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Scrub residual Ring-LWE mislabels of the Corona/Pulsar threshold
signature family per canonical decision-b (source: ringtail/sign/config.go
M=8,N=7, q=0x1000000004A01).
- Corona = Module-LWE (Ringtail-derived parameter set, A in R_q^{8x7}),
not Ring-LWE / not "Module-LWE at rank 1".
- Pulsar = Module-LWE (ML-DSA-65, FIPS-204 byte-equal).
- Corona+Pulsar differ by parameter regime/codebase, NOT hardness family:
intra-lattice parameter/implementation diversity, NOT family-disjoint.
- True family-disjoint defense = Magnetar (hash, SLH-DSA) / HQC (codes).
Reframed the false Corona(R-LWE)-vs-Pulsar(M-LWE) family-independence
across lp-219/lp-220/lp-222/lp-223 (P3Q kinds), lux-quasar-composition
(profile hardness table + composition corollary/proof), lux-magnetar-pq,
and the superseded triple-proof/quasar drafts (anonymous lattice
threshold lane = Corona). Legitimate FHE/TFHE Ring-LWE, NTT citations,
and neutral "rank-1" lattice facts left intact. PDFs rebuilt.
165 lines
7.5 KiB
TeX
165 lines
7.5 KiB
TeX
\section{Conclusion}
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\label{sec:conclusion}
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\subsection{What QuasarCert is}
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QuasarCert is the wire-format finality certificate for the Lux
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Network's PQ consensus suite. It composes up to five independent
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cryptographic legs --- a BLS12-381 aggregate, a Pulsar threshold
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ML-DSA-65 signature, an optional Corona threshold M-LWE signature,
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an optional Magnetar threshold SLH-DSA signature, and a Z-Chain
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Groth16 rollup of per-validator ML-DSA-65 identity signatures ---
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under a strict conjunctive verifier. Three cert profiles
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(\texttt{Pulsar}, \texttt{Aurora}, \texttt{Polaris}) select which
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legs are populated, with profile-specific hardness diversification:
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\begin{itemize}[leftmargin=2em,nosep]
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\item \texttt{Pulsar} (PQ floor, $\sim 3.5$ KB): co-CDH $\wedge$
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M-LWE $\wedge$ KEA. Forging the cert under quantum attack
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requires breaking Pulsar.
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\item \texttt{Aurora} (intra-lattice, $\sim 37$ KB): adds a second
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Module-LWE leg (Corona) at a distinct parameter set and
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codebase. Forging requires breaking both legs --- parameter
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and implementation diversity within M-LWE, not a second
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hardness family.
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\item \texttt{Polaris} (cross-family, $\sim 53$ KB): adds SHA-3
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one-wayness. Forging requires breaking lattice and hash
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assumptions both.
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\end{itemize}
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\subsection{What QuasarCert delivers}
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\paragraph{Hardness diversification, not redundancy.} Each populated
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leg invokes an independent hardness assumption; the conjunctive
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soundness theorem (Theorem~\ref{thm:composition}) bounds forgery
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by the minimum advantage over legs. A cryptanalytic break against
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one family does not transfer to the others (Corollaries
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\ref{cor:diversification}, \ref{cor:polaris}).
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\paragraph{Wire-format stability.} The QuasarCert byte layout is
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specified at \texttt{luxfi/quasar/SPEC.md} and is byte-compatible
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with the Go canonical at \texttt{luxfi/consensus/protocol/quasar/types.go}.
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Cross-chain finality propagation uses the same byte string
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regardless of consensus mode (linear-chain or DAG); cross-chain
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Warp messaging carries QuasarCerts as the universal finality
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envelope.
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\paragraph{Composable primitives.} Each primitive lives in its own
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repository with its own audit, version pin, and submission
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trajectory. The umbrella does not re-implement primitives; the
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primitives do not depend on the umbrella. The only shared contract
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is the wire format. This is the only sustainable PQ-stack
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architecture for the migration era: primitives must be swappable
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without rebuilding the engine.
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\paragraph{Per-chain profile selection.} A single Lux chain is
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configured with one profile via the \texttt{FinalitySchemeID}
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field on its consensus config. Different chains may run different
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profiles; cross-chain interoperability is via the universal
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QuasarCert envelope. Profile rotation is a coordinated
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multi-window event documented in the deployment runbooks.
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\subsection{Tier status by primitive}
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\begin{itemize}[leftmargin=2em,nosep]
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\item Pulsar: \textbf{Tier A} (cut-ready for NIST MPTC v0.1
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submission on $2026$-$11$-$16$). Cryptographer sign-off
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APPROVED WITH GATES \cite{pulsar}.
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\item Corona: \textbf{Tier A documentation shape complete}.
