mirror of
https://github.com/lux-apps/papers.git
synced 2026-10-30 18:15:21 +00:00
zeekay
abf99d05fc
Restructured from flat .tex/.pdf files into per-paper subdirectories. Added Antje Worring as co-author on all papers. Synced PDFs to pdfs/ for download site.
100 lines
4.0 KiB
TeX
100 lines
4.0 KiB
TeX
\section{Slashing Architecture}
|
|
|
|
\label{sec:slashing}
|
|
%%==========================================================================
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Slashing Conditions}
|
|
|
|
Each AVS $s$ registers a \emph{slashing module} $\Phi_s$, a smart contract on the C-Chain
|
|
exposing the interface:
|
|
|
|
\begin{algorithmic}
|
|
\Function{SubmitSlashProof}{operator $v$, evidence $\pi$}
|
|
\State Verify $\pi$ proves $v$ violated $\Sigma_s$
|
|
\State Emit \texttt{SlashRequest}$(v, s, \text{fraction})$
|
|
\EndFunction
|
|
\end{algorithmic}
|
|
|
|
The LRP coordinator contract on the P-Chain monitors all registered slashing modules.
|
|
Upon receiving a valid \texttt{SlashRequest}, it initiates the following multi-step process.
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Slashing Execution Flow}
|
|
|
|
\begin{algorithm}[H]
|
|
\caption{LRP Slashing Protocol}
|
|
\label{alg:slash}
|
|
\begin{algorithmic}[1]
|
|
\Require Operator $v$, Service $s$, Slash fraction $\delta$, Evidence $\pi$
|
|
\Ensure Operator's allocated stake reduced; slashed amount distributed
|
|
\State \textbf{Freeze} operator $v$'s stake for all services (prevent withdrawal)
|
|
\State \textbf{Verify} $\Phi_s.\texttt{SubmitSlashProof}(v, \pi)$ returns \texttt{true}
|
|
\State Compute slash amount: $\Delta = \delta \cdot \alpha_{v,s} \cdot w(v)$
|
|
\State Initiate \textbf{veto window} of duration $T_{\text{veto}} = 24\,\text{hours}$
|
|
\If{Veto Committee approves slash within $T_{\text{veto}}$}
|
|
\State Transfer $\Delta$ from $v$'s staking contract to slash distributor
|
|
\State Update $w(v) \leftarrow w(v) - \Delta$
|
|
\State Redistribute $\Delta$: 50\% burn, 30\% AVS insurance fund, 20\% reporter reward
|
|
\Else
|
|
\State \textbf{Unfreeze} $v$'s stake; no slash executed
|
|
\EndIf
|
|
\State Update $v$'s reputation score $\rho_v \leftarrow \rho_v - \text{SlashPenalty}$
|
|
\end{algorithmic}
|
|
\end{algorithm}
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Veto Committee}
|
|
|
|
The veto committee prevents spurious or malicious slashing. It consists of:
|
|
|
|
\begin{itemize}[leftmargin=1.5em]
|
|
\item 9 members elected by LUX governance with 6-month terms;
|
|
\item Quorum requirement: 5-of-9 must approve a slash within the veto window;
|
|
\item Committee members have no financial stake in the slashed operator or AVS;
|
|
\item Decisions are final and not subject to further governance challenge.
|
|
\end{itemize}
|
|
|
|
\begin{remark}[Decentralization Trajectory]
|
|
The veto committee is a pragmatic interim mechanism. Our roadmap targets replacing it with
|
|
an on-chain ZK proof of valid slashing conditions by Q4 2025, eliminating the trusted
|
|
committee entirely.
|
|
\end{remark}
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Double-Slash Prevention}
|
|
|
|
A critical invariant is that the total slashed amount never exceeds $w(v)$, even when
|
|
multiple services slash the same operator simultaneously. The LRP coordinator enforces:
|
|
|
|
\[
|
|
\sum_{s: \text{active slash}(v,s)} \delta_{v,s} \cdot \alpha_{v,s} \leq 1.
|
|
\]
|
|
|
|
This is implemented through a \emph{slash queue}: incoming slash requests for operator $v$
|
|
are serialized and executed in order, with each subsequent slash computed on the
|
|
\emph{post-slash} stake. If the remaining stake falls below the minimum required for any
|
|
service, the operator is automatically ejected from that service.
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Slashing Conditions Taxonomy}
|
|
|
|
Table~\ref{tab:slash_conditions} summarizes the standard slashing conditions defined by
|
|
the LRP specification. Individual AVSs may define additional conditions.
|
|
|
|
\begin{table}[H]
|
|
\centering
|
|
\caption{Standard Slashing Conditions in LRP}
|
|
\label{tab:slash_conditions}
|
|
\begin{tabular}{lll}
|
|
\toprule
|
|
\textbf{Condition} & \textbf{Evidence Type} & \textbf{Slash Rate} \\
|
|
\midrule
|
|
Double signing (Beacon) & Two conflicting block headers & 100\% \\
|
|
Equivocation (X-Chain UTXO) & Two conflicting UTXO spends & 100\% \\
|
|
Liveness fault (extended) & $> 1\%$ downtime in epoch & 0.5\% per epoch \\
|
|
Invalid state transition & ZK proof of invalid transition & 10--100\% \\
|
|
Oracle manipulation & Statistical divergence proof & 5--50\% \\
|
|
Data withholding (DA service) & Coding proof of unavailability & 10\% \\
|
|
Censorship (MEV service) & Transaction inclusion proof & 2\% \\
|
|
\bottomrule
|
|
\end{tabular}
|
|
\end{table}
|
|
|
|
%%==========================================================================
|