mirror of
https://github.com/lux-apps/papers.git
synced 2026-11-03 05:07:46 +00:00
zeekay
f4ee7a0525
Bylines, paper authorship, correspondence addresses and the founder blurb under each post named an individual. They name the organisation that published the work instead: the brand on posts and pages, the research byline on papers, and research@ in place of a personal address. Both are what these repositories already used elsewhere — nothing new was coined. Co-authors are untouched. Where a paper named someone else alongside, they stay named; only the one byline changed. Bibliography entries, running heads, PDF metadata and affiliations move with it, so a citation still resolves to whoever the cited paper names. Sample and fixture data uses the placeholder name these tests already use elsewhere, so no assertion changed meaning.
216 lines
7.6 KiB
TeX
216 lines
7.6 KiB
TeX
\documentclass[11pt,a4paper]{article}
|
|
\usepackage{../shared/luxcover}
|
|
\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
|
|
\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
|
|
\usepackage{amsmath,amssymb,amsfonts,amsthm}
|
|
\usepackage{hyperref}
|
|
\usepackage{booktabs}
|
|
\usepackage{enumitem}
|
|
\usepackage{longtable}
|
|
\usepackage{array}
|
|
\usepackage{algorithm}
|
|
\usepackage{algpseudocode}
|
|
\usepackage{xcolor}
|
|
\usepackage{tikz}
|
|
\usetikzlibrary{arrows.meta,positioning,shapes.geometric,fit,calc}
|
|
|
|
\hypersetup{colorlinks=true,linkcolor=black,citecolor=blue,urlcolor=blue}
|
|
|
|
\newtheorem{theorem}{Theorem}[section]
|
|
\newtheorem{lemma}[theorem]{Lemma}
|
|
\newtheorem{corollary}[theorem]{Corollary}
|
|
\newtheorem{proposition}[theorem]{Proposition}
|
|
\newtheorem{definition}{Definition}[section]
|
|
\newtheorem{remark}{Remark}[section]
|
|
\newtheorem{requirement}{Requirement}[section]
|
|
|
|
\title{Institutional Digital Asset Custody\\at the Eight Billion Dollar Tier}
|
|
|
|
\author{
|
|
Lux Research\thanks{Corresponding author: [email protected]}\\
|
|
\textit{Lux Industries, Inc.}\\
|
|
\texttt{[email protected]}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
\date{2026}
|
|
|
|
\begin{document}
|
|
|
|
\luxcoverpage
|
|
|
|
\begin{abstract}
|
|
We present a reference custody architecture for institutional digital
|
|
asset holdings at the eight billion dollar tier (\$8B AUM, BTC and
|
|
ETH). The architecture is structured as a three-tier signing hierarchy:
|
|
a cold tier holding 95\% of assets behind a 3-of-5 threshold across
|
|
five geographically and administratively independent hardware security
|
|
modules; a warm tier holding 4\% behind a 2-of-3 threshold across
|
|
three independent cloud HSMs; and a hot tier holding 1\% behind a
|
|
2-of-2 threshold with a per-transaction time-lock for trading desk
|
|
operations. All three tiers use threshold multi-party computation
|
|
(MPC) signing -- specifically CGGMP21 for ECDSA (Bitcoin and
|
|
Ethereum) -- such that the custody policy is invisible to the
|
|
underlying chain and signing latency matches single-key signers.
|
|
The design eliminates any single party (custodian, cloud provider,
|
|
geography, ops team) capable of unilateral asset movement, satisfies
|
|
FIPS 140-2 Level 3 on every signing component, and maps to SOC 2 Type
|
|
II, ISO 27001, CCSS Level 3, MiCA (EU), MAS PSF (Singapore), and
|
|
NYDFS BitLicense (US) compliance frameworks. Post-quantum hedging is
|
|
provided through Lux Triple Consensus (BLS plus Pulsar plus ML-DSA,
|
|
LP-020) at the chain layer. We give a complete cost model
|
|
(approximately 1.5--2 basis points of AUM per annum, all-in), a
|
|
ninety-day migration plan from incumbent custodians (BitGo, Fireblocks,
|
|
Anchorage Digital, Coinbase Custody), and a detailed comparison of
|
|
trust assumptions versus those incumbents.
