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papers/lux-restaking/sections/05-operator-registration-protocol.tex
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\section{Operator Registration Protocol}
\label{sec:operators}
%%==========================================================================
\subsection{Registration Lifecycle}
Operator registration in LRP proceeds through four phases:
\paragraph{Phase 1: Identity Registration.}
The operator generates a BLS12-381 keypair $(sk_{\text{op}}, pk_{\text{op}})$ and registers
$pk_{\text{op}}$ on the P-Chain alongside their existing validator NodeID. This keypair is
used for LRP-specific signing (separate from the Beacon signing key to prevent cross-protocol
replay attacks).
\paragraph{Phase 2: Delegation Setup.}
The operator deploys an \texttt{OperatorVault} contract on the C-Chain. Restakers delegate
stake to this vault, which handles:
\begin{itemize}
\item LUX deposit and withdrawal with a configurable unbonding period
$T_{\text{unbond}} \in [7, 90]\,\text{days}$;
\item Allocation tracking per AVS ($\alpha_{v,s}$ values);
\item Reward distribution to delegators according to operator-specified commission.
\end{itemize}
\paragraph{Phase 3: AVS Opt-In.}
To opt into service $s$, the operator calls:
\begin{algorithmic}
\Function{OptIntoAVS}{$s$, $\alpha$}
\State Verify $\sum_{s'} \alpha_{v,s'} + \alpha \leq 1$
\State Verify $w(v) \cdot \alpha \geq \text{MinSecurityDeposit}(s)$
\State Sign commitment $\sigma = \text{BLS.Sign}(sk_{\text{op}}, (v, s, \alpha, \text{epoch}))$
\State Submit $(v, s, \alpha, \sigma)$ to LRP coordinator
\State Update P-Chain state: $\mathcal{E} \leftarrow \mathcal{E} \cup \{e_{v,s}\}$
\EndFunction
\end{algorithmic}
\paragraph{Phase 4: Opt-Out / Deregistration.}
Opt-out from service $s$ requires:
\begin{enumerate}[leftmargin=1.5em]
\item Operator signals intent; withdrawal delay $T_s$ starts.
\item During $T_s$, slashing conditions remain active (prevents withdrawal before slash).
\item After $T_s$, allocation $\alpha_{v,s}$ is released.
\end{enumerate}
Withdrawal delays $T_s$ are set by each AVS and published at registration time. Typical
values range from 7 days (low-risk oracle services) to 90 days (high-security DeFi
clearing networks).
\subsection{Delegation and Re-delegation}
Token holders who do not wish to operate nodes can delegate their LUX to an
\texttt{OperatorVault}. Delegation is non-custodial: the operator never has direct
access to delegated tokens. Delegators share in slashing risk proportionally to their
deposit fraction and may re-delegate to a different operator after the unbonding period.
\begin{equation}
\text{DelegatorReward}(d, v, \text{epoch}) =
\frac{w_d}{\sum_{d'} w_{d'}} \cdot (1 - c_v) \cdot \text{OperatorReward}(v, \text{epoch}),
\end{equation}
where $w_d$ is delegator $d$'s deposit, $c_v \in [0, 0.3]$ is the operator's commission
rate, and $\text{OperatorReward}(v, \text{epoch})$ aggregates rewards from all opted-in AVSs.
%%==========================================================================