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71 lines
4.2 KiB
TeX
71 lines
4.2 KiB
TeX
\section{Introduction}
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%%==========================================================================
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Proof-of-stake networks achieve Byzantine fault tolerance by requiring validators to post
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economic collateral that may be confiscated---\emph{slashed}---if they behave dishonestly.
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This arrangement transforms cryptographic security into economic security: the cost of an
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attack is bounded below by the value of stake at risk. However, as the number of services
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requiring such security grows, naive staking architectures suffer from a fundamental tension.
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On one side, validators face a \emph{capital allocation problem}: each new service they wish
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to secure demands a fresh deposit, fragmenting their capital and reducing the yield they
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earn on any given unit. On the other side, new services face a \emph{bootstrapping problem}:
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accumulating enough staked capital to credibly threaten slashers requires either recruiting
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an entirely new validator set or offering yields so high they are economically unsustainable.
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\textbf{Restaking} resolves this tension by permitting a single deposit to simultaneously
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collateralize multiple services. The key insight is that staked tokens can serve as economic
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security \emph{jointly} across services so long as the aggregate slashing exposure is bounded
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and the rules governing each service are transparent and enforceable on-chain.
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This paper describes the design, analysis, and early implementation of the Lux Restaking
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Protocol. Our contributions are:
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\begin{enumerate}[leftmargin=1.5em]
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\item A formal model of restaking as a hypergraph over staking commitments, with rigorous
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definitions of operator exposure, aggregate economic security, and systemic risk
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(Section~\ref{sec:model}).
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\item A slashing architecture that coordinates across independent AVS slashers while
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preventing double-slash attacks and ensuring stake coverage invariants
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(Section~\ref{sec:slashing}).
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\item An operator registration protocol with cryptographic attestation, on-chain delegation,
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and progressive opt-in/opt-out semantics (Section~\ref{sec:operators}).
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\item A marketplace design for AVS discovery and negotiation, including reputation scoring
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and minimum-security thresholds (Section~\ref{sec:marketplace}).
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\item Formal capital efficiency and systemic risk analyses, with comparison to EigenLayer
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(Sections~\ref{sec:efficiency}--\ref{sec:comparison}).
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\item Prototype implementation benchmarks on Lux Fuji testnet
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(Section~\ref{sec:implementation}).
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\end{enumerate}
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\subsection{Motivation}
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The Lux Network operates a Primary Network of validators who secure the Exchange Chain (X),
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Platform Chain (P), and Contract Chain (C). Appchains---application-specific blockchains---may
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elect their own validator sets from any subset of Primary Network validators. This architecture
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creates a natural restaking substrate: Primary Network validators already post their LUX stake
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once; extending that commitment to additional appchains and services is an incremental rather
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than additive cost.
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As of 2025, Lux hosts 47 production appchains with a combined transaction throughput
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exceeding 450,000 TPS. Many emerging appchains, particularly those launched by DeFi protocols,
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gaming studios, and institutional asset managers, require economic security guarantees before
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they can attract liquidity and users. LRP directly addresses this bootstrapping bottleneck.
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\subsection{Paper Organization}
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Section~\ref{sec:background} reviews related work and the Lux Network architecture.
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Section~\ref{sec:model} develops the formal staking hypergraph model.
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Section~\ref{sec:slashing} describes slashing conditions and the veto committee.
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Section~\ref{sec:operators} details operator registration and delegation.
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Section~\ref{sec:marketplace} presents the AVS marketplace design.
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Section~\ref{sec:efficiency} analyzes capital efficiency.
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Section~\ref{sec:risk} analyzes systemic risk.
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Section~\ref{sec:comparison} compares LRP with EigenLayer, Babylon, and Symbiotic.
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Section~\ref{sec:implementation} describes the prototype implementation.
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Section~\ref{sec:security} provides the formal security analysis.
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Section~\ref{sec:conclusion} concludes.
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%%==========================================================================
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