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Bylines, paper authorship, correspondence addresses and the founder blurb under each post named an individual. They name the organisation that published the work instead: the brand on posts and pages, the research byline on papers, and research@ in place of a personal address. Both are what these repositories already used elsewhere — nothing new was coined. Co-authors are untouched. Where a paper named someone else alongside, they stay named; only the one byline changed. Bibliography entries, running heads, PDF metadata and affiliations move with it, so a citation still resolves to whoever the cited paper names. Sample and fixture data uses the placeholder name these tests already use elsewhere, so no assertion changed meaning.
63 lines
1.9 KiB
TeX
63 lines
1.9 KiB
TeX
\documentclass[11pt,a4paper]{article}
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\usepackage{../shared/luxcover}
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\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
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\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
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\usepackage{amsmath,amssymb,amsfonts,amsthm}
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\usepackage{graphicx}
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\usepackage{hyperref}
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\usepackage{booktabs}
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\usepackage{enumitem}
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\usepackage{xcolor}
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\hypersetup{colorlinks=true,linkcolor=black,citecolor=blue,urlcolor=blue}
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\newtheorem{theorem}{Theorem}[section]
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\newtheorem{definition}{Definition}[section]
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\newtheorem{remark}{Remark}[section]
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\title{LP-309: Quantum Network Comparison\\[4pt]
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\large Per-Chain Quantum Vulnerability Analysis and the\\
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Case for Post-Quantum Infrastructure}
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\author{
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Lux Research\thanks{Corresponding author: [email protected]}\\
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\textit{Lux Industries, Inc.}\\
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\texttt{[email protected]}
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}
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\date{Original: January 2025\quad|\quad Revised: March 2026}
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\begin{document}
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\luxcoverpage
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\begin{abstract}
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We analyze the quantum vulnerability of four major blockchain
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networks---Bitcoin, Ethereum, Solana, and Cardano---examining their
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key generation, address derivation, and transaction signing processes
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to determine the window of public key exposure available to a quantum
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adversary. We then describe how Lux Network's architecture mitigates
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these vulnerabilities through post-quantum consensus signatures,
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threshold key management with continuous rotation, and an X-Chain UTXO
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model that minimizes key exposure.
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This is not a hypothetical exercise. NIST estimates that
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cryptanalytically relevant quantum computers may emerge within 10--15
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years~\cite{nist-pqc-report}. Assets on-chain today will still be
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on-chain then. The time to migrate is now.
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\end{abstract}
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\tableofcontents
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\newpage
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%% ============================================================
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\input{sections/01-introduction}
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\input{sections/02-per-chain-analysis}
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\input{sections/03-comparative-summary}
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\input{sections/04-lux-network-s-post-quantum-architecture}
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\input{sections/05-applications-beyond-finance}
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\input{sections/99-conclusion}
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\end{document}
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