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24 lines
1.4 KiB
TeX
24 lines
1.4 KiB
TeX
\section{Conclusion}
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Protocol bugs are the hardest bugs to find and the most expensive to exploit. Tamarin
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Prover provides machine-checked guarantees that a protocol is secure against all
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adversary strategies in the Dolev-Yao model. For Lux Network, Tamarin verification of
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the FROST-BLS bridge protocol found a reflection attack that would have caused bridge
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liveness failures, and verified that the hybrid PQ handshake provides forward secrecy
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even against quantum-capable adversaries.
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The investment is modest: each protocol model took 2--3 days to write and seconds to
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verify. The return is certainty that the protocol logic is correct, independent of the
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implementation.
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\begin{thebibliography}{99}
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\bibitem{tamarin} Meier, S. et al. ``The TAMARIN Prover for the Symbolic Analysis of Security Protocols.'' CAV, 2013.
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\bibitem{dolev1983} Dolev, D. and Yao, A. ``On the Security of Public Key Protocols.'' IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 1983.
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\bibitem{frost} Komlo, C. and Goldberg, I. ``FROST: Flexible Round-Optimized Schnorr Threshold Signatures.'' SAC, 2020.
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\bibitem{mlkem} NIST. ``Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard (ML-KEM).'' FIPS 203, 2024.
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\bibitem{proverif} Blanchet, B. ``An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on Prolog Rules.'' CSFW, 2001.
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\bibitem{hybrid} Stebila, D. et al. ``Hybrid Key Exchange in TLS 1.3.'' IETF Draft, 2024.
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\end{thebibliography}
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