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zeekay
f4ee7a0525
Bylines, paper authorship, correspondence addresses and the founder blurb under each post named an individual. They name the organisation that published the work instead: the brand on posts and pages, the research byline on papers, and research@ in place of a personal address. Both are what these repositories already used elsewhere — nothing new was coined. Co-authors are untouched. Where a paper named someone else alongside, they stay named; only the one byline changed. Bibliography entries, running heads, PDF metadata and affiliations move with it, so a citation still resolves to whoever the cited paper names. Sample and fixture data uses the placeholder name these tests already use elsewhere, so no assertion changed meaning.
53 lines
2.3 KiB
TeX
53 lines
2.3 KiB
TeX
\documentclass[11pt,a4paper]{article}
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\usepackage{../shared/luxcover}
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\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
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\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
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\usepackage{amsmath,amssymb,amsfonts,amsthm}
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\usepackage{hyperref}
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\usepackage{booktabs}
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\usepackage{enumitem}
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\usepackage{xcolor}
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\usepackage{tikz}
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\usepackage{pgfplots}
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\pgfplotsset{compat=1.18}
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\usetikzlibrary{arrows.meta,positioning}
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\hypersetup{colorlinks=true,linkcolor=black,citecolor=blue,urlcolor=blue}
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\newtheorem{theorem}{Theorem}[section]
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\newtheorem{lemma}[theorem]{Lemma}
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\newtheorem{definition}{Definition}[section]
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\newtheorem{observation}{Observation}[section]
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\title{Performance vs Security Tradeoffs\\in Cryptographic Infrastructure}
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\author{
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Lux Research \\
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Lux Industries, Inc.\\
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\texttt{[email protected]}
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}
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\date{2026}
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\begin{document}
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\luxcoverpage
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\begin{abstract}
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Security systems that are too slow to use get bypassed. We quantify the performance cost of every cryptographic primitive deployed in the Lux network: MPC threshold signing (50ms at 2-of-3 to 1.2s at 20-of-50), FHE bootstrapping (12ms per gate, $10^7$--$10^9\times$ cleartext), BLS aggregation ($O(1)$ verification regardless of validator count), ML-DSA signatures (3,309 bytes, 51.7$\times$ ECDSA), STARK aggregation ($O(\log N)$ verification compressing $N$ signatures to $\sim$200 bytes), and triple-proof epoch finality (248 bytes, ${\sim}2$--$5$\,ms CPU QuasarCert verification). We measure each primitive on production hardware and present a benchmark table with actual values. We analyze the practical constraint that defines the Lux architecture: achieving sub-second finality with post-quantum security on commodity hardware. The conclusion is that no single primitive satisfies all requirements; the architecture must compose primitives across time scales (per-block classical speed, per-epoch post-quantum security) and across trust models (BLS for speed, MPC for distribution, FHE for privacy).
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\end{abstract}
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\input{sections/01-introduction}
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\input{sections/02-mpc-latency-vs-threshold-size}
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\input{sections/03-fhe-compute-cost}
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\input{sections/04-bls-aggregation}
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\input{sections/05-ml-dsa-signature-size}
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\input{sections/06-stark-aggregation}
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\input{sections/07-triple-proof-overhead}
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\input{sections/08-storage-scaling}
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\input{sections/09-the-practical-constraint}
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\input{sections/10-benchmark-summary}
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\input{sections/99-conclusion}
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\end{document}
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