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zeekayandHanzo Dev
178febad68
Every rendered "T-Chain" / "ThresholdVM" / "teleportvm" reference across the paper corpus is rewritten to the correct canonical chain by concern: threshold signing / MPC / bridge custody / key recovery -> M-Chain (MVM); FHE / encrypted compute / threshold decryption -> F-Chain (FVM); teleport / cross-chain messaging -> B-Chain (bridgevm); consensus Pulsar stays Q-Chain. Section lux-trust-kernel/03-t-chain-threshold-governance.tex renamed -> 03-f-chain-encrypted-policy.tex (with \input + xref fixes). Braided "T-Chain" sections split by concern (M vs F). Only lp-020's chain-separation rationale and the shared lux/chains/thresholdvm library path retain the name, to record the removal. All changed papers rebuilt (pdflatex, rc=0, no undefined refs). ยง09 of lux-dao-governance-framework reframed: fabricated "production deployment" metrics ($50M/$240k/$12M, survey %s, "as of Oct 2024") relabeled as illustrative design configurations with no invented replacements; reality noted (DAO treasury is a 1/1 Safe); conclusion echo + one "first production" overclaim softened. This commit also captures concurrent corpus workstreams on the same tree. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
81 lines
3.2 KiB
TeX
81 lines
3.2 KiB
TeX
\section{Lux Network's Post-Quantum Architecture}
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\subsection{Consensus Layer}
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Quasar consensus (LP-020) uses a hybrid signature scheme:
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\begin{itemize}[nosep]
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\item \textbf{BLS-381}: Aggregate signatures for validator voting.
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Efficient ($\sim$48 bytes per signature), enabling compact block
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headers. Vulnerable to quantum attack via discrete log on
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pairing-friendly curves.
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\item \textbf{ML-DSA-65} (FIPS 204): NIST-standardized lattice-based
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signatures. 3.3\,KB signatures. Quantum-resistant under LWE
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hardness assumption.
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\item \textbf{Pulsar}: Module-LWE threshold signatures over the
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validator committee, byte-compatible with FIPS-204 ML-DSA
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verification. Post-quantum by construction.
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\end{itemize}
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The hybrid design provides defense in depth: if BLS is broken by a
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quantum adversary, ML-DSA and Pulsar signatures on the same blocks
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prevent consensus forgery.
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\subsection{X-Chain: UTXO with Minimal Exposure}
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Lux's X-Chain inherits the UTXO model. Each transaction output is
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associated with a fresh key. Public keys are revealed only at spending
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time, and the network's sub-second finality (via Quasar) minimizes
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the exposure window to under one second.
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\begin{remark}
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Compared to Bitcoin's 10-minute exposure window, Lux's sub-second
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finality reduces the quantum attack window by approximately
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$600\times$. This is not a substitute for post-quantum signatures---it
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is an additional defense layer.
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\end{remark}
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\subsection{EVM Precompiles}
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The Lux EVM provides post-quantum cryptographic operations as
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precompiled contracts in the reserved \texttt{0x0200} range (see
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\texttt{lux-evm-precompile-engineering.tex} for the canonical
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specification, addresses, and gas costs). Available primitives
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include ML-DSA-65 / SLH-DSA-128s / ML-KEM-768 verify and decapsulate,
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FROST and CGGMP21 threshold verification, Pulsar threshold verification,
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and TFHE evaluation gates.
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Smart contracts can verify post-quantum signatures natively, without
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off-chain computation or trusted oracles.
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\subsection{Bridge: MPC with Key Rotation}
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The Lux Bridge uses 2-of-3 MPC threshold signing for cross-chain
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transactions. Key rotation occurs at every withdrawal event:
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\begin{enumerate}[nosep]
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\item Validators perform distributed key generation (DKG) for a new
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signing key.
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\item The withdrawal transaction spends from the old multisig address
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and sends remaining funds to a new address derived from the new
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key.
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\item The old key's public component is exposed for the duration of
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the withdrawal transaction only.
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\end{enumerate}
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This ensures no ECDSA public key is exposed for more than the time
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required to confirm the withdrawal transaction. Combined with a
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policy of batching withdrawals (hourly or daily), the total key
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exposure across a year is measured in hours, not the permanent
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exposure of Ethereum accounts.
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\subsection{Hybrid Encryption: X-Wing}
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For key encapsulation and encrypted communication, Lux uses X-Wing
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(X25519 + ML-KEM-768 hybrid) implemented in \texttt{luxfi/age}. This
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provides post-quantum confidentiality: an adversary must break
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\emph{both} the elliptic curve and lattice components to decrypt.
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%% ============================================================
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