mirror of
https://github.com/lux-apps/papers.git
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zeekay
dd93cb41f7
Sweep across the non-Tier-1 paper catalogue (Tier-1 owned by parallel
agent and excluded). All 113 processed papers already had luxcover
wired up; this commit fixes 14 build breakers and produces fresh
PDFs across the catalogue.
Fixes:
- lux-blockchain-scaling-laws: em-dash inside lstlisting -> --
- lux-corona-pq: stale \input pointing at 03-the-corona-scheme renamed
to 03-the-corona-scheme (file already renamed on disk)
- lux-lattice-cryptography-primer: same Corona->Corona rename
- lux-formal-verification-lean4: Lean source uses unicode (×, ∀, ∃, ∈,
∧, ∨, ∩, ≠, ⟨, ⟩, ·, ¬) inside lstlistings. Added a literate map
so listings render the math glyphs without UTF-8 fault.
- lux-id-did-specification: ✓/✗ in tabular replaced with \ding{51}
/ \ding{55} (pifont). Added pifont package.
- lux-ntt-simd-implementation: middle-dot in Go assembly listings;
added literate {·}{\textperiodcentered}.
- lux-ntt-transform: μ, ×, –, — in regular text (no T1 fontenc).
Replaced with $\mu$/$\times$/--/--- via unicode->latex sweep.
- lux-perpetuals-derivatives, lux-quantum-consensus,
lux-quasar-consensus, lux-tee-computing-mesh: same unicode->latex
sweep across body text. Also fixed broken math segment
`$L_{avg} = 10$\times$$` -> `$L_{avg} = 10\times$`.
- lux-zchain: emoji glyphs in roadmap table replaced with
parenthetical text.
- lux-triple-proof-consensus: dropped duplicate \usepackage{geometry}
that clashed with luxcover (geometry option clash).
- pq: defined missing \Rq macro.
PDFs rebuilt for the full Tier-2/3 set.
Excluded (Tier-1, parallel agent): lp-073-pulsar, lp-stricte2epq,
dag-evm-formal, lp-010-quasar-stm-{3,4}, lp-020-quasar-consensus,
lux-institutional-custody, lux-nist-mptc-submission, pqsafe-il5,
pq-rns, plus shared/ and lps/.
67 lines
3.3 KiB
TeX
67 lines
3.3 KiB
TeX
\documentclass[11pt,a4paper]{article}
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\usepackage{../shared/luxcover}
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\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
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\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
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\usepackage{amsmath,amssymb,amsfonts,amsthm}
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\usepackage{graphicx}
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\usepackage{hyperref}
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\usepackage{algorithm}
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\usepackage{algpseudocode}
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\usepackage{booktabs}
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\usepackage{multirow}
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\usepackage{array}
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\usepackage{xcolor}
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\usepackage{float}
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\usepackage{enumitem}
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\usepackage{mathtools}
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\newtheorem{theorem}{Theorem}
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\newtheorem{lemma}[theorem]{Lemma}
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\newtheorem{proposition}[theorem]{Proposition}
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\newtheorem{definition}{Definition}
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\newtheorem{corollary}[theorem]{Corollary}
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\newtheorem{remark}{Remark}
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\hypersetup{
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colorlinks=true,
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linkcolor=blue,
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citecolor=blue,
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urlcolor=blue
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}
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\title{\textbf{Privacy Pools on Lux: Compliant Transaction Privacy\\with Association Sets}\\[6pt]
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\large Association Set Proofs, Compliance-Friendly Privacy,\\ZK Inclusion Proofs, and Regulatory Compatibility}
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\author{
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Zach Kelling\thanks{Corresponding author: [email protected]}\\
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\textit{Lux Industries, Inc.}\\
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\texttt{[email protected]}
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}
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\date{2024}
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\begin{document}
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\luxcoverpage
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\begin{abstract}
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We present Lux Privacy Pools, a compliant transaction privacy system that enables users to transact privately while proving they are not associated with sanctioned or illicit addresses. The design extends the Privacy Pool framework of Buterin et al.\ to the Lux Network's multi-chain architecture, using zero-knowledge proofs to demonstrate membership in curated ``association sets'' of compliant depositors without revealing which specific deposit a withdrawal corresponds to. Users deposit tokens into a privacy pool contract, which commits deposits to a Merkle tree. To withdraw, a user generates a zero-knowledge proof showing: (i)~knowledge of a valid deposit in the Merkle tree (spend authorization); (ii)~that the deposit is a member of an association set $\mathcal{A}$ of compliant addresses (regulatory compliance); and (iii)~that the withdrawal nullifier is fresh (double-spend prevention). We formalize the association set model, define the roles of Association Set Providers (ASPs), and prove that the system achieves indistinguishability of withdrawals within an association set while preventing illicit fund mixing. The construction uses Groth16 zk-SNARKs over BLS12-381, achieving proof generation in 2.8 seconds on consumer hardware and on-chain verification in 326,000 gas via Lux's BLS12-381 precompile. We prove the system is sound (no withdrawal without a valid deposit), zero-knowledge (no information leakage beyond association set membership), and complete (honest users can always withdraw). We analyze the privacy--compliance tradeoff, showing that larger association sets provide stronger privacy guarantees while maintaining regulatory compatibility.
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\end{abstract}
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\input{sections/01-introduction}
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\input{sections/02-system-model}
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\input{sections/03-association-sets}
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\input{sections/04-zero-knowledge-proof-system}
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\input{sections/05-protocol-specification}
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\input{sections/06-security-analysis}
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\input{sections/07-privacy-compliance-tradeoff}
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\input{sections/08-multi-chain-privacy}
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\input{sections/09-gas-cost-analysis}
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\input{sections/10-comparison-with-existing-systems}
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\input{sections/11-deposit-denomination-analysis}
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\input{sections/12-implementation-details}
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\input{sections/13-related-work}
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\input{sections/99-conclusion}
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\end{document}
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