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Scrub residual Ring-LWE mislabels of the Corona/Pulsar threshold
signature family per canonical decision-b (source: ringtail/sign/config.go
M=8,N=7, q=0x1000000004A01).
- Corona = Module-LWE (Ringtail-derived parameter set, A in R_q^{8x7}),
not Ring-LWE / not "Module-LWE at rank 1".
- Pulsar = Module-LWE (ML-DSA-65, FIPS-204 byte-equal).
- Corona+Pulsar differ by parameter regime/codebase, NOT hardness family:
intra-lattice parameter/implementation diversity, NOT family-disjoint.
- True family-disjoint defense = Magnetar (hash, SLH-DSA) / HQC (codes).
Reframed the false Corona(R-LWE)-vs-Pulsar(M-LWE) family-independence
across lp-219/lp-220/lp-222/lp-223 (P3Q kinds), lux-quasar-composition
(profile hardness table + composition corollary/proof), lux-magnetar-pq,
and the superseded triple-proof/quasar drafts (anonymous lattice
threshold lane = Corona). Legitimate FHE/TFHE Ring-LWE, NTT citations,
and neutral "rank-1" lattice facts left intact. PDFs rebuilt.
76 lines
2.9 KiB
TeX
76 lines
2.9 KiB
TeX
\section{Conclusion}
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M-Chain eliminates single points of failure in cross-chain bridges through decentralized threshold custody, on-chain coordination via SwapSigTx, and economic alignment through staking and slashing. The system achieves:
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\begin{enumerate}
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\item \textbf{Zero-trust custody}: No single validator can compromise funds
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\item \textbf{Sub-second signing}: 80ms threshold signature generation
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\item \textbf{Quantum resistance}: Dual-signature upgrade path to post-quantum security
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\item \textbf{Economic security}: \$100M+ staked with automated slashing
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\item \textbf{Transparency}: All swap operations auditable on-chain
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\end{enumerate}
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By replacing centralized swap databases and key managers with decentralized blockchain infrastructure, M-Chain provides the foundation for secure, high-performance cross-chain asset transfers. The phased quantum security approach ensures long-term viability as quantum computing advances.
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M-Chain demonstrates that decentralization, security, and performance are not mutually exclusive---threshold cryptography and economic incentives can achieve all three simultaneously.
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\begin{thebibliography}{99}
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\bibitem{bridge-exploits-2022}
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Chainalysis (2022).
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\textit{Cross-Chain Bridge Hacks Emerge as Top Security Risk}.
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Chainalysis Blog.
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\bibitem{cgg21}
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Canetti, R., Gennaro, R., Goldfeder, S., Makriyannis, N., \& Peled, U. (2021).
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\textit{UC Non-Interactive, Proactive, Threshold ECDSA with Identifiable Aborts}.
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ACM CCS 2021.
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\bibitem{musig2}
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Nick, J., Ruffing, T., \& Seurin, Y. (2021).
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\textit{MuSig2: Simple Two-Round Schnorr Multi-Signatures}.
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CRYPTO 2021.
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\bibitem{frost}
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Komlo, C., \& Goldberg, I. (2020).
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\textit{FROST: Flexible Round-Optimized Schnorr Threshold Signatures}.
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SAC 2020.
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\bibitem{corona}
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{Lux Industries} (2026).
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\textit{Corona: Two-Round Module-LWE Threshold Signatures}.
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\texttt{github.com/luxfi/corona}.
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Lux's own Module-LWE (Ringtail-derived) two-round threshold scheme;
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builds on the Ringtail line~\cite{ringtail}.
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\bibitem{ringtail}
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C.~Boschini, D.~Kaviani, R.~W.~F.~Lai, G.~Malavolta, A.~Takahashi, and
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M.~Tibouchi (2024).
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\textit{Ringtail: Practical Two-Round Threshold Signatures from LWE}.
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Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2024/1113; IEEE S\&P 2025.
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Academic two-round lattice threshold (IACR ePrint 2024/1113).
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\bibitem{lux-bridge-2025}
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Kelling, Z. \& Bin, W. (2025).
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\textit{Lux Bridge: Threshold-Secured Cross-Chain Communication with MPC Custody, Post-Quantum Verification, and Formally Verified Contract Invariants}.
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Lux Industries, Inc.
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\bibitem{shamir-ss}
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Shamir, A. (1979).
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\textit{How to Share a Secret}.
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Communications of the ACM, 22(11), 612-613.
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\bibitem{gennaro-dkg}
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Gennaro, R., Jarecki, S., Krawczyk, H., \& Rabin, T. (1999).
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\textit{Secure Distributed Key Generation for Discrete-Log Based Cryptosystems}.
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EUROCRYPT 1999.
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\bibitem{threshold-crypto}
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Desmedt, Y., \& Frankel, Y. (1990).
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\textit{Threshold Cryptosystems}.
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CRYPTO 1989.
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\end{thebibliography}
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