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Sweep across the non-Tier-1 paper catalogue (Tier-1 owned by parallel
agent and excluded). All 113 processed papers already had luxcover
wired up; this commit fixes 14 build breakers and produces fresh
PDFs across the catalogue.
Fixes:
- lux-blockchain-scaling-laws: em-dash inside lstlisting -> --
- lux-corona-pq: stale \input pointing at 03-the-corona-scheme renamed
to 03-the-corona-scheme (file already renamed on disk)
- lux-lattice-cryptography-primer: same Corona->Corona rename
- lux-formal-verification-lean4: Lean source uses unicode (×, ∀, ∃, ∈,
∧, ∨, ∩, ≠, ⟨, ⟩, ·, ¬) inside lstlistings. Added a literate map
so listings render the math glyphs without UTF-8 fault.
- lux-id-did-specification: ✓/✗ in tabular replaced with \ding{51}
/ \ding{55} (pifont). Added pifont package.
- lux-ntt-simd-implementation: middle-dot in Go assembly listings;
added literate {·}{\textperiodcentered}.
- lux-ntt-transform: μ, ×, –, — in regular text (no T1 fontenc).
Replaced with $\mu$/$\times$/--/--- via unicode->latex sweep.
- lux-perpetuals-derivatives, lux-quantum-consensus,
lux-quasar-consensus, lux-tee-computing-mesh: same unicode->latex
sweep across body text. Also fixed broken math segment
`$L_{avg} = 10$\times$$` -> `$L_{avg} = 10\times$`.
- lux-zchain: emoji glyphs in roadmap table replaced with
parenthetical text.
- lux-triple-proof-consensus: dropped duplicate \usepackage{geometry}
that clashed with luxcover (geometry option clash).
- pq: defined missing \Rq macro.
PDFs rebuilt for the full Tier-2/3 set.
Excluded (Tier-1, parallel agent): lp-073-pulsar, lp-stricte2epq,
dag-evm-formal, lp-010-quasar-stm-{3,4}, lp-020-quasar-consensus,
lux-institutional-custody, lux-nist-mptc-submission, pqsafe-il5,
pq-rns, plus shared/ and lps/.
57 lines
1.6 KiB
TeX
57 lines
1.6 KiB
TeX
\section{Security Analysis}
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\subsection{Attack Vectors}
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\subsubsection{Oracle Manipulation}
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Mitigation: Multi-source validation, TWAP, circuit breakers
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\subsubsection{Flash Loan Attacks}
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Mitigation: Same-block liquidation protection, minimum holding period
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\subsubsection{Liquidation Cascades}
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Mitigation: Partial liquidations, insurance fund, dynamic fees
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\subsubsection{Front-Running}
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Mitigation: Commit-reveal scheme, threshold encryption (as per Lightspeed DEX)
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\subsection{Formal Verification}
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Key invariants proven using Certora:
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\begin{theorem}[Solvency Invariant]
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At all times $t$, total protocol assets exceed liabilities:
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\begin{equation}
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\sum_{i} \text{Deposit}_i + \text{Insurance} \geq \sum_{j} \text{PnL}_j^+ + \sum_{k} \text{Withdrawal}_k
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\end{equation}
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\end{theorem}
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\begin{theorem}[Liquidation Safety]
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No liquidation can result in negative protocol equity:
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\begin{equation}
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\forall L \in \text{Liquidations}: \text{Insurance}_{t+1} \geq \text{Insurance}_t - \max(0, L_{\text{loss}})
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\end{equation}
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\end{theorem}
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\subsection{Risk Parameters}
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Conservative parameters ensure system stability:
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\begin{table}[h]
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\centering
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\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|}
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\hline
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\textbf{Parameter} & \textbf{Value} & \textbf{Rationale} \\
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\hline
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Max Leverage & 100$\times$ & Industry standard \\
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Min Collateral & \$10 & Spam prevention \\
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Max OI/TVL & 3$\times$ & Capital efficiency \\
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Insurance Target & 2\% of OI & Historical drawdowns \\
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Oracle Deviation & 1\% & Manipulation resistance \\
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Funding Cap & 1\%/8h & Extreme market protection \\
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\hline
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\end{tabular}
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\caption{Risk parameter configuration}
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\end{table}
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