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https://github.com/lux-apps/papers.git
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zeekayandHanzo Dev
178febad68
Every rendered "T-Chain" / "ThresholdVM" / "teleportvm" reference across the paper corpus is rewritten to the correct canonical chain by concern: threshold signing / MPC / bridge custody / key recovery -> M-Chain (MVM); FHE / encrypted compute / threshold decryption -> F-Chain (FVM); teleport / cross-chain messaging -> B-Chain (bridgevm); consensus Pulsar stays Q-Chain. Section lux-trust-kernel/03-t-chain-threshold-governance.tex renamed -> 03-f-chain-encrypted-policy.tex (with \input + xref fixes). Braided "T-Chain" sections split by concern (M vs F). Only lp-020's chain-separation rationale and the shared lux/chains/thresholdvm library path retain the name, to record the removal. All changed papers rebuilt (pdflatex, rc=0, no undefined refs). ยง09 of lux-dao-governance-framework reframed: fabricated "production deployment" metrics ($50M/$240k/$12M, survey %s, "as of Oct 2024") relabeled as illustrative design configurations with no invented replacements; reality noted (DAO treasury is a 1/1 Safe); conclusion echo + one "first production" overclaim softened. This commit also captures concurrent corpus workstreams on the same tree. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
52 lines
2.1 KiB
TeX
52 lines
2.1 KiB
TeX
\section{Introduction}
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\subsection{Background}
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Shor's algorithm~\cite{shor1999} renders RSA, ECDSA, and all
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discrete-logarithm-based signature schemes insecure on a sufficiently
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powerful quantum computer. NIST's Post-Quantum Cryptography
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standardization process~\cite{nist-pqc} selected ML-KEM,
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ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA (FIPS 205, formerly SPHINCS+) as the primary
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replacements. Lux Network adopted these standards at the consensus
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layer and extended them with threshold post-quantum signatures (Pulsar) and
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fully homomorphic encryption (TFHE) for computation over ciphertexts.
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\subsection{Scope}
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This paper covers five layers of Lux's post-quantum stack:
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\begin{enumerate}[nosep]
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\item \textbf{Consensus signatures}: BLS-381 + ML-DSA-65 + Pulsar
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(Quasar protocol, LP-020).
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\item \textbf{Threshold key management}: TFHE key generation via
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Shamir LSSS over a 2048-bit safe prime, with Feldman VSS
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commitments.
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\item \textbf{Fully homomorphic encryption}: TFHE boolean-gate
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circuits for encrypted CRDT merge, encrypted search, and
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private smart contracts.
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\item \textbf{Non-custodial wallets}: 2-of-3 MPC (CGGMP21 for
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secp256k1, FROST for Ed25519) with HSM co-signing.
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\item \textbf{Regulatory disclosure}: viewing keys, threshold
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disclosure, and ZK attestation anchoring.
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\end{enumerate}
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\subsection{Evolution from the 2022 Design}
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The 2022 internal document proposed Lamport one-time signatures for
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vault protection and an OTP-based information-theoretic signing layer.
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Both were superseded:
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\begin{itemize}[nosep]
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\item Lamport signatures $\rightarrow$ ML-DSA-65 (FIPS~204): multi-use,
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smaller signatures (3.3\,KB vs 16\,KB per Lamport instance),
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NIST-standardized.
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\item Network-layer OTP signing $\rightarrow$ dropped. The throughput
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cost of per-transaction OTP generation was incompatible with
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sub-second finality. ML-DSA provides computational (not
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information-theoretic) PQ security, which is sufficient given
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current lattice-hardness estimates~\cite{nist-pqc-report}.
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\end{itemize}
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%% ============================================================
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