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\section{Conclusion}
Security requires explicit threat models, not vague assertions. This document
provides such a model for the Lux Network, covering four adversary classes, four
protocol layers, three cryptographic assumption families, and their interactions.
The key structural property is defense in depth: any two of the three cryptographic
assumption families (discrete log, lattice, hash) suffice for security. No single
breakthrough---quantum computers, lattice attacks, hash function weaknesses---is
sufficient to compromise the system. Only a simultaneous failure of two independent
mathematical hardness assumptions could break the security guarantees.
The key process property is the machine-checkable invariant: every security claim is
either formally proven, empirically tested, or explicitly marked as an assumption.
This eliminates the most dangerous category of security claims---those that nobody
has checked.
Triple-proof quantum finality achieves the practical synthesis: 248 bytes per epoch,
${\sim}2$--$5$\,ms CPU verification~\cite{lux-benchmarks}, 1\,ms blocks, and security
against classical, quantum, and economic adversaries simultaneously.
%% ========================================================================
%% BIBLIOGRAPHY
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