lux-magnetar-pq,
and the superseded triple-proof/quasar drafts (anonymous lattice
threshold lane = Corona). Legitimate FHE/TFHE Ring-LWE, NTT citations,
and neutral "rank-1" lattice facts left intact. PDFs rebuilt.
111 lines
4.3 KiB
TeX
111 lines
4.3 KiB
TeX
\section{Per-Layer Security Guarantees}
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\label{sec:layers}
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\subsection{Layer 1: Consensus}
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\begin{table}[ht]
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\centering
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\caption{Consensus layer security guarantees.}
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\label{tab:consensus-security}
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\begin{tabular}{llll}
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\toprule
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\textbf{Property} & \textbf{Guarantee} & \textbf{Assumption} & \textbf{Status} \\
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\midrule
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Safety & No conflicting finalized blocks & $f < n/3$, co-CDH & [Proven] \\
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Liveness & Blocks finalized within $\Delta$ & Partial synchrony & [Proven] \\
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PQ safety & Epoch-level finality & Module-LWE & [Assumed] \\
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Privacy & Anonymous validator votes & Module-LWE (Pulsar) & [Assumed] \\
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\bottomrule
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\end{tabular}
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\end{table}
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\textbf{Triple-proof quantum finality} combines three independent proofs per epoch:
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\begin{enumerate}[leftmargin=2em]
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\item \textbf{BLS aggregate signature} (48 bytes): Classical speed, sub-millisecond
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verification. \textbf{[Proven]} secure under co-CDH in the random oracle
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model~\cite{boneh2001bls}.
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\item \textbf{STARK-compressed ML-DSA} ($\sim$200 bytes): Post-quantum identity
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binding. \textbf{[Assumed]} secure under Module-LWE (NIST FIPS 204). STARK
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soundness \textbf{[Proven]} under collision-resistant hash functions.
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\item \textbf{Corona threshold signature} (embedded in STARK): Anonymous
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validator participation. \textbf{[Assumed]} secure under Module-LWE
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(Ringtail-derived parameter set) with
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parameters providing $> 128$-bit classical security.
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\end{enumerate}
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Total epoch proof size: 248 bytes. Epoch verification time: ${\sim}2$--$5$\,ms CPU
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(dominated by Groth16's 3 pairings on BLS12-381)~\cite{lux-benchmarks}.
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Block time: 1\,ms.
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\subsection{Layer 2: Transport (P2P Network)}
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\begin{table}[ht]
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\centering
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\caption{Transport layer security guarantees.}
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\label{tab:transport-security}
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\begin{tabular}{llll}
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\toprule
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\textbf{Property} & \textbf{Guarantee} & \textbf{Assumption} & \textbf{Status} \\
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\midrule
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Confidentiality & Encrypted P2P channels & CDH (X25519) + M-LWE & [Tested] \\
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Integrity & Authenticated messages & HMAC-SHA256 & [Proven] \\
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Forward secrecy & Past sessions protected & Ephemeral ML-KEM & [Assumed] \\
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Peer auth & Mutual node authentication & Node certificate chain & [Tested] \\
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\bottomrule
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\end{tabular}
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\end{table}
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Hybrid key exchange (X25519 + ML-KEM-768) provides forward secrecy against quantum
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adversaries as long as ephemeral ML-KEM private keys are erased after each session.
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\textbf{[Tested]} via integration tests with simulated key compromise.
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\subsection{Layer 3: Execution (EVM)}
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\begin{table}[ht]
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\centering
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\caption{Execution layer security guarantees.}
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\label{tab:execution-security}
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\begin{tabular}{llll}
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\toprule
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\textbf{Property} & \textbf{Guarantee} & \textbf{Assumption} & \textbf{Status} \\
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\midrule
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Determinism & Same input $\to$ same output & EVM specification & [Tested] \\
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Isolation & Contract cannot access other state & EVM sandboxing & [Tested] \\
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Gas metering & Computation is bounded & Gas limit enforcement & [Proven] \\
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PQ signatures & Quantum-safe tx verification & ML-DSA precompile & [Tested] \\
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FHE & Encrypted computation & Ring-LWE (FHE) & [Assumed] \\
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\bottomrule
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\end{tabular}
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\end{table}
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Post-quantum precompiles (ML-DSA, ML-KEM, SLH-DSA) are activated at genesis.
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\textbf{[Tested]} with 100\% coverage of NIST Known Answer Tests (KATs).
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\subsection{Layer 4: Application (Smart Contracts)}
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\begin{table}[ht]
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\centering
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\caption{Application layer security guarantees.}
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\label{tab:application-security}
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\begin{tabular}{llll}
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\toprule
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\textbf{Property} & \textbf{Guarantee} & \textbf{Assumption} & \textbf{Status} \\
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\midrule
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Access control & Owner-only functions enforced & Signature verification & [Tested] \\
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Reentrancy & CEI pattern enforced & Audit/static analysis & [Tested] \\
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Overflow & SafeMath / Solidity 0.8+ & Compiler guarantees & [Proven] \\
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Oracle integrity & Multi-source price feeds & $> n/2$ honest oracles & [Assumed] \\
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\bottomrule
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\end{tabular}
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\end{table}
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Application-layer security is the responsibility of smart contract developers, not the
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protocol. The protocol provides tools (precompiles, gas metering, access control
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primitives) but cannot prevent application-level logic errors.
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%% ========================================================================
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%% 5. FAILURE MODES
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%% ========================================================================
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