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A July commit removed eight papers on the premise "no license — DEX/non-custodial only". That premise is wrong: Lux operates an ATS, a broker-dealer, a transfer agent and a bank, and this material is resold at lux.financial. The merge that brought main in preserved the removal because the commit stated a reason, which is how a stale reason outlives the fact it rested on. Back, at the versions main carried — main never received the removal, so its copies are the later ones: the ATS architecture, the security-token standard, smart order routing, institutional custody, MPC custody, post-quantum securities, the SSB partnership and the CoinBridge brief. 83 files. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
153 lines
5.6 KiB
TeX
153 lines
5.6 KiB
TeX
\section{Tiered Architecture}
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\label{sec:tiers}
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%% =====================================================================
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The portfolio is partitioned into three signing tiers. Each tier has
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a fixed AUM allocation, a fixed threshold structure, and a fixed
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latency profile. The boundaries are enforced by independent rebalancing
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rules and by the M-Chain custody ledger (LP-006 \cite{lp006}); no
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operational action can move funds between tiers without an explicit
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inter-tier transfer that itself goes through the source tier's
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signing flow.
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\subsection{Tier 1 -- Cold (95\%, \$7.6B)}
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\begin{table}[h]
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\centering
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\small
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\begin{tabular}{cllll}
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\toprule
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\textbf{Share} & \textbf{HSM} & \textbf{Vendor / Model} &
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\textbf{Location} & \textbf{Cert} \\
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\midrule
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$\mathbf{c}_1$ & On-prem & Thales Luna Network HSM 7
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& Fund HQ DC (Tier IV) & FIPS 140-2 L3 \\
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$\mathbf{c}_2$ & On-prem & Utimaco u.trust SR-Se200 Gen2
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& DR DC, $\geq$500 mi from HQ & FIPS 140-2 L3 (L4 phys) \\
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$\mathbf{c}_3$ & Cloud & AWS CloudHSM (Marvell LiquidSecurity)
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& Multi-region (us-east-1 + eu-west-1) & FIPS 140-2 L3 \\
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$\mathbf{c}_4$ & Cloud & GCP Cloud HSM (Marvell LiquidSecurity)
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& Multi-region (us-central1 + europe-west1) & FIPS 140-2 L3 \\
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$\mathbf{c}_5$ & Airgap & YubiHSM 2 in offline vault
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& Underground vault, separate continent & FIPS 140-2 L3 \\
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\bottomrule
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\end{tabular}
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\caption{Cold-tier share placement (3-of-5 threshold).}
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\label{tab:cold}
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\end{table}
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\paragraph{Default signing path.} Routine cold-tier movements (e.g.\
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quarterly rebalances, large client redemptions) sign with shares
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$\mathbf{c}_3 + \mathbf{c}_4 + \mathbf{c}_5$. The two on-prem shares
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$\mathbf{c}_1$ and $\mathbf{c}_2$ are reserved for catastrophic
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recovery and are not exercised on the default path; this minimises
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their exposure surface.
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\paragraph{Recovery path.} If any one of $\mathbf{c}_3, \mathbf{c}_4,
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\mathbf{c}_5$ is unavailable, signing falls back to $\mathbf{c}_1$
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or $\mathbf{c}_2$ as the third share. If three cloud/airgap shares
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are unavailable, the on-prem pair plus the airgap share form the
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quorum.
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\paragraph{Latency.} The airgapped share contributes via the LP-137
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\cite{lp137} four-round file/QR airgap protocol; signing turnaround
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is dominated by ceremony scheduling and is contractually 1--24 hours.
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This is acceptable for cold reserves and intentionally creates a
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human-in-the-loop checkpoint on every cold movement.
