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Restructured from flat .tex/.pdf files into per-paper subdirectories. Added Antje Worring as co-author on all papers. Synced PDFs to pdfs/ for download site.
43 lines
2.2 KiB
TeX
43 lines
2.2 KiB
TeX
\section{Introduction}
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\label{sec:introduction}
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The development of cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs) poses an
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existential threat to the elliptic curve cryptography underpinning every major
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blockchain. Shor's algorithm factors integers and computes discrete logarithms in
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polynomial time on a quantum computer, rendering ECDSA (secp256k1), EdDSA (Ed25519),
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and BLS (BLS12-381) insecure. NIST standardized three post-quantum algorithms in
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August 2024: ML-KEM (FIPS~203)~\cite{fips203}, ML-DSA (FIPS~204)~\cite{fips204},
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and SLH-DSA (FIPS~205)~\cite{fips205}. These are believed secure against quantum
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adversaries, but their underlying lattice and hash-based assumptions lack the
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decades of cryptanalytic scrutiny enjoyed by elliptic curves.
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This creates a dilemma. Deploying post-quantum algorithms alone risks relying on
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assumptions that may prove weaker than expected. Retaining classical algorithms
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alone leaves the system vulnerable to quantum attack. The \emph{hybrid} approach---
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requiring both a classical and a post-quantum signature to validate, or combining
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both a classical and post-quantum key exchange to derive session keys---eliminates
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this dilemma entirely: security degrades only if \emph{both} assumptions fail
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simultaneously.
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We formalize this intuition for the blockchain setting. Our contributions:
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\begin{enumerate}[leftmargin=2em]
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\item A formal threat model for harvest-now-decrypt-later (HNDL) attacks against
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blockchain infrastructure (Section~\ref{sec:threat-model}).
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\item Dual-signature construction: BLS12-381 + ML-DSA-65, with a proof that
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compromise requires breaking both co-CDH and Module-LWE
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(Section~\ref{sec:dual-sig}).
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\item Hybrid key exchange: ECDH (Curve25519) + ML-KEM-768, with a key combiner
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construction preserving IND-CCA2 security
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(Section~\ref{sec:hybrid-kex}).
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\item Forward secrecy analysis for the hybrid construction
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(Section~\ref{sec:forward-secrecy}).
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\item Lux precompile implementation and benchmarks
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(Section~\ref{sec:implementation}).
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\end{enumerate}
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%% ========================================================================
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%% 2. THREAT MODEL
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%% ========================================================================
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