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92 lines
4.3 KiB
TeX
92 lines
4.3 KiB
TeX
\section{Cryptographic Assumptions}
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\label{sec:assumptions}
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The Lux Network relies on three independent families of cryptographic assumptions:
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\subsection{Family 1: Discrete Logarithm (BLS12-381)}
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\begin{itemize}[leftmargin=2em]
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\item \textbf{Assumption}: The co-CDH problem is hard in the bilinear groups of
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BLS12-381.
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\item \textbf{Used by}: BLS aggregate signatures (consensus layer), ECDSA
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(transaction signing), ECDH (P2P key exchange).
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\item \textbf{Status}: \textbf{[Assumed]} Decades of cryptanalysis, no known
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classical attacks. Broken by Shor's algorithm on quantum computers.
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\item \textbf{Quantum resistance}: None.
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\end{itemize}
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\subsection{Family 2: Lattice (ML-DSA, Pulsar)}
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\begin{itemize}[leftmargin=2em]
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\item \textbf{Assumption}: The Module-LWE problem is hard with parameters $N = 256$,
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$k = 4$, $q = 8380417$ (ML-DSA-65) or $N = 256$, $M = 8$,
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$q = 2^{48} + 2561$ (Pulsar).
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\item \textbf{Used by}: ML-DSA-65 post-quantum signatures (epoch finality),
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Pulsar threshold signatures (anonymous validator participation), ML-KEM
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(hybrid key exchange).
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\item \textbf{Status}: \textbf{[Assumed]} NIST standardized (FIPS 204) after
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extensive review. No known polynomial quantum speedup beyond Grover on
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search. $>$128-bit classical security, $>$100-bit quantum security.
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\item \textbf{Quantum resistance}: Believed quantum-resistant. Lattice
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cryptanalysis is an active research area.
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\end{itemize}
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\subsection{Family 3: Hash Functions (STARK)}
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\begin{itemize}[leftmargin=2em]
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\item \textbf{Assumption}: SHA-256 and Keccak-256 are collision-resistant with
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$>$128-bit classical security and $>$85-bit quantum security.
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\item \textbf{Used by}: STARK proof system (epoch ML-DSA signature compression),
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Merkle trees (state commitment), address derivation.
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\item \textbf{Status}: \textbf{[Assumed]} SHA-256 and Keccak-256 have no known
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practical collision attacks. Grover's algorithm reduces collision resistance
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to $\sim 2^{85}$, which remains infeasible.
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\item \textbf{Quantum resistance}: Partially resistant. Preimage resistance remains
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at $2^{128}$. Collision resistance reduced to $2^{85}$.
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\end{itemize}
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\subsection{Defense in Depth: Any 2 of 3 Suffice}
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\begin{theorem}[Two-of-three security]
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\label{thm:two-of-three}
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The Lux Network maintains safety and liveness if at least two of the three
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cryptographic assumption families hold.
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\end{theorem}
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\begin{proof}[Proof sketch]
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We enumerate the three single-failure scenarios:
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\textbf{Case 1: Discrete log breaks (quantum adversary).} BLS signatures are forged.
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Classical consensus via BLS is compromised. However, epoch finality via
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STARK-compressed ML-DSA (Family~2) remains valid, and state commitments via hash
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Merkle trees (Family~3) remain binding. The chain can continue with ML-DSA-only
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consensus (degraded throughput, epoch-level finality only).
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\textbf{Case 2: Lattice assumptions break.} ML-DSA and Pulsar signatures can be
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forged. Post-quantum epoch proofs are compromised. However, BLS consensus
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(Family~1) continues to provide per-block finality, and STARK proofs based on
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hash collision resistance (Family~3) remain valid for state commitment. The chain
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continues with BLS-only consensus (classical security, no post-quantum guarantee).
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\textbf{Case 3: Hash functions break.} STARK proofs are compromised (forged proofs).
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Merkle state commitments can be spoofed. However, BLS consensus (Family~1) still
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provides per-block finality, and ML-DSA (Family~2) still provides post-quantum
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epoch signatures. The chain continues with BLS + ML-DSA consensus (no STARK
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compression, larger epoch proofs).
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In each case, two surviving families provide sufficient security for continued
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operation, potentially with degraded performance or reduced guarantees.
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\end{proof}
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\begin{remark}
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The scenario where \emph{all three} families fail simultaneously---discrete log,
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lattice, and hash functions all broken---implies a fundamental breakthrough in
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mathematics (or quantum computing far beyond current projections) that would
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compromise all of modern cryptography, not just blockchain.
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\end{remark}
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%% ========================================================================
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%% 4. PER-LAYER SECURITY GUARANTEES
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%% ========================================================================
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