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Four open gates to full Tier A
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(EC / Lean$\leftrightarrow$EC / dudect / external audit).
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\item Magnetar: \textbf{Tier B} (v0.1 reveal-and-aggregate impl
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landed). Tier A roadmap targets 2027 Q3.
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\item BLS / Z-Chain Groth16: production-deployed; existing
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literature audit.
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\end{itemize}
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The Pulsar profile is the current production deployment on Lux
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primary network's Q-Chain. The Aurora profile is operationally
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ready and gated on Corona Tier A. The Polaris profile is
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operationally ready and gated on Magnetar Tier A.
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\subsection{Path to Polaris}
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The path from current production (\texttt{Pulsar} profile) to
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maximum-assurance deployment (\texttt{Polaris} profile) is:
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\begin{enumerate}[leftmargin=2em,nosep]
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\item \textbf{Corona Tier A closure}. Land EC theory shells, the
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Lean$\leftrightarrow$EC bridge, dudect $10^9$ samples, and
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external audit. Target: 2027 Q1.
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\item \textbf{Aurora profile activation}. Coordinated multi-window
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rotation from Pulsar to Aurora on a target chain (initial
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candidate: Z-Chain itself, which has the highest assurance
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requirements).
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\item \textbf{Magnetar Tier A closure}. Land the full Tier A
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artifact bundle for Magnetar; complete the Tier B$\rightarrow$Tier A
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gap analysis in \texttt{luxfi/magnetar/BLOCKERS.md}.
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Target: 2027 Q3.
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\item \textbf{Polaris profile activation}. Coordinated rotation
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from Aurora to Polaris on the target chain.
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\end{enumerate}
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At each step, the cert wire format is stable; only the populated-leg
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set changes. This is what the umbrella spec was designed to make
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possible.
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\subsection{Open questions}
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\paragraph{Hash agility.} The QuasarCert binds all legs to
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round-digest $\mu$, which is currently SHA3-256. A hash break
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would require migrating $\mu$ to a different hash function. The
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umbrella spec does not currently specify a hash-agility upgrade
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path; this is a candidate for a future LP.
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\paragraph{Cert size at large $n$.} The Pulsar and Corona threshold
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signatures are $O(1)$ in $n$ (the validator count) after DKG, but
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the Z-Chain Groth16 prover time scales linearly in $n$
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($\sim 2^{20}$ constraints per validator). At $n \geq 1000$, the
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Z-Chain leg's prover cost becomes the bottleneck. The
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\texttt{pq-finality-no-bls.tex} analysis~\cite{pqfinalitynobls}
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proposes fixed-committee signing ($k = 128$) as a scale-invariant
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alternative; this is a candidate for the next iteration of the
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Z-Chain leg.
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\paragraph{PQ VRF for committee sampling.} The current Photon
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committee selection uses a VRF based on classical primitives. A
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fully PQ-safe committee sampler would require a lattice-based VRF
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(see Boneh-Dai 2024 \cite{bonehdai2024}); this is an open research
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area.
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\paragraph{Strict-PQ profile.} A profile that omits the BLS leg
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entirely is implemented as \texttt{pq-finality-no-bls}
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\cite{pqfinalitynobls} and is available behind a chain-config
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flag. The wire format supports an empty $\sigma^{\mathrm{BLS}}$
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slot, so the strict-PQ profile is a valid QuasarCert variant. The
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profile-match clause would need to allow this variant; this is a
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candidate for a fourth registered profile (working name: ``Quanta'').
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\subsection{Closing}
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QuasarCert is the cryptographic conscience of Lux consensus. Each
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primitive does one thing, in one place; each profile composes them
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under one verifier; each cert carries one byte string; each chain
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selects one profile. The composition is conjunctive --- one leg
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breaks, the cert still stands --- and the assumptions are
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diversified across discrete-log, two lattice families, and
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hash-based primitives. The wire format is stable; the primitives
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are swappable; the profiles are independently selectable.
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This is what hardness diversification looks like when it is
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designed orthogonally from day one. No redundant computation, no
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braided concerns, no implicit cross-leg dependencies. Each
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primitive is independently complete; the umbrella composes them
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without owning them. As Hickey would put it: simple, not easy.
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The PQ migration is not a single event; it is a multi-year
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trajectory across multiple primitives, audits, standards, and
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deployments. QuasarCert is the wire-format contract that makes the
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trajectory coherent: a Pulsar-profile cert today, an Aurora-profile
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cert tomorrow, a Polaris-profile cert when Magnetar matures, all
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carrying the same Go struct, the same verifier, the same Warp
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envelope, the same Z-Chain proof structure.
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The primitives change; the contract is forever.
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