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94 lines
3.8 KiB
TeX
94 lines
3.8 KiB
TeX
\section{Benchmark 5: Post-Quantum Readiness}
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\label{sec:pq}
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We evaluate the computational overhead of replacing classical signatures (Ed25519, BLS)
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with ML-DSA (FIPS~204~\cite{fips204}), the NIST-standardized post-quantum digital
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signature scheme.
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\subsection{Signature Primitive Benchmarks}
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All measurements on a single AMD EPYC 9454 core, median of 100{,}000 iterations:
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\begin{table}[h]
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\centering
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\small
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\begin{tabular}{@{}lrrrr@{}}
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\toprule
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\textbf{Scheme} & \textbf{Sign ($\mu$s)} & \textbf{Verify ($\mu$s)} & \textbf{Pub Key (B)} & \textbf{Sig (B)} \\
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\midrule
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Ed25519 & 25.2 & 34.4 & 32 & 64 \\
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BLS12-381 & 310.0 & 840.0 & 48 & 96 \\
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BLS12-381 (agg.) & 310.0 & 1.8$^*$ & 48 & 96 \\
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ML-DSA-44 & 69.2 & 30.3 & 1{,}312 & 2{,}420 \\
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ML-DSA-65 & 112.0 & 47.9 & 1{,}952 & 3{,}309 \\
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Pulsar (share) & 48.0 & 7.0 & 1{,}024 & 1{,}024 \\
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\bottomrule
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\end{tabular}
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\caption{Cryptographic primitive performance. $^*$BLS aggregate verification amortizes
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to $\sim$1.8\,$\mu$s per signer when verifying a single aggregate signature over $n$
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public keys.}
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\label{tab:crypto}
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\end{table}
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\textbf{Key finding}: ML-DSA-65 verification (47.9\,$\mu$s) is faster than Ed25519
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verification (34.4\,$\mu$s) by only 39\% overhead, and faster than individual BLS
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verification (840\,$\mu$s) by 17.5$\times$. The post-quantum verification tax is
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minimal. The cost is in signature and key sizes, not computation.
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\subsection{Bandwidth Overhead}
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\begin{table}[h]
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\centering
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\begin{tabular}{@{}lrr@{}}
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\toprule
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\textbf{Certificate Type} & \textbf{Size @ $n=21$} & \textbf{Size @ $n=100$} \\
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\midrule
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BLS aggregate only & 144\,B & 144\,B \\
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Ed25519 multi-sig & 1{,}344\,B & 6{,}400\,B \\
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ML-DSA-65 multi-sig & 69{,}489\,B & 330{,}900\,B \\
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Pulsar threshold & 1{,}024\,B & 1{,}024\,B \\
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\textbf{Quasar dual-cert} & \textbf{1{,}168\,B} & \textbf{1{,}168\,B} \\
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\bottomrule
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\end{tabular}
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\caption{Certificate size comparison. Quasar's dual-certificate is constant-size
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because both BLS aggregation and Pulsar threshold combination produce fixed-size
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outputs regardless of signer count.}
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\label{tab:cert-size}
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\end{table}
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Quasar's dual-certificate (1{,}168\,B) is 282$\times$ smaller than a naive ML-DSA-65
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multi-signature at $n=100$. This is the key engineering advantage of threshold
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cryptography over multi-signature schemes for post-quantum consensus.
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\subsection{Upgrade Path Analysis}
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\begin{table}[h]
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\centering
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\small
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\begin{tabular}{@{}llll@{}}
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\toprule
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\textbf{Protocol} & \textbf{Current Sigs} & \textbf{PQ Upgrade Path} & \textbf{Difficulty} \\
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\midrule
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\textbf{Quasar} & BLS + Pulsar & Already PQ-secure & N/A (done) \\
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Tendermint & Ed25519 & Replace with ML-DSA-65 & Hard fork \\
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HotStuff & Ed25519 & Replace with ML-DSA-65 & Hard fork \\
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Narwhal+Tusk & Ed25519 & Replace with ML-DSA-65 & Hard fork \\
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Casper FFG & BLS12-381 & No production PQ BLS scheme & Research \\
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Tower BFT & Ed25519 & Replace with ML-DSA-65 & Hard fork \\
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Snow & Ed25519/BLS & Replace with ML-DSA-65 & Hard fork \\
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\bottomrule
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\end{tabular}
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\caption{Post-quantum upgrade readiness. Quasar is the only production protocol with
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post-quantum finality today.}
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\label{tab:pq-readiness}
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\end{table}
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Ethereum faces the hardest upgrade path: Casper FFG relies on BLS12-381 signature
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aggregation, and no post-quantum BLS equivalent exists. A PQ Ethereum would require
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fundamental redesign of the finality gadget---an open research problem as of
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2025~\cite{ethereum-pq}.
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%% ============================================================================
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