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\subsection{Tier 2 -- Warm (4\%, \$320M)}
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\begin{table}[h]
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\centering
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\small
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\begin{tabular}{cllll}
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\toprule
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\textbf{Share} & \textbf{HSM} & \textbf{Vendor / Model} &
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\textbf{Region} & \textbf{Cert} \\
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\midrule
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$\mathbf{w}_1$ & AWS CloudHSM (separate cluster from $\mathbf{c}_3$) &
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Marvell LiquidSecurity & us-west-2 & FIPS 140-2 L3 \\
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$\mathbf{w}_2$ & GCP Cloud HSM (separate project from $\mathbf{c}_4$) &
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Marvell LiquidSecurity & asia-east1 & FIPS 140-2 L3 \\
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$\mathbf{w}_3$ & Azure Dedicated HSM &
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Thales Luna 7 (managed) & North Europe & FIPS 140-2 L3 \\
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\bottomrule
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\end{tabular}
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\caption{Warm-tier share placement (2-of-3 threshold).}
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\label{tab:warm}
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\end{table}
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\paragraph{Signing.} Programmatic, mTLS-authenticated, sub-second
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turnaround. The Lux MPC orchestrator (\texttt{luxfi/mpc}) issues
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parallel partial-signing requests to two of three shares; the third
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is held in reserve.
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\paragraph{Policy enforcement.} Every warm signing request is
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gated by an HSM-resident policy module (Section~\ref{sec:hsm}):
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daily withdrawal cap, destination allowlist, per-transaction limit,
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and Chainalysis/TRM screening of the destination
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\cite{chainalysis,trm}.
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\paragraph{Use cases.} Daily client redemptions below \$5M, quarterly
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rebalancing legs that exceed the hot tier cap, and pre-funded movements
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into the hot tier.
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\subsection{Tier 3 -- Hot (1\%, \$80M)}
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\begin{table}[h]
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\centering
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\small
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\begin{tabular}{cllll}
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\toprule
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\textbf{Share} & \textbf{Backend} & \textbf{Region} &
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\textbf{Cert} \\
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\midrule
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$\mathbf{h}_1$ & AWS KMS (HSM-backed CMK) & us-east-1 &
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FIPS 140-2 L3 (KMS HSM) \\
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$\mathbf{h}_2$ & GCP Cloud KMS (HSM-backed) & us-central1 &
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FIPS 140-2 L3 \\
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\bottomrule
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\end{tabular}
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\caption{Hot-tier share placement (2-of-2 threshold).}
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\label{tab:hot}
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\end{table}
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\paragraph{Time-lock.} Every hot signing request enters a 24-hour
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delay queue by default. The trading desk may override with a signed
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codeword (separate authentication, separate ops shift) for
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time-critical actions, subject to a per-day override budget.
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\paragraph{Cap.} Daily withdrawal cap of \$10M (configurable, default
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above) at the policy layer. Exceeding the cap requires a warm-tier
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top-up.
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\paragraph{Use cases.} Market-maker rebates, exchange-rebalancing
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flows, on-chain liquidity provision, and any near-real-time order
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flow.
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\subsection{Tier-Boundary Transfers}
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Any transfer that crosses a tier boundary (cold-to-warm, warm-to-hot,
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hot-to-warm, warm-to-cold) must be signed by the source tier's
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threshold. The destination tier credit is conditional on the source
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tier's signature being final on chain. The M-Chain custody ledger
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(LP-006 \cite{lp006}) records the inter-tier transfer with the source
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threshold's BLS aggregate as proof.
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\begin{theorem}[Tier Authority Independence]
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\label{thm:tier-indep}
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The compromise of all parties at one tier does not yield authority
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over assets at any other tier.
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\end{theorem}
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\begin{proof}
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Each tier has a distinct threshold key with disjoint share sets and
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disjoint HSM custodians. The threshold protocols are unforgeable
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\cite{cggmp21}, so signing one tier's key requires that tier's
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quorum. No tier's quorum is a subset of another tier's quorum.
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Therefore signing authority is tier-local.
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\end{proof}
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%% =====================================================================
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