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zooqueen
ac61e71667
Scrub residual Ring-LWE mislabels of the Corona/Pulsar threshold
signature family per canonical decision-b (source: ringtail/sign/config.go
M=8,N=7, q=0x1000000004A01).
- Corona = Module-LWE (Ringtail-derived parameter set, A in R_q^{8x7}),
not Ring-LWE / not "Module-LWE at rank 1".
- Pulsar = Module-LWE (ML-DSA-65, FIPS-204 byte-equal).
- Corona+Pulsar differ by parameter regime/codebase, NOT hardness family:
intra-lattice parameter/implementation diversity, NOT family-disjoint.
- True family-disjoint defense = Magnetar (hash, SLH-DSA) / HQC (codes).
Reframed the false Corona(R-LWE)-vs-Pulsar(M-LWE) family-independence
across lp-219/lp-220/lp-222/lp-223 (P3Q kinds), lux-quasar-composition
(profile hardness table + composition corollary/proof), lux-magnetar-pq,
and the superseded triple-proof/quasar drafts (anonymous lattice
threshold lane = Corona). Legitimate FHE/TFHE Ring-LWE, NTT citations,
and neutral "rank-1" lattice facts left intact. PDFs rebuilt.
87 lines
3.2 KiB
TeX
87 lines
3.2 KiB
TeX
\section{LP-202 Tier-Degradation Contract}
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\subsection{Required-set semantics}
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A cert is at mode $M$ iff every leg in $M$'s required set has been
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aggregated and verified at the round digest. A cert with extra legs
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is still at mode $M$ -- extra legs are allowed but not required.
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\subsection{Tier degradation}
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If a required leg fails to aggregate by the round deadline, the
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cert is published with that leg empty. Relying parties whose policy
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requires mode $M$ wait for the next height or fall back to the
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previous height; relying parties at the highest mode whose required
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set is satisfied finalize normally. Consensus liveness is preserved
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by the surviving legs.
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\subsection{Monotone observability}
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The cert is observable at progressively higher modes as legs
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arrive. A single cert struct serves all relying-party policies; the
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relying party applies its mode policy against the cert's observed
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leg set.
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\paragraph{Worked example.} Parent L1 configured PQ-heavy; the cert
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arrives in tiers:
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\begin{table}[h]
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\centering
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\small
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\begin{tabular}{@{}rp{4cm}p{3.5cm}p{4cm}@{}}
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\toprule
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\textbf{$t$ (ms)} & \textbf{Event} & \textbf{Cert observable at} & \textbf{Relying party at PQ-strict acts?} \\
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\midrule
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$0$ & Round start; cert begins aggregating & n/a & no \\
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$1$ & BLS leg arrives & PQ-off & no \\
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$5$ & Pulsar leg arrives & PQ-fast & no \\
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$20$ & Corona leg arrives & PQ-strict & \textbf{yes} \\
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$70$ & Magnetar leg arrives & PQ-heavy & (already acted) \\
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\bottomrule
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\end{tabular}
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\caption{Monotonic cert-tier observability. A single cert struct
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serves all relying-party policies.}
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\label{tab:monotone}
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\end{table}
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\subsection{Pure-PQ variants drop BLS}
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\texttt{strict-PQ-*} modes do not require BLS. A cert with BLS
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present and the required PQ legs satisfies both the classical mode
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(\texttt{PQ-*}) and the pure-PQ variant (\texttt{strict-PQ-*}).
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Operators pick the mode their relying-party policy enforces; the
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cert is the same.
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\subsection{ZK leg is profile-orthogonal}
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The optional zero-knowledge leg (execution-side certification,
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LP-017 v1) is not part of the mode ladder. It is attached or
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absent independently per chain; modes describe consensus-cert
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posture only.
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\section{Per-Mode Use Cases}
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\paragraph{PQ-off.} HFT trading chains where the
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\SI{50}{\micro\second} preliminary cert is in the critical path of
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an order-matching engine; non-financial L2s whose threat model
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does not include store-now-decrypt-later adversaries; legacy
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bridge endpoints that consume only classical BLS-verifiable certs.
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\paragraph{PQ-fast.} Payment rails (the
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\SI{500}{\micro\second} cost is below typical ACH/card-rail
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end-to-end latency); gaming chains where PQ insurance is desired
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but \SI{5}{\milli\second} is the upper budget; DEX matching layers
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settling to a PQ-strict L1.
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\paragraph{PQ-strict.} Custody and treasury chains; regulated
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securities L1s where the cert is the audit anchor; store-of-value
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chains. The intra-lattice diversity (two Module-LWE parameter
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sets --- Pulsar + Corona) hedges against a parameter- or
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implementation-specific break.
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\paragraph{PQ-heavy.} Cross-chain bridges (the cert is the proof a
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remote chain consumes); sovereign-network anchors; long-archival
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commitments (cert verified $30{+}$ years out, where the
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hash-based Magnetar leg provides defense against any future lattice
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break).
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