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Add LP-134 canonical naming banner to 46 LaTeX papers that reference T-Chain in MPC/FHE context. Banner clarifies the M-Chain (MPC ceremonies for external-wallet bridge custody) and F-Chain (FHE compute) split. LP-020 quasar-consensus paper already correctly describes the M/F-Chain split and is unmodified.
98 lines
4.4 KiB
TeX
98 lines
4.4 KiB
TeX
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%% ===================================================================
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%% LP-134 canonical naming (2025-12-15):
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%% Per LP-134 (Lux Chain Topology), T-Chain has been split into:
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%% M-Chain — MPC ceremonies for bridge custody of EXTERNAL wallets
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%% (CGGMP21, FROST, Pulsar-general)
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%% F-Chain — FHE compute + TFHE bootstrap-key generation (encrypted EVM)
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%% The legacy name "T-Chain" is retained ONLY for `teleportvm` (LP-6332).
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%% Where this paper says "T-Chain MPC" / "T-Chain threshold governance" /
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%% "T-Chain TFHE" / "T-Chain custody", read as M-Chain (MPC) or F-Chain (FHE).
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%% ===================================================================
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\section{T-Chain: Threshold Governance}
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\label{sec:tchain}
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%% ===================================================================
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The T-Chain handles quorum-controlled operations: actions that require $t$-of-$n$
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authorization before execution. Unlike simple multi-signature schemes, the T-Chain
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supports \emph{policy evaluation over encrypted inputs} via TFHE and \emph{confidential
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aggregation} via CKKS.
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\subsection{Quorum-Controlled Reveal}
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\begin{definition}[Quorum Policy]\label{def:quorum}
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A quorum policy $Q$ is a tuple:
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\[
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Q = (n, t, \mathsf{voters}, \mathsf{predicate}, \mathsf{timeout})
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\]
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where $n$ is the total number of authorized voters, $t$ is the threshold,
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$\mathsf{voters} \subseteq \mathsf{DID}^n$ is the voter set,
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$\mathsf{predicate}$ is a boolean circuit evaluated on voter inputs,
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and $\mathsf{timeout}$ is a block height deadline.
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\end{definition}
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Applications of quorum-controlled reveal include:
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\begin{itemize}
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\item \textbf{Treasury approval}: $t$-of-$n$ board members must approve a
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disbursement before the transaction is signed on M-Chain.
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\item \textbf{Admin recovery}: a compromised admin key can be rotated if $t$
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recovery contacts authorize the rotation on K-Chain.
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\item \textbf{Conditional access}: a document is revealed to a requestor only
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if $t$ data stewards approve the access request.
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\end{itemize}
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\subsection{TFHE Policy Evaluation}
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For policies where voter inputs must remain private (e.g., salary-based approval
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thresholds, credit scoring), the T-Chain evaluates the quorum predicate as a
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boolean circuit over TFHE-encrypted bits. Each voter submits an encrypted vote
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$\hat{v}_i = \mathsf{TFHE.Enc}(v_i)$. The chain evaluates the predicate
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circuit homomorphically:
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\[
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\hat{r} = \mathsf{Circuit}(\hat{v}_1, \ldots, \hat{v}_n)
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\]
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and the result is threshold-decrypted by the T-Chain validators, yielding
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$r \in \{0, 1\}$ without revealing individual votes. The TFHE parameters
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follow \cite{lux-tfhe}: $N = 1024$, $q \approx 2^{27}$, 128-bit security.
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\subsection{CKKS Confidential Compute}
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For policies requiring arithmetic over real-valued inputs (e.g., weighted voting,
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aggregate risk scores), the T-Chain supports CKKS approximate homomorphic encryption.
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Each party submits $\hat{x}_i = \mathsf{CKKS.Enc}(x_i)$ where $x_i \in \mathbb{R}$.
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The chain computes:
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\[
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\hat{y} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i \cdot \hat{x}_i
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\]
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and compares the result against a threshold $\tau$. The aggregated value $y$ is
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revealed; individual inputs $x_i$ are not.
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\begin{proposition}[Vote Privacy]\label{prop:vote-privacy}
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Under the LWE assumption with parameters $(N, q, \sigma)$ as specified in
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\cite{lux-pq-crypto-suite}, no coalition of fewer than $t$ T-Chain validators
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can recover any individual vote $v_i$ from the transcript of a quorum evaluation.
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\end{proposition}
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\subsection{Treasury Approval and Admin Recovery}
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Treasury operations bind T-Chain governance to M-Chain signing. A disbursement
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follows a strict sequence:
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\begin{enumerate}
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\item A proposer submits a \textsc{TreasuryProposal} to the T-Chain with
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the target address, amount, and justification hash.
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\item Authorized voters submit encrypted approvals.
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\item The T-Chain evaluates the quorum predicate.
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\item If approved, the T-Chain emits a \textsc{GovernanceReceipt} that
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authorizes the M-Chain to produce a threshold signature on the
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disbursement transaction.
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\item The M-Chain produces the signature only upon verifying the receipt.
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\end{enumerate}
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Admin recovery follows the same pattern with the rotation request replacing the
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disbursement transaction. The recovery quorum is stored on the K-Chain as part
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of the key record's policy (Definition~\ref{def:rotation}).
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%% ===================================================================
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