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papers/lp-308-quantum-amm/sections/05-privacy-homomorphic-encryption-of-order-.tex
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\section{Privacy: Homomorphic Encryption of Order Flow}
\subsection{Threat Model}
In a standard AMM, pending transactions are visible in the mempool.
An adversary can:
\begin{itemize}[nosep]
\item \textbf{Front-run}: Place a transaction before the victim's to
profit from the price impact.
\item \textbf{Sandwich}: Place transactions before and after the
victim's, extracting value from the spread.
\end{itemize}
\subsection{TFHE-Protected Pools}
QuantumSwap encrypts order parameters (amount, direction, slippage
tolerance) under TFHE before submission. The AMM contract evaluates
the bonding curve on encrypted inputs:
\begin{itemize}[nosep]
\item Comparison operations (is the price within slippage tolerance?)
execute as TFHE boolean circuits.
\item Reserve updates use TFHE integer arithmetic.
\item The result (trade executed or rejected) is encrypted; only
the trader can decrypt their outcome.
\end{itemize}
The performance cost is significant: a single TFHE-protected swap
requires approximately 100 bootstrapping operations ($\sim$10 seconds
at PN10QP27 parameters). This is acceptable for high-value RWA
trades but not for high-frequency token swaps.
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