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Bylines, paper authorship, correspondence addresses and the founder blurb under each post named an individual. They name the organisation that published the work instead: the brand on posts and pages, the research byline on papers, and research@ in place of a personal address. Both are what these repositories already used elsewhere — nothing new was coined. Co-authors are untouched. Where a paper named someone else alongside, they stay named; only the one byline changed. Bibliography entries, running heads, PDF metadata and affiliations move with it, so a citation still resolves to whoever the cited paper names. Sample and fixture data uses the placeholder name these tests already use elsewhere, so no assertion changed meaning.
52 lines
2.5 KiB
TeX
52 lines
2.5 KiB
TeX
\documentclass[11pt,a4paper]{article}
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\usepackage{../shared/luxcover}
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\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
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\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
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\usepackage{amsmath,amssymb,amsfonts,amsthm}
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\usepackage{hyperref}
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\usepackage{booktabs}
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\usepackage{enumitem}
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\usepackage{algorithm}
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\usepackage{algpseudocode}
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\usepackage{xcolor}
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\usepackage{tikz}
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\usetikzlibrary{arrows.meta,positioning,shapes.geometric,fit}
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\hypersetup{colorlinks=true,linkcolor=black,citecolor=blue,urlcolor=blue}
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\newtheorem{theorem}{Theorem}[section]
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\newtheorem{lemma}[theorem]{Lemma}
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\newtheorem{definition}{Definition}[section]
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\newtheorem{invariant}{Invariant}[section]
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\title{Security Architecture for\\Multi-Chain Networks}
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\author{
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Lux Research \\
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Lux Industries, Inc.\\
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\texttt{[email protected]}
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}
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\date{Original: 2023\quad|\quad Revised: February 2026}
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\begin{document}
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\luxcoverpage
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\begin{abstract}
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We analyze the security architecture of multi-chain blockchain networks where multiple specialized chains share a common validator set. The Lux Network operates three primary chains (P-Chain for platform governance, X-Chain for asset transfers, C-Chain for EVM computation) plus application-specific chains (D-Chain DEX, F-Chain FHE, M-Chain MPC, G-Chain GraphQL). Security in this architecture is not the security of any individual chain---it is the security of the cross-chain composition. We identify four classes of cross-chain attack: bridge exploits via message forgery, replay attacks across chain boundaries, finality mismatch exploitation, and validator set desynchronization. We formalize the security inheritance model by which application chains derive their security from the primary network's shared validator set and triple-proof consensus. We specify the Warp messaging protocol's authenticated cross-chain communication, including domain separators, typed payload hashing, and nonce tracking. We prove that triple-proof finality propagation across chains ensures that a transaction finalized on any chain is finalized on all chains within one epoch (1 second).
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\end{abstract}
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\input{sections/01-introduction}
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\input{sections/02-chain-architecture}
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\input{sections/03-trust-separation-model}
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\input{sections/04-cross-chain-attack-surfaces}
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\input{sections/05-warp-messaging-protocol}
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\input{sections/06-replay-protection}
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\input{sections/07-security-inheritance-for-application-cha}
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\input{sections/08-triple-proof-finality-propagation}
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\input{sections/09-quantitative-security-analysis}
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\input{sections/99-conclusion}
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\end{document}
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