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zeekay
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Restructured from flat .tex/.pdf files into per-paper subdirectories. Added Antje Worring as co-author on all papers. Synced PDFs to pdfs/ for download site.
30 lines
1.1 KiB
TeX
30 lines
1.1 KiB
TeX
\section{Implementation Considerations}
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\subsection{Scalability}
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The quantum circuit for a single Eisenstein evaluation at precision $p$
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with truncation $N$ requires $O(N^2 \cdot k \cdot p \log p)$ gates.
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For practical parameters ($k=4$, $p=32$, $N=64$), this is approximately
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$10^7$ gates---within reach of early fault-tolerant quantum computers
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but beyond current NISQ devices.
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\subsection{Security Against Quantum Adversaries}
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The protocol's BFT security does not depend on quantum hardness
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assumptions. Even an adversary with an arbitrarily powerful quantum
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computer cannot violate safety (which requires $> n/3$ corrupt
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validators) or forge Eisenstein evaluations (which are deterministic
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given the inputs). The quantum advantage is limited to the \emph{speed}
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of finding valid proposals.
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\subsection{Classical Fallback}
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Every round can be completed by classical proposers, albeit more
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slowly. The protocol degrades gracefully: if no quantum proposer
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participates, block times increase by at most a factor of
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$\sqrt{M/t}$, and the difficulty adjustment compensates within $w$
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rounds.
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%% ============================================================
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