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47 lines
1.9 KiB
TeX
47 lines
1.9 KiB
TeX
\section{Learning With Errors (LWE)}
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\subsection{The Problem}
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\begin{definition}[Learning With Errors]
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Given $m$ samples of the form $(\mathbf{a}_i, b_i)$ where:
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\begin{itemize}[nosep]
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\item $\mathbf{a}_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ is uniformly random,
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\item $b_i = \langle \mathbf{a}_i, \mathbf{s} \rangle + e_i \pmod{q}$,
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\item $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ is a secret vector,
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\item $e_i$ is a small ``error'' sampled from a discrete Gaussian,
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\end{itemize}
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recover $\mathbf{s}$.
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\end{definition}
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Without the error $e_i$, this is a system of linear equations---solvable by Gaussian
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elimination. The error makes the problem hard: it turns an easy linear algebra problem
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into a problem equivalent to finding short vectors in a lattice.
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\subsection{Why LWE Is Hard}
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Regev (2005) proved that solving LWE is at least as hard as solving worst-case lattice
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problems (approximate SVP and approximate SIVP) in dimension $n$. This is a
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\emph{worst-case to average-case} reduction: even random LWE instances are as hard as
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the hardest lattice instances. No other family of cryptographic assumptions has this
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property.
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\subsection{LWE as Encryption}
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LWE directly yields a public-key encryption scheme:
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\begin{itemize}[nosep]
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\item \textbf{Key generation}: Choose secret $\mathbf{s}$. Publish samples
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$(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{b} = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e})$.
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\item \textbf{Encryption of bit $m$}: Choose random $\mathbf{r}$. Compute
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$\mathbf{u} = \mathbf{A}^T \mathbf{r}$ and $v = \mathbf{b}^T \mathbf{r} + m \cdot \lfloor q/2 \rfloor$.
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\item \textbf{Decryption}: Compute $v - \mathbf{u}^T \mathbf{s} = m \cdot \lfloor q/2 \rfloor + \text{small noise}$.
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Round to recover $m$.
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\end{itemize}
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The decryption works because the noise terms are small relative to $q/2$. The scheme is
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secure because distinguishing $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A}\mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e})$ from
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uniform random is the LWE problem.
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%% ============================================================
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