|
|
\end{abstract}
|
|
|
|
\tableofcontents
|
|
\newpage
|
|
|
|
%% =====================================================================
|
|
|
|
\input{sections/01-executive-summary}
|
|
\input{sections/02-threat-model}
|
|
\input{sections/03-tiered-architecture}
|
|
\input{sections/04-hsm-selection-matrix}
|
|
\input{sections/05-threshold-mpc-vs-multisig}
|
|
\input{sections/06-airgapped-signing-protocol}
|
|
\input{sections/07-key-generation-ceremony}
|
|
\input{sections/08-operational-procedures}
|
|
\input{sections/09-compliance-map}
|
|
\input{sections/10-disaster-recovery}
|
|
\input{sections/11-cost-analysis}
|
|
\input{sections/12-implementation-timeline}
|
|
\input{sections/13-comparison-existing-custodians}
|
|
\input{sections/14-migration-plan}
|
|
\input{sections/99-conclusion}
|
|
|
|
\bibliographystyle{plain}
|
|
\begin{thebibliography}{99}
|
|
|
|
\bibitem{cggmp21}
|
|
R.~Canetti, R.~Gennaro, S.~Goldfeder, N.~Makriyannis, and U.~Peled.
|
|
UC non-interactive, proactive, threshold ECDSA with identifiable
|
|
aborts. \emph{ACM CCS}, 2020.
|
|
|
|
\bibitem{frost}
|
|
C.~Komlo and I.~Goldberg. FROST: Flexible round-optimized Schnorr
|
|
threshold signatures. \emph{Selected Areas in Cryptography (SAC)}, 2020.
|
|
|
|
\bibitem{shamir}
|
|
A.~Shamir. How to share a secret. \emph{Communications of the ACM},
|
|
22(11):612--613, 1979.
|
|
|
|
\bibitem{lp020}
|
|
Lux Industries. LP-020: Triple-proof consensus (BLS + Pulsar +
|
|
ML-DSA). \emph{Lux Improvement Proposals}, 2025.
|
|
|
|
\bibitem{lp137}
|
|
Lux Industries. LP-137: GPU residency, attestation, and airgapped
|
|
signing flow. \emph{Lux Improvement Proposals}, 2026.
|
|
|
|
\bibitem{lp006}
|
|
Lux Industries. LP-006: M-Chain (MPC custody chain) specification.
|
|
\emph{Lux Improvement Proposals}, 2024.
|
|
|
|
\bibitem{nist-fips140-2}
|
|
NIST. \emph{FIPS PUB 140-2: Security Requirements for Cryptographic
|
|
Modules}, 2001 (validation programme active through 2026).
|
|
|
|
\bibitem{nist-fips140-3}
|
|
NIST. \emph{FIPS PUB 140-3: Security Requirements for Cryptographic
|
|
Modules}, 2019.
|
|
|
|
\bibitem{nist-sp800-57}
|
|
NIST. \emph{SP 800-57 Part 1 Rev.~5: Recommendation for Key
|
|
Management}, 2020.
|
|
|
|
\bibitem{ccss}
|
|
CryptoCurrency Certification Consortium (C4). \emph{CryptoCurrency
|
|
Security Standard (CCSS), v8.0}, 2024.
|
|
|
|
\bibitem{soc2}
|
|
AICPA. \emph{Trust Services Criteria for Security, Availability,
|
|
Processing Integrity, Confidentiality, and Privacy (SOC~2)}, 2017.
|
|
|
|
\bibitem{iso27001}
|
|
ISO/IEC. \emph{ISO/IEC 27001:2022 -- Information security management
|
|
systems}.
|
|
|
|
\bibitem{mica}
|
|
European Parliament. \emph{Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 on Markets in
|
|
Crypto-Assets (MiCA)}, 2023.
|
|
|
|
\bibitem{mas-psn02}
|
|
Monetary Authority of Singapore. \emph{Notice PSN02: Prevention of
|
|
Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism --- Digital
|
|
Payment Token Service}, 2020 (revised 2024).
