mirror of
https://github.com/lux-apps/papers.git
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zeekay
dd93cb41f7
Sweep across the non-Tier-1 paper catalogue (Tier-1 owned by parallel
agent and excluded). All 113 processed papers already had luxcover
wired up; this commit fixes 14 build breakers and produces fresh
PDFs across the catalogue.
Fixes:
- lux-blockchain-scaling-laws: em-dash inside lstlisting -> --
- lux-corona-pq: stale \input pointing at 03-the-corona-scheme renamed
to 03-the-corona-scheme (file already renamed on disk)
- lux-lattice-cryptography-primer: same Corona->Corona rename
- lux-formal-verification-lean4: Lean source uses unicode (×, ∀, ∃, ∈,
∧, ∨, ∩, ≠, ⟨, ⟩, ·, ¬) inside lstlistings. Added a literate map
so listings render the math glyphs without UTF-8 fault.
- lux-id-did-specification: ✓/✗ in tabular replaced with \ding{51}
/ \ding{55} (pifont). Added pifont package.
- lux-ntt-simd-implementation: middle-dot in Go assembly listings;
added literate {·}{\textperiodcentered}.
- lux-ntt-transform: μ, ×, –, — in regular text (no T1 fontenc).
Replaced with $\mu$/$\times$/--/--- via unicode->latex sweep.
- lux-perpetuals-derivatives, lux-quantum-consensus,
lux-quasar-consensus, lux-tee-computing-mesh: same unicode->latex
sweep across body text. Also fixed broken math segment
`$L_{avg} = 10$\times$$` -> `$L_{avg} = 10\times$`.
- lux-zchain: emoji glyphs in roadmap table replaced with
parenthetical text.
- lux-triple-proof-consensus: dropped duplicate \usepackage{geometry}
that clashed with luxcover (geometry option clash).
- pq: defined missing \Rq macro.
PDFs rebuilt for the full Tier-2/3 set.
Excluded (Tier-1, parallel agent): lp-073-pulsar, lp-stricte2epq,
dag-evm-formal, lp-010-quasar-stm-{3,4}, lp-020-quasar-consensus,
lux-institutional-custody, lux-nist-mptc-submission, pqsafe-il5,
pq-rns, plus shared/ and lps/.
68 lines
3.1 KiB
TeX
68 lines
3.1 KiB
TeX
\documentclass[11pt,a4paper]{article}
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\usepackage{../shared/luxcover}
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\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
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\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
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\usepackage{amsmath,amssymb,amsfonts,amsthm}
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\usepackage{graphicx}
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\usepackage{hyperref}
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\usepackage{algorithm}
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\usepackage{algpseudocode}
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\usepackage{booktabs}
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\usepackage{multirow}
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\usepackage{array}
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\usepackage{xcolor}
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\usepackage{float}
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\usepackage{enumitem}
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\usepackage{mathtools}
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\usepackage{pgfplots}
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\pgfplotsset{compat=1.18}
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\newtheorem{theorem}{Theorem}
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\newtheorem{lemma}[theorem]{Lemma}
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\newtheorem{proposition}[theorem]{Proposition}
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\newtheorem{definition}{Definition}
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\newtheorem{corollary}[theorem]{Corollary}
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\newtheorem{remark}{Remark}
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\hypersetup{
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colorlinks=true,
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linkcolor=blue,
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citecolor=blue,
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urlcolor=blue
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}
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\title{\textbf{Validator Economics in Proof-of-Stake:\\Incentive Alignment for Lux Network}\\[6pt]
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\large Delegation Mechanics, Commission Structures, Slashing Conditions,\\Reward Distribution, and Game-Theoretic Equilibrium Analysis}
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\author{
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Zach Kelling\thanks{Corresponding author: [email protected]}\\
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\textit{Lux Partners Limited Limited}\\
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\texttt{[email protected]}
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}
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\date{2023}
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\begin{document}
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\luxcoverpage
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\begin{abstract}
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We present a comprehensive economic analysis of validator incentives in the Lux Network Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus system. Validators secure the network by staking LUX tokens and participating in consensus, earning rewards proportional to their stake and performance. Delegators extend the system by entrusting tokens to validators in exchange for a share of rewards. This paper formalizes the complete validator economic model, including: (i)~a delegation mechanism with bounded commission rates and minimum stake thresholds that ensures Sybil resistance; (ii)~a multi-tier slashing protocol with graduated penalties for downtime, equivocation, and coordinated attacks; (iii)~a reward distribution algorithm that accounts for uptime, stake weight, and appchain participation; and (iv)~a game-theoretic analysis proving that honest validation is a dominant strategy under rational assumptions. We derive the Nash equilibrium of the validator participation game, show that the commission market converges to a competitive rate under free entry, and demonstrate through simulation that the protocol achieves target validator decentralization (Nakamoto coefficient $\geq 20$) within 100 epochs. The model is parameterized for Lux Network's multi-appchain architecture, where validators may simultaneously validate multiple appchains and earn compounded rewards.
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\end{abstract}
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\input{sections/01-introduction}
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\input{sections/02-system-model}
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\input{sections/03-delegation-mechanism}
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\input{sections/04-slashing-protocol}
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\input{sections/05-reward-distribution}
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\input{sections/06-game-theoretic-analysis}
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\input{sections/07-multi-appchain-validator-economics}
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\input{sections/08-decentralization-metrics}
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\input{sections/09-simulation-results}
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\input{sections/10-validator-lifecycle-management}
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\input{sections/11-comparison-with-other-pos-systems}
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\input{sections/12-related-work}
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\input{sections/99-conclusion}
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\end{document}
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