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Every rendered "T-Chain" / "ThresholdVM" / "teleportvm" reference across the paper corpus is rewritten to the correct canonical chain by concern: threshold signing / MPC / bridge custody / key recovery -> M-Chain (MVM); FHE / encrypted compute / threshold decryption -> F-Chain (FVM); teleport / cross-chain messaging -> B-Chain (bridgevm); consensus Pulsar stays Q-Chain. Section lux-trust-kernel/03-t-chain-threshold-governance.tex renamed -> 03-f-chain-encrypted-policy.tex (with \input + xref fixes). Braided "T-Chain" sections split by concern (M vs F). Only lp-020's chain-separation rationale and the shared lux/chains/thresholdvm library path retain the name, to record the removal. All changed papers rebuilt (pdflatex, rc=0, no undefined refs). ยง09 of lux-dao-governance-framework reframed: fabricated "production deployment" metrics ($50M/$240k/$12M, survey %s, "as of Oct 2024") relabeled as illustrative design configurations with no invented replacements; reality noted (DAO treasury is a 1/1 Safe); conclusion echo + one "first production" overclaim softened. This commit also captures concurrent corpus workstreams on the same tree. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
43 lines
1.5 KiB
TeX
43 lines
1.5 KiB
TeX
\section{Future Work}
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%% +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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\subsection{Post-Quantum Full Migration (Phase 3)}
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Complete migration to post-quantum cryptography:
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\begin{itemize}[leftmargin=1.1em]
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\item Corona as primary threshold signature (replacing CGGMP21/FROST)
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\item Quantum-resistant P3Q (\texttt{luxfi/p3q}) proofs for fraud proofs
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\item ML-KEM (FIPS 203) for key exchange in relayer network
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\item Target: Phase 3 activation by 2035
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\end{itemize}
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\subsection{Proactive Secret Sharing}
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Automatic key rotation without changing aggregate public keys:
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\begin{itemize}[leftmargin=1.1em]
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\item Periodic re-sharing of MPC key shares (30-day cycles)
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\item Mitigates slow key leakage attacks
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\item Leaves the aggregate public key unchanged, so deployed bridge contracts need no update
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\end{itemize}
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\subsection{Confidential Multi-Token Bridging}
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Extending confidential transfers with:
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\begin{itemize}[leftmargin=1.1em]
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\item Multi-token private swaps during bridge transfer (lock token $A$, receive token $B$)
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\item Confidential rate limits (rate limiting without revealing individual amounts)
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\item TFHE-accelerated batch settlement
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\end{itemize}
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\subsection{Cross-VM Bridges}
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Extending bridge to non-EVM chains:
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\begin{itemize}[leftmargin=1.1em]
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\item Solana via native program verification
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\item Polkadot via XCM adapters
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\item Remaining Lean~4 proof coverage: 15/45 consensus theorems in progress
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\end{itemize}
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%% +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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