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zeekayandHanzo Dev
178febad68
Every rendered "T-Chain" / "ThresholdVM" / "teleportvm" reference across the paper corpus is rewritten to the correct canonical chain by concern: threshold signing / MPC / bridge custody / key recovery -> M-Chain (MVM); FHE / encrypted compute / threshold decryption -> F-Chain (FVM); teleport / cross-chain messaging -> B-Chain (bridgevm); consensus Pulsar stays Q-Chain. Section lux-trust-kernel/03-t-chain-threshold-governance.tex renamed -> 03-f-chain-encrypted-policy.tex (with \input + xref fixes). Braided "T-Chain" sections split by concern (M vs F). Only lp-020's chain-separation rationale and the shared lux/chains/thresholdvm library path retain the name, to record the removal. All changed papers rebuilt (pdflatex, rc=0, no undefined refs). ยง09 of lux-dao-governance-framework reframed: fabricated "production deployment" metrics ($50M/$240k/$12M, survey %s, "as of Oct 2024") relabeled as illustrative design configurations with no invented replacements; reality noted (DAO treasury is a 1/1 Safe); conclusion echo + one "first production" overclaim softened. This commit also captures concurrent corpus workstreams on the same tree. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
82 lines
2.3 KiB
TeX
82 lines
2.3 KiB
TeX
\section{Security and Attack Prevention}
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\subsection{Governance Attack Vectors}
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\textbf{Common Attacks}:
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\begin{enumerate}
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\item \textbf{51\% Attack}: Attacker acquires majority voting power
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\item \textbf{Sybil Attack}: Creating multiple fake identities to inflate voting power
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\item \textbf{Bribery Attack}: Paying voters to vote particular way
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\item \textbf{Flash Loan Attack}: Borrowing tokens temporarily to vote
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\item \textbf{Front-Running}: Observing vote outcomes and acting before execution
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\end{enumerate}
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\subsection{Mitigation Strategies}
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\textbf{1. Time-Locked Staking}:
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\begin{itemize}
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\item Tokens must be staked for $\geq$ 7 days before gaining voting power
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\item Prevents flash loan attacks
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\item Snapshot voting power at proposal creation block
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\end{itemize}
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\textbf{2. Quadratic Voting}:
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\begin{itemize}
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\item Cost of $n$ votes: $n^2$ tokens
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\item Reduces whale dominance
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\item Makes vote buying less economically viable
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\end{itemize}
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\textbf{3. Validator Verification}:
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\begin{itemize}
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\item Validators must prove stake and identity
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\item Enhanced security through validator consensus
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\item Slashing for malicious voting behavior
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\end{itemize}
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\textbf{4. Proposal Deposits}:
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\begin{itemize}
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\item Proposers stake 100-1000 LUX (refunded if approved)
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\item Prevents spam proposals
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\item Slashed if proposal determined malicious
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\end{itemize}
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\textbf{5. Emergency Pause}:
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\begin{itemize}
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\item 5-of-7 multisig can pause governance in emergency
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\item Multisig controlled by trusted community members
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\item Transparent 48-hour timelock on pause activation
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\end{itemize}
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\subsection{Post-Quantum Security}
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Governance signatures use Quasar dual-certificate system:
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\begin{lstlisting}[language=Solidity,caption=Quantum-secure governance signature]
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struct GovernanceSignature {
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// Classical security (BLS aggregate)
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bytes48 blsSignature;
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// Quantum security (Pulsar lattice-based)
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bytes pulsarSignature; // ~2.5KB
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// Validator index in committee
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uint16 validatorIndex;
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// Proposal being signed
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uint256 proposalId;
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}
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function verifyGovernanceVote(
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GovernanceSignature calldata sig
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) external view returns (bool) {
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// Both signatures must verify
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bool classicalValid = verifyBLS(sig);
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bool quantumValid = verifyPulsar(sig);
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return classicalValid && quantumValid;
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}
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\end{lstlisting}
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