mirror of
https://github.com/lux-apps/papers.git
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zeekay
dd93cb41f7
Sweep across the non-Tier-1 paper catalogue (Tier-1 owned by parallel
agent and excluded). All 113 processed papers already had luxcover
wired up; this commit fixes 14 build breakers and produces fresh
PDFs across the catalogue.
Fixes:
- lux-blockchain-scaling-laws: em-dash inside lstlisting -> --
- lux-corona-pq: stale \input pointing at 03-the-corona-scheme renamed
to 03-the-corona-scheme (file already renamed on disk)
- lux-lattice-cryptography-primer: same Corona->Corona rename
- lux-formal-verification-lean4: Lean source uses unicode (×, ∀, ∃, ∈,
∧, ∨, ∩, ≠, ⟨, ⟩, ·, ¬) inside lstlistings. Added a literate map
so listings render the math glyphs without UTF-8 fault.
- lux-id-did-specification: ✓/✗ in tabular replaced with \ding{51}
/ \ding{55} (pifont). Added pifont package.
- lux-ntt-simd-implementation: middle-dot in Go assembly listings;
added literate {·}{\textperiodcentered}.
- lux-ntt-transform: μ, ×, –, — in regular text (no T1 fontenc).
Replaced with $\mu$/$\times$/--/--- via unicode->latex sweep.
- lux-perpetuals-derivatives, lux-quantum-consensus,
lux-quasar-consensus, lux-tee-computing-mesh: same unicode->latex
sweep across body text. Also fixed broken math segment
`$L_{avg} = 10$\times$$` -> `$L_{avg} = 10\times$`.
- lux-zchain: emoji glyphs in roadmap table replaced with
parenthetical text.
- lux-triple-proof-consensus: dropped duplicate \usepackage{geometry}
that clashed with luxcover (geometry option clash).
- pq: defined missing \Rq macro.
PDFs rebuilt for the full Tier-2/3 set.
Excluded (Tier-1, parallel agent): lp-073-pulsar, lp-stricte2epq,
dag-evm-formal, lp-010-quasar-stm-{3,4}, lp-020-quasar-consensus,
lux-institutional-custody, lux-nist-mptc-submission, pqsafe-il5,
pq-rns, plus shared/ and lps/.
86 lines
2.6 KiB
TeX
86 lines
2.6 KiB
TeX
\documentclass[11pt,a4paper]{article}
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\usepackage{../shared/luxcover}
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\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
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\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
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\usepackage{amsmath,amssymb,amsthm}
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\usepackage{booktabs}
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\usepackage{enumitem}
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\usepackage{hyperref}
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\usepackage{url}
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\usepackage{tikz}
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\usepackage{listings}
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\usepackage{xcolor}
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\usepackage{longtable}
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\usepackage{tabularx}
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\usetikzlibrary{positioning,arrows.meta,shapes.geometric}
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\definecolor{codebg}{gray}{0.95}
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\lstset{
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basicstyle=\ttfamily\small,
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backgroundcolor=\color{codebg},
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breaklines=true,
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frame=single,
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rulecolor=\color{gray},
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xleftmargin=0.5em,
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xrightmargin=0.5em,
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showstringspaces=false,
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numbers=left,
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numberstyle=\tiny\color{gray},
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keywordstyle=\color{blue!70!black}\bfseries,
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commentstyle=\color{green!50!black}\itshape,
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}
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\hypersetup{colorlinks=true,linkcolor=black,citecolor=blue,urlcolor=blue}
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\newtheorem{theorem}{Theorem}[section]
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\newtheorem{lemma}[theorem]{Lemma}
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\newtheorem{corollary}[theorem]{Corollary}
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\newtheorem{definition}{Definition}[section]
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\newtheorem{property}{Property}[section]
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\newtheorem{invariant}{Invariant}[section]
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\title{\textbf{Sovereign Key Management\\in Post-Quantum Local-First Applications}}
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\author{
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Zach Kelling\thanks{Corresponding author: [email protected]} \\[6pt]
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\textit{Lux Industries, Inc.} \\
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\texttt{[email protected]}
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}
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\date{2025}
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\begin{document}
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\luxcoverpage
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\begin{abstract}
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We describe a key management architecture for local-first applications on
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the Lux Network where users hold their own keys and service providers
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cannot decrypt user data. The architecture uses Argon2id for passphrase-based
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root key derivation, ML-KEM-1024 (FIPS 203) for post-quantum key encapsulation,
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AES-256-GCM for symmetric encryption, and ML-DSA-87 (FIPS 204) for
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post-quantum digital signatures. Vault sharing uses ML-KEM envelope
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encryption; threshold control uses CGGMP21 (ECDSA) and FROST (EdDSA)
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with user-controlled signer sets. Fully homomorphic encryption over
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lattices enables private computation on encrypted data without provider
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access. We contrast this sovereign model with the regulated custody model
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where operator decrypt capability is a legal requirement, and show that
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both models share the same cryptographic primitives but differ in trust
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assumptions.
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\end{abstract}
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\tableofcontents
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\newpage
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% ======================================================================
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\input{sections/01-the-sovereign-app-model}
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\input{sections/02-key-architecture}
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\input{sections/03-fhe-for-private-computation}
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\input{sections/04-mpc-for-threshold-control}
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\input{sections/05-contrast-with-regulated-model}
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\input{sections/06-security-analysis}
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\input{sections/99-conclusion}
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\end{document}
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