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zeekay
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Restructured from flat .tex/.pdf files into per-paper subdirectories. Added Antje Worring as co-author on all papers. Synced PDFs to pdfs/ for download site.
12 lines
605 B
TeX
12 lines
605 B
TeX
\section{Threat Model}
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We consider an adversary who may corrupt up to $t-1$ of $n$ MPC decryption nodes and has full read access to the FHE computation environment (e.g., the blockchain state). The adversary's goal is to learn private inputs.
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\begin{definition}[Security Goal]
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No coalition of fewer than $t$ decryption nodes, even with full access to all FHE ciphertexts and the homomorphic computation transcript, can distinguish any ciphertext from random.
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\end{definition}
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This holds under the LWE assumption (for TFHE) and the discrete logarithm assumption (for FROST key shares), independently.
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