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77 lines
2.7 KiB
TeX
77 lines
2.7 KiB
TeX
\documentclass[11pt,a4paper]{article}
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\usepackage{../shared/luxcover}
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\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
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\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
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\usepackage{amsmath,amssymb,amsfonts,amsthm}
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\usepackage{hyperref}
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\usepackage{booktabs}
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\usepackage{enumitem}
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\usepackage{algorithm}
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\usepackage{algpseudocode}
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\usepackage{xcolor}
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\usepackage{tikz}
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\usetikzlibrary{arrows.meta,positioning,shapes.geometric,fit}
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\hypersetup{colorlinks=true,linkcolor=black,citecolor=blue,urlcolor=blue}
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\newtheorem{theorem}{Theorem}[section]
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\newtheorem{lemma}[theorem]{Lemma}
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\newtheorem{corollary}[theorem]{Corollary}
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\newtheorem{proposition}[theorem]{Proposition}
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\newtheorem{definition}{Definition}[section]
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\newtheorem{remark}{Remark}[section]
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\title{Non-Custodial Securities Custody\\via Threshold Signing}
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\author{
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Zach Kelling\thanks{Corresponding author: [email protected]}\\
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\textit{Lux Industries, Inc.}\\
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\texttt{[email protected]}
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}
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\date{2023}
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\begin{document}
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\luxcoverpage
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\begin{abstract}
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We present a non-custodial custody architecture for digital securities
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in which no single party---not the exchange operator, not the user, not
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any custodian---can unilaterally move assets. The construction uses
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threshold signing with two complementary protocols: CGGMP21 (threshold
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ECDSA over secp256k1) for EVM-compatible chains and FROST (threshold
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Schnorr over Ed25519) for EdDSA chains. Each user's wallet is a
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$2$-of-$3$ threshold address with shares distributed across the user's
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device, the exchange operator (auto-co-signs after compliance checks),
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and a cold backup. We prove three security properties:
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(1)~\emph{non-custodial guarantee}---no single party can forge a
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signature; (2)~\emph{liveness}---any two of three parties can sign,
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so asset recovery is possible even if one party is lost;
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(3)~\emph{key rotation safety}---shares can be refreshed
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(reshared) without changing the on-chain address.
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We describe the HSM attestation layer in which every signing share
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is co-attested by a hardware security module, and prove that the
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HSM attestation composes with the threshold protocol without
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weakening the unforgeability guarantee. The construction is deployed
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on a regulated EVM L1 using the
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\texttt{luxfi/mpc} and \texttt{luxfi/threshold} libraries.
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\end{abstract}
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\tableofcontents
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\newpage
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%% =====================================================================
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\input{sections/01-introduction}
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\input{sections/02-threshold-signing-protocols}
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\input{sections/03-2-of-3-wallet-architecture}
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\input{sections/04-hsm-attestation}
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\input{sections/05-key-rotation}
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\input{sections/06-settlement-flow}
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\input{sections/07-integration-with-evm-precompiles}
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\input{sections/08-formal-verification}
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\input{sections/99-conclusion}
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\end{document}
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