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papers/lux-master-security-model/lux-master-security-model.tex
zeekay f4ee7a0525 Publish under the org, not a person
Bylines, paper authorship, correspondence addresses and the founder blurb under
each post named an individual. They name the organisation that published the
work instead: the brand on posts and pages, the research byline on papers, and
research@ in place of a personal address. Both are what these repositories
already used elsewhere — nothing new was coined.

Co-authors are untouched. Where a paper named someone else alongside, they stay
named; only the one byline changed. Bibliography entries, running heads,
PDF metadata and affiliations move with it, so a citation still resolves to
whoever the cited paper names.

Sample and fixture data uses the placeholder name these tests already use
elsewhere, so no assertion changed meaning.
2026-09-01 08:58:10 -07:00

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TeX

\documentclass[11pt,a4paper]{article}
\usepackage{../shared/luxcover}
\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
\usepackage{amsmath,amssymb,amsfonts,amsthm}
\usepackage{graphicx}
\usepackage{hyperref}
\usepackage{algorithm}
\usepackage{algpseudocode}
\usepackage{xcolor}
\usepackage{booktabs}
\usepackage{enumitem}
\usepackage{tikz}
\usepackage{tabularx}
\usepackage{mathtools}
\usepackage{multirow}
\hypersetup{colorlinks=true,linkcolor=black,citecolor=blue,urlcolor=blue}
\newtheorem{theorem}{Theorem}[section]
\newtheorem{lemma}[theorem]{Lemma}
\newtheorem{corollary}[theorem]{Corollary}
\newtheorem{proposition}[theorem]{Proposition}
\newtheorem{definition}{Definition}[section]
\newtheorem{remark}{Remark}[section]
\newtheorem{invariant}{Invariant}[section]
\title{\textbf{Comprehensive Security Model\\for the Lux Network}}
\author{
Lux Research \\
\textit{Lux Industries, Inc.}\\
\texttt{[email protected]}
}
\date{Original: 2023\quad|\quad Revised: February 2026}
\begin{document}
\luxcoverpage
\begin{abstract}
We present a comprehensive, layered security model for the Lux Network that makes
every security assumption explicit, every failure mode enumerated, and every trust
boundary documented. The model covers four adversary classes (classical, quantum,
economic, network-level), four protocol layers (consensus, transport, execution,
application), and three cryptographic assumption families (discrete logarithm for BLS,
lattice for ML-DSA and Pulsar, hash for STARK proofs). We prove that any two of the
three cryptographic assumption families sufficing for security (defense in depth),
enumerate what happens when each component breaks, and specify explicit trust
assumptions per component. The central invariant: \emph{every security claim in this
document is either formally proven, empirically tested with cited results, or
explicitly marked as an assumption}. No vague assertions. Triple-proof quantum finality
achieves 248 bytes per epoch, ${\sim}2$--$5$\,ms CPU verification, and 1\,ms block times.
\textbf{Keywords}: security model, threat model, blockchain security, defense in depth,
cryptographic assumptions, formal verification, trust boundaries
\end{abstract}
\tableofcontents
\newpage
%% ========================================================================
%% 1. INTRODUCTION
%% ========================================================================
\input{sections/01-introduction}
\input{sections/02-adversary-classes}
\input{sections/03-cryptographic-assumptions}
\input{sections/04-per-layer-security-guarantees}
\input{sections/05-failure-modes}
\input{sections/06-trust-assumptions}
\input{sections/07-formal-verification-status}
\input{sections/08-triple-proof-quantum-finality-summary}
\input{sections/09-the-invariant-machine-checkable-security}
\input{sections/10-related-work}
\input{sections/99-conclusion}
\end{document}