Files
zeekayandHanzo Dev 70f6883235 Restore the regulated-markets papers; Lux holds the licences
A July commit removed eight papers on the premise "no license — DEX/non-custodial
only". That premise is wrong: Lux operates an ATS, a broker-dealer, a transfer
agent and a bank, and this material is resold at lux.financial. The merge that
brought main in preserved the removal because the commit stated a reason, which
is how a stale reason outlives the fact it rested on.

Back, at the versions main carried — main never received the removal, so its
copies are the later ones: the ATS architecture, the security-token standard,
smart order routing, institutional custody, MPC custody, post-quantum securities,
the SSB partnership and the CoinBridge brief. 83 files.

Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
2026-08-30 15:58:05 -07:00

153 lines
5.6 KiB
TeX

\section{Tiered Architecture}
\label{sec:tiers}
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The portfolio is partitioned into three signing tiers. Each tier has
a fixed AUM allocation, a fixed threshold structure, and a fixed
latency profile. The boundaries are enforced by independent rebalancing
rules and by the M-Chain custody ledger (LP-006 \cite{lp006}); no
operational action can move funds between tiers without an explicit
inter-tier transfer that itself goes through the source tier's
signing flow.
\subsection{Tier 1 -- Cold (95\%, \$7.6B)}
\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\small
\begin{tabular}{cllll}
\toprule
\textbf{Share} & \textbf{HSM} & \textbf{Vendor / Model} &
\textbf{Location} & \textbf{Cert} \\
\midrule
$\mathbf{c}_1$ & On-prem & Thales Luna Network HSM 7
& Fund HQ DC (Tier IV) & FIPS 140-2 L3 \\
$\mathbf{c}_2$ & On-prem & Utimaco u.trust SR-Se200 Gen2
& DR DC, $\geq$500 mi from HQ & FIPS 140-2 L3 (L4 phys) \\
$\mathbf{c}_3$ & Cloud & AWS CloudHSM (Marvell LiquidSecurity)
& Multi-region (us-east-1 + eu-west-1) & FIPS 140-2 L3 \\
$\mathbf{c}_4$ & Cloud & GCP Cloud HSM (Marvell LiquidSecurity)
& Multi-region (us-central1 + europe-west1) & FIPS 140-2 L3 \\
$\mathbf{c}_5$ & Airgap & YubiHSM 2 in offline vault
& Underground vault, separate continent & FIPS 140-2 L3 \\
\bottomrule
\end{tabular}
\caption{Cold-tier share placement (3-of-5 threshold).}
\label{tab:cold}
\end{table}
\paragraph{Default signing path.} Routine cold-tier movements (e.g.\
quarterly rebalances, large client redemptions) sign with shares
$\mathbf{c}_3 + \mathbf{c}_4 + \mathbf{c}_5$. The two on-prem shares
$\mathbf{c}_1$ and $\mathbf{c}_2$ are reserved for catastrophic
recovery and are not exercised on the default path; this minimises
their exposure surface.
\paragraph{Recovery path.} If any one of $\mathbf{c}_3, \mathbf{c}_4,
\mathbf{c}_5$ is unavailable, signing falls back to $\mathbf{c}_1$
or $\mathbf{c}_2$ as the third share. If three cloud/airgap shares
are unavailable, the on-prem pair plus the airgap share form the
quorum.
\paragraph{Latency.} The airgapped share contributes via the LP-137
\cite{lp137} four-round file/QR airgap protocol; signing turnaround
is dominated by ceremony scheduling and is contractually 1--24 hours.
This is acceptable for cold reserves and intentionally creates a
human-in-the-loop checkpoint on every cold movement.
\subsection{Tier 2 -- Warm (4\%, \$320M)}
\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\small
\begin{tabular}{cllll}
\toprule
\textbf{Share} & \textbf{HSM} & \textbf{Vendor / Model} &
\textbf{Region} & \textbf{Cert} \\
\midrule
$\mathbf{w}_1$ & AWS CloudHSM (separate cluster from $\mathbf{c}_3$) &
Marvell LiquidSecurity & us-west-2 & FIPS 140-2 L3 \\
$\mathbf{w}_2$ & GCP Cloud HSM (separate project from $\mathbf{c}_4$) &
Marvell LiquidSecurity & asia-east1 & FIPS 140-2 L3 \\
$\mathbf{w}_3$ & Azure Dedicated HSM &
Thales Luna 7 (managed) & North Europe & FIPS 140-2 L3 \\
\bottomrule
\end{tabular}
\caption{Warm-tier share placement (2-of-3 threshold).}
\label{tab:warm}
\end{table}
\paragraph{Signing.} Programmatic, mTLS-authenticated, sub-second
turnaround. The Lux MPC orchestrator (\texttt{luxfi/mpc}) issues
parallel partial-signing requests to two of three shares; the third
is held in reserve.
\paragraph{Policy enforcement.} Every warm signing request is
gated by an HSM-resident policy module (Section~\ref{sec:hsm}):
daily withdrawal cap, destination allowlist, per-transaction limit,
and Chainalysis/TRM screening of the destination
\cite{chainalysis,trm}.
\paragraph{Use cases.} Daily client redemptions below \$5M, quarterly
rebalancing legs that exceed the hot tier cap, and pre-funded movements
into the hot tier.
\subsection{Tier 3 -- Hot (1\%, \$80M)}
\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\small
\begin{tabular}{cllll}
\toprule
\textbf{Share} & \textbf{Backend} & \textbf{Region} &
\textbf{Cert} \\
\midrule
$\mathbf{h}_1$ & AWS KMS (HSM-backed CMK) & us-east-1 &
FIPS 140-2 L3 (KMS HSM) \\
$\mathbf{h}_2$ & GCP Cloud KMS (HSM-backed) & us-central1 &
FIPS 140-2 L3 \\
\bottomrule
\end{tabular}
\caption{Hot-tier share placement (2-of-2 threshold).}
\label{tab:hot}
\end{table}
\paragraph{Time-lock.} Every hot signing request enters a 24-hour
delay queue by default. The trading desk may override with a signed
codeword (separate authentication, separate ops shift) for
time-critical actions, subject to a per-day override budget.
\paragraph{Cap.} Daily withdrawal cap of \$10M (configurable, default
above) at the policy layer. Exceeding the cap requires a warm-tier
top-up.
\paragraph{Use cases.} Market-maker rebates, exchange-rebalancing
flows, on-chain liquidity provision, and any near-real-time order
flow.
\subsection{Tier-Boundary Transfers}
Any transfer that crosses a tier boundary (cold-to-warm, warm-to-hot,
hot-to-warm, warm-to-cold) must be signed by the source tier's
threshold. The destination tier credit is conditional on the source
tier's signature being final on chain. The M-Chain custody ledger
(LP-006 \cite{lp006}) records the inter-tier transfer with the source
threshold's BLS aggregate as proof.
\begin{theorem}[Tier Authority Independence]
\label{thm:tier-indep}
The compromise of all parties at one tier does not yield authority
over assets at any other tier.
\end{theorem}
\begin{proof}
Each tier has a distinct threshold key with disjoint share sets and
disjoint HSM custodians. The threshold protocols are unforgeable
\cite{cggmp21}, so signing one tier's key requires that tier's
quorum. No tier's quorum is a subset of another tier's quorum.
Therefore signing authority is tier-local.
\end{proof}
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