Files
papers/lux-protocol-verification-tamarin/lux-protocol-verification-tamarin.tex
zeekay f4ee7a0525 Publish under the org, not a person
Bylines, paper authorship, correspondence addresses and the founder blurb under
each post named an individual. They name the organisation that published the
work instead: the brand on posts and pages, the research byline on papers, and
research@ in place of a personal address. Both are what these repositories
already used elsewhere — nothing new was coined.

Co-authors are untouched. Where a paper named someone else alongside, they stay
named; only the one byline changed. Bibliography entries, running heads,
PDF metadata and affiliations move with it, so a citation still resolves to
whoever the cited paper names.

Sample and fixture data uses the placeholder name these tests already use
elsewhere, so no assertion changed meaning.
2026-09-01 08:58:10 -07:00

90 lines
2.8 KiB
TeX

\documentclass[11pt,a4paper]{article}
\usepackage{../shared/luxcover}
\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
\usepackage{amsmath,amssymb,amsfonts,amsthm}
\usepackage{graphicx}
\usepackage{hyperref}
\usepackage{booktabs}
\usepackage{listings}
\input{../shared/lstlang}
\usepackage{xcolor}
\usepackage{enumitem}
\usepackage{float}
\newtheorem{theorem}{Theorem}
\newtheorem{lemma}[theorem]{Lemma}
\newtheorem{definition}{Definition}
\newtheorem{remark}{Remark}
\lstdefinelanguage{Tamarin}{
morekeywords={theory,begin,end,rule,lemma,builtins,functions,equations,
restriction,axiom,In,Out,Fr,K,All,Ex,not,let,in,if,then,else,
diffie_hellman,symmetric_encryption,asymmetric_encryption,hashing,
signing,multiset},
morecomment=[l]{//},
morecomment=[s]{/*}{*/},
morestring=[b]",
sensitive=true,
}
\lstset{
basicstyle=\small\ttfamily,
keywordstyle=\color{blue}\bfseries,
commentstyle=\color{gray},
stringstyle=\color{red},
breaklines=true,
frame=single,
numbers=left,
numberstyle=\tiny\color{gray}
}
\hypersetup{
colorlinks=true,
linkcolor=blue,
citecolor=blue,
urlcolor=blue
}
\title{Security Protocol Verification with Tamarin Prover}
\author{
Lux Research \\
Lux Industries, Inc.\thanks{Corresponding author: [email protected]}\\
\texttt{[email protected]}
}
\date{2025}
\begin{document}
\luxcoverpage
\begin{abstract}
Tamarin Prover is a tool for the symbolic analysis of security protocols. It can prove
that a protocol satisfies security properties (authentication, secrecy, forward secrecy)
for \emph{all} possible adversary strategies, not just those a tester thought to try.
This paper teaches Tamarin from first principles: the Dolev-Yao adversary model,
multiset rewriting rules, lemma specification, and proof strategies. We then present
Tamarin models of two Lux Network protocols: the MPC bridge signing protocol (FROST-BLS
threshold signatures over a network adversary) and the hybrid post-quantum TLS handshake
(combining ML-KEM with X25519 for quantum resistance). For each, we verify authentication,
secrecy, and agreement properties, and we show how Tamarin's attack finding mode uncovered
a reflection attack in an early version of the MPC protocol. The reader will learn to
model protocols, specify security properties, run Tamarin, and interpret its output.
\end{abstract}
\tableofcontents
\newpage
%% ============================================================
\input{sections/01-what-is-protocol-verification}
\input{sections/02-tamarin-fundamentals}
\input{sections/03-modeling-the-mpc-bridge-protocol}
\input{sections/04-modeling-the-hybrid-pq-handshake}
\input{sections/05-running-tamarin}
\input{sections/06-common-pitfalls}
\input{sections/07-tamarin-vs-proverif}
\input{sections/99-conclusion}
\end{document}