|
|
|
|
\bibitem{nydfs-bitlicense}
|
|
New York Department of Financial Services. \emph{23 NYCRR Part 200:
|
|
Virtual Currencies (BitLicense)}, 2015.
|
|
|
|
\bibitem{occ-trust}
|
|
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. \emph{Interpretive
|
|
Letter 1170: Custody of Cryptocurrency Assets}, 2020.
|
|
|
|
\bibitem{thales-luna7}
|
|
Thales Group. \emph{Luna Network HSM 7 Product Brief and FIPS 140-2
|
|
Level 3 Certificate \#3205}, 2024.
|
|
|
|
\bibitem{utimaco-secsr}
|
|
Utimaco. \emph{u.trust SecurityServer Se-Series Gen2 Datasheet --- FIPS
|
|
140-2 Level 3 (Level 4 for physical)}, 2024.
|
|
|
|
\bibitem{aws-cloudhsm}
|
|
Amazon Web Services. \emph{AWS CloudHSM (Marvell LiquidSecurity)
|
|
Service Documentation and FIPS 140-2 Level 3 Certificate \#4218},
|
|
2024.
|
|
|
|
\bibitem{gcp-cloudhsm}
|
|
Google Cloud. \emph{Cloud HSM Documentation: FIPS 140-2 Level 3
|
|
attested via Marvell LiquidSecurity}, 2024.
|
|
|
|
\bibitem{azure-dedicated-hsm}
|
|
Microsoft Azure. \emph{Azure Dedicated HSM (Thales Luna 7) Product
|
|
Documentation}, 2024.
|
|
|
|
\bibitem{yubihsm2}
|
|
Yubico. \emph{YubiHSM 2 Product Specification --- FIPS 140-2 Level 3
|
|
Certificate \#3915}, 2023.
|
|
|
|
\bibitem{chainalysis}
|
|
Chainalysis Inc. \emph{KYT (Know Your Transaction) API Reference},
|
|
2024.
|
|
|
|
\bibitem{trm}
|
|
TRM Labs. \emph{Transaction Monitoring API Reference}, 2024.
|
|
|
|
\bibitem{bitgo-soc}
|
|
BitGo Trust Company. \emph{SOC 2 Type II Report (excerpts) and
|
|
\$250M Insurance Disclosure}, 2024.
|
|
|
|
\bibitem{fireblocks}
|
|
Fireblocks. \emph{Architecture White Paper: MPC-CMP and Policy
|
|
Engine}, 2023.
|
|
|
|
\bibitem{anchorage}
|
|
Anchorage Digital Bank. \emph{OCC National Trust Charter and
|
|
Custody Operations Disclosure}, 2021.
|
|
|
|
\bibitem{coinbase-custody}
|
|
Coinbase Custody Trust Co.~LLC. \emph{NYDFS Trust Charter Filing
|
|
and Cold Storage Architecture Disclosure}, 2018--2024.
|
|
|
|
\end{thebibliography}
|
|
|
|
\appendix
|
|
\section*{Reproducibility}
|
|
\textbf{Source code.} \texttt{github.com/luxfi/threshold} (MPC custody backbone, commit \texttt{TBD}); HSM adapters at \texttt{github.com/luxfi/hsm}; key-management policy at \texttt{github.com/luxfi/kms}.\\
|
|
\textbf{Build.} \texttt{go build ./...}; HSM integration tests require vendor SDKs (Thales Luna, Utimaco, YubiHSM, AWS CloudHSM, GCP Cloud HSM).\\
|
|
\textbf{Hardware tested.} TBD (Tier-1 HSM lab: Thales Luna 7, Utimaco SR-Se200, YubiHSM 2; cloud Tier-1: AWS CloudHSM, GCP Cloud HSM).\\
|
|
\textbf{Standards referenced.} FIPS 140-2 Level 3, FIPS 140-3, SOC 2 Type II, ISO 27001:2022, CCSS Level 3, MiCA, MAS PSN02, US OCC trust charter, NYDFS BitLicense.\\
|
|
\textbf{Contact.} [email protected].
|
|
|
|
\end{document}
|