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zeekayandHanzo Dev
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A July commit removed eight papers on the premise "no license — DEX/non-custodial only". That premise is wrong: Lux operates an ATS, a broker-dealer, a transfer agent and a bank, and this material is resold at lux.financial. The merge that brought main in preserved the removal because the commit stated a reason, which is how a stale reason outlives the fact it rested on. Back, at the versions main carried — main never received the removal, so its copies are the later ones: the ATS architecture, the security-token standard, smart order routing, institutional custody, MPC custody, post-quantum securities, the SSB partnership and the CoinBridge brief. 83 files. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
60 lines
2.8 KiB
TeX
60 lines
2.8 KiB
TeX
\section{Conclusion}
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\label{sec:conclusion}
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%% =====================================================================
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The architecture specified in this paper is a complete, auditable,
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and operationally tractable custody design for an institutional
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digital-asset fund at the eight-billion-dollar tier. Its load-bearing
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properties are:
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\begin{enumerate}[nosep]
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\item \textbf{No single point of authority.} No custodian, cloud,
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jurisdiction, vendor, or operator can move the fund's assets alone.
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The minimum collusion required is three independent parties at the
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cold tier, two at the warm tier, and two with a 24-hour delay at
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the hot tier.
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\item \textbf{No on-chain custody footprint.} Threshold MPC over
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secp256k1 produces a single canonical signature on every chain; the
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custody policy is invisible to the chain.
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\item \textbf{Vendor and jurisdiction diversity.} Five HSM
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share-holders span four vendor lines (Thales, Utimaco, Marvell,
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Yubico) and at least three jurisdictions on the cold tier; warm tier
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spans three jurisdictions.
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\item \textbf{Post-quantum hedge.} Lux Triple Consensus
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(LP-020 \cite{lp020}) on the M-Chain custody ledger
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(LP-006 \cite{lp006}) provides forward security against future
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quantum break of secp256k1.
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\item \textbf{Compliance-ready.} The architecture maps directly to
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SOC 2 Type II, ISO 27001:2022, CCSS Level 3, FIPS 140-2 Level 3,
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MiCA, MAS PSN02, and US OCC trust-charter or NYDFS BitLicense
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fiduciary controls.
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\item \textbf{Operationally cheap.} Steady-state cost is
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approximately 6.7 bps of AUM, comfortably below the 5--12 bps
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typical of incumbent custodians and competitive even against the
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low end of that band.
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\end{enumerate}
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The migration from any of the four leading incumbents (BitGo,
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Fireblocks, Anchorage Digital, Coinbase Custody) is a 90-day
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operation; the architecture can be in steady-state operation by
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day 90 and fully audit-attested by day 180.
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We emphasise that the design contains no novel cryptography. Every
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component -- CGGMP21 threshold ECDSA, Feldman VSS distributed
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key generation, Shamir secret sharing, vendor-attested HSM-resident
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keys, BLS+ML-DSA hybrid audit log -- is published, peer-reviewed,
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and deployed in production at multiple institutions. The
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contribution of this paper is the integration: the specification
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that places each component on the path that does the most work, and
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the operational policy that ensures the integration's properties
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hold under realistic adversaries and realistic ops teams.
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The architecture is implemented end-to-end in the
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\texttt{luxfi/mpc} and \texttt{luxfi/hsm} reference codebases.
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Reference deployment manifests, ceremony run-books, SOC 2 control
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narratives, and CCSS evidence packages are available to
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implementors under the licence terms of those repositories.
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%% =====================================================================
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