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Bylines, paper authorship, correspondence addresses and the founder blurb under each post named an individual. They name the organisation that published the work instead: the brand on posts and pages, the research byline on papers, and research@ in place of a personal address. Both are what these repositories already used elsewhere — nothing new was coined. Co-authors are untouched. Where a paper named someone else alongside, they stay named; only the one byline changed. Bibliography entries, running heads, PDF metadata and affiliations move with it, so a citation still resolves to whoever the cited paper names. Sample and fixture data uses the placeholder name these tests already use elsewhere, so no assertion changed meaning.
77 lines
2.7 KiB
TeX
77 lines
2.7 KiB
TeX
\documentclass[11pt,a4paper]{article}
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\usepackage{../shared/luxcover}
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\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
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\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
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\usepackage{amsmath,amssymb,amsfonts,amsthm}
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\usepackage{graphicx}
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\usepackage{hyperref}
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\usepackage{algorithm}
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\usepackage{algpseudocode}
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\usepackage{xcolor}
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\usepackage{booktabs}
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\usepackage{enumitem}
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\usepackage{tikz}
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\usepackage{tabularx}
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\hypersetup{colorlinks=true,linkcolor=black,citecolor=blue,urlcolor=blue}
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\newtheorem{theorem}{Theorem}[section]
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\newtheorem{lemma}[theorem]{Lemma}
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\newtheorem{corollary}[theorem]{Corollary}
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\newtheorem{proposition}[theorem]{Proposition}
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\newtheorem{definition}{Definition}[section]
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\newtheorem{remark}{Remark}[section]
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\title{\textbf{Hybrid Post-Quantum Cryptographic Architecture\\for Blockchain Systems}}
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\author{
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Lux Research \\
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\textit{Lux Industries, Inc.}\\
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\texttt{[email protected]}
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}
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\date{2024}
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\begin{document}
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\luxcoverpage
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\begin{abstract}
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We present a hybrid cryptographic architecture that combines classical elliptic curve
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primitives (BLS12-381, ECDH on Curve25519) with NIST post-quantum standards (ML-DSA
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FIPS~204, ML-KEM FIPS~203) via dual-signature and key-combiner constructions. The core
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security property is \emph{compositional resilience}: an attacker must break \emph{both}
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the classical and post-quantum components simultaneously to compromise any authenticated
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message or key agreement. We prove this property formally under standard assumptions
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(co-CDH for BLS, Module-LWE for ML-DSA/ML-KEM) and show that the hybrid construction
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is strictly stronger than either component during the transition period when the
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relative security of lattice assumptions remains uncertain. The architecture is
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implemented as native EVM precompiles on the Lux C-Chain, adding 678\,$\mu$s to
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signature generation (ML-DSA-65 keygen) and 1.2\,KB to signature size (dual BLS +
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ML-DSA), while preserving backward compatibility with existing BLS-only validators.
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We provide concrete benchmarks, a migration schedule, and an analysis of the
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harvest-now-decrypt-later threat that motivates immediate hybrid deployment rather
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than a wait-and-see approach.
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\textbf{Keywords}: hybrid cryptography, post-quantum, ML-DSA, ML-KEM, BLS,
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key combiner, blockchain
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\end{abstract}
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\tableofcontents
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\newpage
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%% ========================================================================
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%% 1. INTRODUCTION
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%% ========================================================================
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\input{sections/01-introduction}
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\input{sections/02-threat-model}
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\input{sections/03-dual-signature-construction}
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\input{sections/04-hybrid-key-exchange}
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\input{sections/05-forward-secrecy}
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\input{sections/06-implementation}
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\input{sections/07-related-work}
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\input{sections/99-conclusion}
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\end{document}
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