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zeekay
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Restructured from flat .tex/.pdf files into per-paper subdirectories. Added Antje Worring as co-author on all papers. Synced PDFs to pdfs/ for download site.
40 lines
1.7 KiB
TeX
40 lines
1.7 KiB
TeX
\section{Security Analysis}
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\subsection{Threat Mitigation}
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\begin{table}[h]
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\centering
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\small
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\begin{tabular}{@{}p{4cm}p{8cm}@{}}
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\toprule
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\textbf{Threat} & \textbf{Mitigation} \\
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\midrule
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Malicious worker submits fake result & On-chain verifier rejects unless vendor quote and Merkle root match encrypted input hash. Fraud proofs slash stake. \\
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\midrule
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State rollback inside enclave & Worker must report \texttt{prevTraceRoot}; verifier checks continuity. Missing link $\Rightarrow$ slash. \\
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\midrule
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Side-channel attacks (LVI, SGAxe) & Workers run only on microcode-patched CPUs. Alternatively, job spec can request GPU-only execution. \\
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\midrule
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Consensus re-org affects job state & Job receipts finalized only after 3 L1 blocks. dApps wait or re-submit. \\
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\midrule
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Data unavailability & Result ciphertext stored in IPFS + optional Arweave. Merkle root on-chain ensures tamper-proof. \\
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\bottomrule
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\end{tabular}
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\caption{Security threat model and mitigations}
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\label{tab:security}
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\end{table}
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\subsection{Known Limitations}
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\begin{enumerate}
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\item \textbf{EPC Swapping}: Intel SGX's encrypted page cache (EPC) is limited to 128 MB (256 MB on Ice Lake). Large datasets require page swapping, reducing throughput to $\sim$100 MiB/s. GPU TEEs recommended for video/LLM workloads.
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\item \textbf{Not Full FHE}: Operators can observe memory access patterns. For complete pattern privacy, combine with ZK-SNARKs or use fully homomorphic encryption.
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\item \textbf{Attestation Licensing}: Intel DCAP quote generation incurs $\sim$\$0.02/quote. This cost is passed to job submitters.
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\item \textbf{No Cross-Enclave Composability}: Currently, TEEs cannot directly call each other. Cross-TEE workflows require round-trip via L1 transactions.
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\end{enumerate}
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