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Bylines, paper authorship, correspondence addresses and the founder blurb under each post named an individual. They name the organisation that published the work instead: the brand on posts and pages, the research byline on papers, and research@ in place of a personal address. Both are what these repositories already used elsewhere — nothing new was coined. Co-authors are untouched. Where a paper named someone else alongside, they stay named; only the one byline changed. Bibliography entries, running heads, PDF metadata and affiliations move with it, so a citation still resolves to whoever the cited paper names. Sample and fixture data uses the placeholder name these tests already use elsewhere, so no assertion changed meaning.
77 lines
2.8 KiB
TeX
77 lines
2.8 KiB
TeX
\documentclass[11pt,a4paper]{article}
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\usepackage{../shared/luxcover}
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\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
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\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
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\usepackage{amsmath,amssymb,amsfonts,amsthm}
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\usepackage{graphicx}
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\usepackage{hyperref}
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\usepackage{algorithm}
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\usepackage{algpseudocode}
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\usepackage{xcolor}
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\usepackage{booktabs}
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\usepackage{enumitem}
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\usepackage{tikz}
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\usepackage{tabularx}
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\hypersetup{colorlinks=true,linkcolor=black,citecolor=blue,urlcolor=blue}
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\newtheorem{theorem}{Theorem}[section]
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\newtheorem{lemma}[theorem]{Lemma}
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\newtheorem{corollary}[theorem]{Corollary}
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\newtheorem{proposition}[theorem]{Proposition}
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\newtheorem{definition}{Definition}[section]
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\newtheorem{remark}{Remark}[section]
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\title{\textbf{Quantum Threat Model\\for Blockchain Infrastructure}}
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\author{
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Lux Research \\
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\textit{Lux Industries, Inc.}\\
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\texttt{[email protected]}
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}
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\date{Original: 2023\quad|\quad Revised: February 2026}
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\begin{document}
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\luxcoverpage
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\begin{abstract}
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We present a systematic threat model for quantum computing attacks against blockchain
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infrastructure. Unlike prior analyses that focus narrowly on signature forgery, we
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enumerate the full attack surface: mempool public key exposure, validator signature
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forgery, retroactive chain compromise via historical transaction replay, bridge key
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extraction, and oracle manipulation through forged attestations. We provide timeline
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estimates for cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs) based on published
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hardware roadmaps from IBM, Google, and PsiQuantum, concluding that a
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$30$--$50\%$ probability of CRQC existence by 2035 (exceeding $50\%$ before 2040)
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mandates immediate defensive action.
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We perform an economic analysis showing that the cost of hybrid post-quantum deployment
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(approximately 15\% throughput overhead and 1.2\,KB additional signature data per epoch)
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is negligible compared to the expected loss from a successful quantum attack on a major
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blockchain (total value at risk exceeding \$500\,billion across all chains). The
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rational strategy is immediate hybrid deployment, not wait-and-see. We conclude with
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concrete recommendations for blockchain protocol designers.
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\textbf{Keywords}: quantum computing, blockchain security, Shor's algorithm,
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Grover's algorithm, post-quantum migration, threat model
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\end{abstract}
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\tableofcontents
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\newpage
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%% ========================================================================
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%% 1. INTRODUCTION
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%% ========================================================================
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\input{sections/01-introduction}
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\input{sections/02-shor-s-algorithm-impact-on-blockchain-pr}
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\input{sections/03-grover-s-algorithm-hash-function-impact}
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\input{sections/04-blockchain-specific-attack-vectors}
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\input{sections/05-timeline-estimates-for-cryptographically}
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\input{sections/06-economic-analysis}
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\input{sections/07-recommendations}
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\input{sections/99-conclusion}
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\end{document}
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