Files
zeekay f4ee7a0525 Publish under the org, not a person
Bylines, paper authorship, correspondence addresses and the founder blurb under
each post named an individual. They name the organisation that published the
work instead: the brand on posts and pages, the research byline on papers, and
research@ in place of a personal address. Both are what these repositories
already used elsewhere — nothing new was coined.

Co-authors are untouched. Where a paper named someone else alongside, they stay
named; only the one byline changed. Bibliography entries, running heads,
PDF metadata and affiliations move with it, so a citation still resolves to
whoever the cited paper names.

Sample and fixture data uses the placeholder name these tests already use
elsewhere, so no assertion changed meaning.
2026-09-01 08:58:10 -07:00

77 lines
3.0 KiB
TeX

\documentclass[11pt,a4paper]{article}
\usepackage{../shared/luxcover}
\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
\usepackage{amsmath,amssymb,amsfonts,amsthm}
\usepackage{graphicx}
\usepackage{hyperref}
\usepackage{algorithm}
\usepackage{algpseudocode}
\usepackage{xcolor}
\usepackage{booktabs}
\usepackage{enumitem}
\usepackage{tikz}
\hypersetup{colorlinks=true,linkcolor=black,citecolor=blue,urlcolor=blue}
\newtheorem{theorem}{Theorem}[section]
\newtheorem{lemma}[theorem]{Lemma}
\newtheorem{corollary}[theorem]{Corollary}
\newtheorem{proposition}[theorem]{Proposition}
\newtheorem{definition}{Definition}[section]
\newtheorem{remark}{Remark}[section]
\title{\textbf{Flare Protocol: Certificate Skip Exclusivity\\with Honest Support in DAG Consensus}}
\author{
Lux Research\thanks{Corresponding author: [email protected]}\\
\textit{Lux Industries, Inc.}\\
\texttt{[email protected]}
}
\date{2024}
\begin{document}
\luxcoverpage
\begin{abstract}
We present the Flare protocol, a conviction-based consensus mechanism that introduces
the \emph{certificate/skip} paradigm for finality in DAG-structured transaction sets.
Flare extends the Slush stochastic sampling primitive with a conviction counter that
tracks consecutive rounds of supermajority agreement. A validator \emph{certifies} a
transaction when its conviction counter reaches threshold $\beta_2$, producing a
cryptographic certificate. If the validator's preference switches before certification,
the counter resets---a \emph{skip}---and the validator must rebuild conviction from zero.
We prove the \emph{Certificate Skip Exclusivity} (CSE) theorem: in any execution
with honest supermajority, at most one color can accumulate $\beta_2$ consecutive
supermajority rounds across the honest validator population, ensuring that conflicting
certificates cannot coexist. The proof leverages the \emph{honest support invariant}:
if an honest validator certifies color $c$, then more than $2/3$ of honest validators
must have supported $c$ during every round of the conviction streak, creating an
information-theoretic barrier against simultaneous certification of opposing colors.
We analyze the protocol's resistance to \emph{luring attacks} where the adversary
attempts to split honest validators by strategic equivocation, proving that the
probability of successfully creating two certificates for opposing colors is bounded by
$e^{-\Omega(k\beta_2)}$. Empirical evaluation on a 500-node testnet demonstrates
sub-second finality with median 6 rounds to certification.
\end{abstract}
\tableofcontents
\newpage
%% -----------------------------------------------------------------------
%% 1. INTRODUCTION
%% -----------------------------------------------------------------------
\input{sections/01-introduction}
\input{sections/02-system-model}
\input{sections/03-the-flare-protocol}
\input{sections/04-certificate-skip-exclusivity}
\input{sections/05-luring-attack-analysis}
\input{sections/06-comparison-with-wave}
\input{sections/07-empirical-evaluation}
\input{sections/08-related-work}
\input{sections/99-conclusion}
\end{document}