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zooqueen
a10bf7bbc6
- canonical lux-corona-pq paper: rank-7 Module-LWE (A in R_q^{8x7}, q=48-bit), Module-SIS
- scrub residual Corona Ring-LWE/R-LWE labels across ethos-of-lux, pqsafe-il5,
lux-whitepaper, lux-quasar-composition, lp-020; Corona<->Pulsar = parameter regime,
both Module-LWE (not rank-1-vs-rank-k)
- LLM.md: drop stale 'Corona as rank-1' wobble note; align to code/Ringtail params
- rebuild affected PDFs
57 lines
3.1 KiB
TeX
57 lines
3.1 KiB
TeX
\section{Integration with Lux Quasar}
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\label{sec:integration}
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Corona is composed under the Lux Quasar consensus engine as the intra-lattice diversity
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leg of multi-leg finality certificates. A Quasar certificate profile bundles
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independently verifiable signature legs, each of which must validate for finality:
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\begin{enumerate}[nosep]
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\item \textbf{BLS leg}: classical BLS12-381 threshold signatures provide the fast
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(1-round) aggregation lane.
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\item \textbf{Pulsar leg}: threshold ML-DSA over Module-LWE (FIPS~204 byte-equal,
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LP-4450) is the post-quantum floor.
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\item \textbf{Corona leg}: this scheme---two-round Module-LWE, Ringtail-derived---is the
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intra-lattice diversity leg, profile-selectable alongside Pulsar.
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\end{enumerate}
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\noindent The \textbf{Aurora} certificate profile (LP-4900) is Pulsar $\|$ Corona; the
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\textbf{Polaris} profile (LP-4910) is Pulsar $\|$ Corona $\|$ Magnetar, adding the
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hash-based Magnetar leg (SLH-DSA, LP-4540).
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\paragraph{Diversity caveat.}
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Corona and Pulsar are \emph{both} Module-LWE constructions; they differ by parameter
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regime, lifecycle, and codebase, not by module rank. The Pulsar~$\|$~Corona composition
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of Aurora is therefore \emph{intra-lattice} defence-in-depth---different code paths,
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different parameter sets, different rejection samplers---and is honestly \emph{not}
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family-disjoint hardness: a structural break of the cyclotomic-ring module lattice
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problem could in principle touch both legs. True cross-family diversity is provided by the
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hash-based Magnetar leg in the Polaris profile, whose security rests on hash (SLH-DSA,
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FIPS~205) rather than lattices. Aurora buys implementation and parameter diversity;
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Polaris buys cryptographic-family diversity.
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\subsection{On-Chain Verification}
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A Corona threshold signature is verified by the native EVM precompile at the raw slot
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\texttt{0x012206} (LP-0120): the precompile checks the aggregated two-round signature
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against the group public key in $\sim$1.6\,ms. Under the P3Q unified rollup-batch verifier
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(LP-218 / LP-220) Corona is \textbf{kind byte \texttt{0x02}} at slot \texttt{0x012205};
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the raw \texttt{0x012206} path remains for non-rollup-batch use.
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\subsection{Permissionless Key Lifecycle}
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Corona's distributed key generation (Algorithm~\ref{alg:keygen}) runs leaderless over the
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\emph{current} validator set, with no trusted dealer, anchored to the Q-Chain ceremony
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root $\rho$. As validators join and leave permissionlessly, the key material is reshared
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across generations: each generation re-runs the DKG over the new set while holding the
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group public key fixed for cross-generation verification, and snapshots are committed
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on-chain. Rotation is rate-limited (a minimum dwell between rotations) and force-rotated
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on an upper bound, so a churning validator set cannot exhaust the rotation machinery.
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This permissionless, on-chain-anchored lifecycle---rather than any change to the
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underlying two-round lattice algebra---is what adapts the academic threshold construction
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to a public chain.
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%% -----------------------------------------------------------------------
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%% 6. EVALUATION
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%% -----------------------------------------------------------------------
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