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zeekayandHanzo Dev
178febad68
Every rendered "T-Chain" / "ThresholdVM" / "teleportvm" reference across the paper corpus is rewritten to the correct canonical chain by concern: threshold signing / MPC / bridge custody / key recovery -> M-Chain (MVM); FHE / encrypted compute / threshold decryption -> F-Chain (FVM); teleport / cross-chain messaging -> B-Chain (bridgevm); consensus Pulsar stays Q-Chain. Section lux-trust-kernel/03-t-chain-threshold-governance.tex renamed -> 03-f-chain-encrypted-policy.tex (with \input + xref fixes). Braided "T-Chain" sections split by concern (M vs F). Only lp-020's chain-separation rationale and the shared lux/chains/thresholdvm library path retain the name, to record the removal. All changed papers rebuilt (pdflatex, rc=0, no undefined refs). ยง09 of lux-dao-governance-framework reframed: fabricated "production deployment" metrics ($50M/$240k/$12M, survey %s, "as of Oct 2024") relabeled as illustrative design configurations with no invented replacements; reality noted (DAO treasury is a 1/1 Safe); conclusion echo + one "first production" overclaim softened. This commit also captures concurrent corpus workstreams on the same tree. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
44 lines
2.0 KiB
TeX
44 lines
2.0 KiB
TeX
\section{Security Analysis}
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%%==========================================================================
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\subsection{Validator Incentive Alignment}
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The proposed mechanisms are incentive-compatible in the following sense:
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\begin{theorem}[Validator Truthfulness]
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Under Mechanism C with the ASF protocol, it is a dominant strategy for validators to
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truthfully report their capacity $K$ and honestly participate in appchains they have opted into.
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\end{theorem}
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\begin{proof}[Proof Sketch]
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Overstating $K$ leads to accepting more appchains than the validator can serve, triggering
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liveness faults and reputation slashing. Understating $K$ forgoes positive-value
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opportunities. Hence truthful reporting maximizes expected utility. Dishonest participation
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(agreeing to validate but not validating) triggers liveness slash penalties that exceed
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the validator's potential gain from saved resources.
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\end{proof}
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\subsection{Collusion Resistance}
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A coalition of validators might coordinate to extract MEV without sharing proceeds
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through the CAMO mechanism. The CAMO is resistant to such collusion because:
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\begin{enumerate}[leftmargin=1.5em]
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\item Lux Teleport bridges emit on-chain events visible to the CAMO oracle;
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\item Any cross-appchain arbitrage that bypasses the CAMO auction is detectable by
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comparing Lux Teleport event timestamps with block production timestamps;
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\item Detected collusion triggers a reputation slash of 50 points per incident.
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\end{enumerate}
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\subsection{Economic Attack Resistance}
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We consider an attacker who creates many low-cost appchains to manipulate the ASF
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distribution (collecting ASF revenue by artificially inflating appchain transaction counts).
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The ASF formula (Eq.~\ref{eq:surcharge}) ties surcharge amounts to observed security
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$\Pi(s)$, which requires real staked capital. An attacker cannot inflate transaction
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count without also posting economic collateral proportional to their claimed security,
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making the attack unprofitable.
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%%==========================================================================
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