papers/lux-dao-governance-framework/sections/09-production-deployments.tex

\section{Deployment Model and Illustrative Configurations}

This section describes how the framework is intended to be deployed and
gives \emph{illustrative} governance configurations that exercise its
capabilities. The configurations below are design scenarios, not audited
production measurements: participation rates, treasury sizes, proposal
counts, and survey figures are deliberately omitted rather than
estimated, because no verified operational dataset exists at the time of
writing.

\subsection{Current Reality}

The Lux DAO treasury is presently held in a \textbf{1-of-1 Safe}
(single-signer multisig) pending progressive decentralization to the
on-chain governance module described in this paper. The framework
targets EVM networks broadly (Ethereum mainnet, Optimism, Polygon, Base,
and their testnets); a live census of deployed DAOs and executed
proposals is intentionally not asserted here until an on-chain indexer
publishes verifiable counts. Any figures a reader needs for planning
should be read from chain state, not from this document.

\subsection{Illustrative Configuration Scenarios}

The following scenarios show how the framework's primitives compose for
different organizational shapes. They specify \emph{configuration}
(the design surface); they do not report measured outcomes.

\subsubsection{Scenario 1: Token + NFT Weighted DeFi DAO}

\textbf{Shape}: a protocol DAO combining fungible-token and
genesis-NFT voting weight.

\textbf{Configuration}:
\begin{itemize}
    \item 70\% voting weight from the protocol token (ERC-20)
    \item 30\% voting weight from genesis NFTs (ERC-721)
    \item 5-day voting period
    \item 24-hour timelock
    \item 10\% quorum requirement
    \item 60\% approval threshold
\end{itemize}

\textbf{What the configuration provides}: a hybrid weighting that keeps
long-term NFT holders influential while broad token holders retain
majority weight; gasless (meta-transaction) voting to lower the
participation barrier; and a timelock that gives the community a fixed
window to react to any passed proposal before execution.

\subsubsection{Scenario 2: Role-Based Media DAO with Payment Streaming}

\textbf{Shape}: a contributor collective governed by roles rather than
pure token weight.

\textbf{Configuration}:
\begin{itemize}
    \item Role-based governance using Hats Protocol
    \item Core roles carrying scoped permissions and payment streams
    \item 3-tier hierarchy (Editorial $\rightarrow$ Department $\rightarrow$ Contributor)
    \item Periodic role elections via governance
    \item ERC-6551 token-bound accounts for automated, streamable compensation
\end{itemize}

\textbf{What the configuration provides}: compensation that follows
role assignment automatically (via token-bound accounts and streaming),
and organizational restructuring expressed as ordinary governance
actions rather than off-chain administration.

\subsubsection{Scenario 3: Parent--Child DAO Hierarchy}

\textbf{Shape}: an investment DAO with sector-specific sub-DAOs.

\textbf{Configuration}:
\begin{itemize}
    \item Parent DAO controls high-level strategy
    \item Child DAOs manage sector-specific mandates
    \item Freeze mechanism for emergency intervention on a child
    \item Cross-DAO treasury coordination
    \item Coordinated proposal execution across the hierarchy
\end{itemize}

\textbf{What the configuration provides}: delegated autonomy to sub-DAOs
under a parent that retains a scoped emergency-freeze control, so a
compromised or misbehaving child can be paused without dissolving the
hierarchy.

\subsection{Anticipated Benefits}

The framework is designed so that: gasless voting removes fee friction
as a barrier to participation; multiple voting strategies let an
organization pick the weighting that matches its legitimacy model;
governance parameters can be adjusted over time without redeploying;
and role-based organization offers a more intuitive mental model than
pure token voting for contributor-driven groups. These are design
intentions; empirical validation awaits published on-chain data and a
structured user study, neither of which is claimed here.