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zeekay fc9b2e03e1 papers: fix LaTeX/ref/typo errors from swarm review (42 papers)
Auto-fixes from the paper accuracy swarm: unambiguous build-breakers, broken
\ref/\cite/\input targets, and prose typos. Substantive accuracy findings
(dates, contradictory numbers, LP numbering) reported separately for review.
2026-06-27 02:02:47 +00:00

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\section{Background}
\subsection{Post-Quantum Cryptography}
NIST standardized three post-quantum algorithms in 2022 \cite{nist2022}:
\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{llll}
\toprule
\textbf{Algorithm} & \textbf{Type} & \textbf{Sig Size} & \textbf{Security} \\
\midrule
ML-DSA (FIPS 204, formerly CRYSTALS-Dilithium) & Lattice & 3,293 bytes & NIST Level 3 \\
SLH-DSA (FIPS 205, formerly SPHINCS+) & Hash-based & 17,088 bytes & NIST Level 3 \\
FALCON & Lattice & 1,280 bytes & NIST Level 5 \\
\bottomrule
\end{tabular}
\caption{NIST post-quantum signature schemes}
\end{table}
\textbf{Lux choice}: ML-DSA for balance of size and performance, SLH-DSA for stateless long-term security.
\subsection{Lattice-Based Cryptography}
ML-DSA security relies on \textbf{Module Learning With Errors (MLWE)}:
\begin{equation}
\mathbf{b} = \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e} \pmod{q}
\end{equation}
where:
\begin{itemize}
\item $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{k \times \ell}$ is public matrix
\item $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^\ell$ is secret key
\item $\mathbf{e}$ is small error vector
\item $\mathbf{b}$ is public key
\end{itemize}
\textbf{Hardness}: No known quantum algorithm solves MLWE faster than classical lattice reduction ($2^{128}$ security).
\subsection{Lux Multi-Consensus}
Lux employs a family of consensus protocols:
\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{Wave}: Linear chain, single-slot finality
\item \textbf{Lux DAG}: DAG-based, parallel execution
\item \textbf{Quasar}: Optimistic consensus with fraud proofs
\end{itemize}
\textbf{Key property}: Metastability-based consensus (unlike Nakamoto or BFT).