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Bylines, paper authorship, correspondence addresses and the founder blurb under each post named an individual. They name the organisation that published the work instead: the brand on posts and pages, the research byline on papers, and research@ in place of a personal address. Both are what these repositories already used elsewhere — nothing new was coined. Co-authors are untouched. Where a paper named someone else alongside, they stay named; only the one byline changed. Bibliography entries, running heads, PDF metadata and affiliations move with it, so a citation still resolves to whoever the cited paper names. Sample and fixture data uses the placeholder name these tests already use elsewhere, so no assertion changed meaning.
52 lines
2.4 KiB
TeX
52 lines
2.4 KiB
TeX
\documentclass[11pt,a4paper]{article}
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\usepackage{../shared/luxcover}
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\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
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\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
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\usepackage{amsmath,amssymb,amsfonts,amsthm}
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\usepackage{hyperref}
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\usepackage{booktabs}
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\usepackage{enumitem}
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\usepackage{algorithm}
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\usepackage{algpseudocode}
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\usepackage{xcolor}
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\usepackage{tikz}
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\usetikzlibrary{arrows.meta,positioning,shapes.geometric,fit}
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\hypersetup{colorlinks=true,linkcolor=black,citecolor=blue,urlcolor=blue}
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\newtheorem{theorem}{Theorem}[section]
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\newtheorem{lemma}[theorem]{Lemma}
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\newtheorem{definition}{Definition}[section]
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\newtheorem{property}{Property}[section]
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\title{FHE + MPC Hybrid Systems\\for Trustless Private Computation}
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\author{
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Lux Research \\
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Lux Industries, Inc.\\
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\texttt{[email protected]}
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}
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\date{2024}
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\begin{document}
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\luxcoverpage
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\begin{abstract}
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We present a hybrid cryptographic architecture combining Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) and Multi-Party Computation (MPC) to achieve trustless private computation. FHE alone computes on encrypted data but concentrates trust in whoever holds the decryption key. MPC alone distributes trust but requires data sharing among participants. The hybrid approach eliminates both weaknesses: FHE handles encrypted computation while MPC distributes the decryption key via threshold secret sharing, ensuring no single party can decrypt intermediate results. We formalize the construction using TFHE for boolean circuit evaluation and FROST-based threshold decryption for key distribution. We demonstrate the architecture on a private orderbook matching engine where $N$ market participants submit encrypted orders, the matching engine evaluates the order book homomorphically, and a $t$-of-$n$ MPC committee decrypts only the matched trades. No party---including the matcher---ever observes the full order book in cleartext. The implementation runs on LiquidFHE (Lux F-Chain) with M-Chain MPC providing threshold decryption, achieving 47ms per encrypted order match at NIST Level 1 security.
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\end{abstract}
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\input{sections/01-introduction}
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\input{sections/02-threat-model}
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\input{sections/03-fhe-background-tfhe}
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\input{sections/04-threshold-decryption-via-mpc}
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\input{sections/05-frost-fhe-key-shares}
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\input{sections/06-application-private-orderbook-matching}
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\input{sections/07-implementation-on-lux}
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\input{sections/08-multi-party-encrypted-workflows}
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\input{sections/09-comparison-with-alternative-approaches}
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\input{sections/99-conclusion}
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\end{document}
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